Pyongyang Goes Pop

Alex Hogan in the Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/series/pyongyang-goes-pop

29 March 2011: Despite there being no internet access in North Korea outside the offices of the few western companies (you can count them on one hand), Pyongyang’s embassy enclosure and a couple of very high-up officials, digital materials still have ways of spreading.

The state runs a nationwide intranet for the exchange of sanctioned material, while USB drives and CD-Rs are becoming more and more common among college and middle school students. It is through these means that the trade in illicit and anti-state media such as the sexy Wangjaesan girls in hot pants is exchanged and passed on, while the ever-growing traffic between North Korea and China has increased opportunities for the cross-border smuggling of pirated films and music from Hollywood and Seoul.

Although these outside cultural influences can be spotted in small doses here and there, North Koreans are understandably loth to admit it. The high-end Japanese-built tourist tour buses shuttling foreigners around Pyongyang are aeons more advanced than the rusting hulks North Korea has been using for average citizens since the 1970s. But ask most Koreans and you’ll find that they are not Japanese. Until they break down, that is, when they become “shitty imperial Japanese technology”.

Given this push/pull attitude to things from the outside, it’s perhaps no surprise that western pop songs penned in a more “communist” vein can ease the North Korean listener into a new state of openness and ease inter-cultural tension. By pop in a communist vein I do, of course mean, Jarvis Cocker.

North Koreans find Pulp’s Common People very, very funny. When one 24-year-old of wealthy descent living in Pyongyang heard the song, he creased up in hysterics as he tried to understand why rich people would pretend to be poor because they thought it was cool. He did concede, however, that he was happy such a song could be so popular, as it suggested people in the west could appreciate the revolutionary spirit of communism after all. You can kind of see what he was getting at.

On hearing about the Rage Against the Machine Christmas No 1 story, the same North Korean said he felt “proud and overjoyed that a socialist band could be the greatest force for good in the British nation,” despite him not quite grasping the concept of record sales or The X Factor or the fact the band is American. He didn’t particularly like Killing in the Name, either.

At times throughout my travels in North Korea, I’m sure I’ve been misunderstood by the locals. Likewise, I have no doubt misunderstood the motivations and explanations that locals brought to the table when I confronted them with pop as the world gives it to us. But the process itself of discussing pop has always eased the initial standoff that North Koreans are trained to have set as their autopilot, and reminded me of the humanity of the people held in the grip of the government’s ongoing tyranny. So, if you find yourself caught up in the regime any time soon, for your sake and theirs, find out what their verdict on the new Kanye record is, won’t you?

10 march 2011: All pop music in North Korea is sanctioned by the state, so if you don’t like songs about The Importance of Fertiliser or Uniting Happily Under the Powerful Juche Idea, then tough – go and listen to the frogs croaking down on the river bank instead. Of the bands permitted, two of North Korea’s most famous are the Pochonbo Electronic Ensemble and Wangjaesan Light Music Band, who have been churning out pro-socialist revolutionary singles for decades.

Wangjaesan were reportedly conceived by the ever-talented Kim Jong-il, who handpicked the group’s members. He’s not just a despotic dictator, you know – he has a reputation in his homeland as being quite the artisan. As well as his taste for fine light music, he’s also a cultured film producer, as this monster movie he made in the 80s tastefully proves.

Pochonbo, meanwhile, have kept themselves busy as Wangjaesan’s main contenders by clocking up 140 albums, some of them with specially created English-language cover art so they can be sold to tourists in the many gift shops Koreans insist on taking you to at every opportunity (only hard currency, Euros or fine imported cigars accepted).

There was mild controversy last year when a secret video featuring Wangjaesan’s female dance troupe entered the public domain. The video was being privately circulated among the elite, but reached the North Korean public before making it over the border to China – and therefore the world. Normally seen in traditional, body-cloaking hangbok dresses as they perform polite folk numbers, this little clip revealed unprecedented levels of sexiness in Pyongyang, as the girls popped up in sparkly hot pants and did the splits. Western displays of decadence like this are illegal but, given Kim Jong-il’s alleged love of pornography, perhaps he turned a blind eye to this one.

22 February 2011:

I’ve written before about Pyongyang’s only nightclub, the Taedong Diplo. Despite it only having one CD to its name, it’s still your best bet for catching Koreans co-mingling with Western music. Unfortunately, this Western music normally involves little more than playing the aforementioned CD (the incessant call of Trance Hits 1993 on loop) or someone sticking on the karaoke edition of the Titanic soundtrack, which North Korean students dig big-time thanks to its frequent showing in Pyongyang’s universities as an example of western culture (according to Korean ideology, industrial revolution: good. Leonardo DiCaprio drowning: better).

This grim legacy of disco downers was all to change, however, on the night DJ Ian Steadman turned up last year, coming fully prepared to man the mic long past the 10pm electricity curfew with a bag of indie hits.

Just prior to Ian’s debut on the decks, visitors to the club were treated to the airing of a new CD held in the North Korean pop vaults – Madonna’s Die Another Day from the soundtrack to the James Bond movie in which James Bond is, er, held captive in North Korea (it’s veiled threats like this that make doing things in the country so much fun).

After this, it was Steadman’s time to step up. What was quite probably North Korea’s first ever indie disco saw a handful of drunken local guides and a large group of foreign tourists dancing to a playlist that included Buraka Som Sistema, Hot Chip and Talking Heads. According to current trends, it seems indie couldn’t be hitting North Korea at a better time. The ever-reliable North Korean Economy Watch recently reported that skinny jeans are all the rage in Pyongyang these days. We’re not sure if this was entirely down to fashion reasons, though, and those holding their breath for a full-scale hipster revolution will have to wait a little longer for the fixie bikes and lens-free glasses to roll through. After all, the other top consumer products listed alongside trouserwear were reportedly pig-intestine rolls and, er, human manure.

According to Steadman, it was TV on The Radio’s Dancing Choose that elicited the biggest response, with one North Korean vigorously grabbing his arm and demanding to know where he could get a copy of this “very, very, very good band”.

If only all nights out in North Korea were so successful. My last visit to the same club culminated in an angered security guard unexpectedly pulling the plug on the music, grabbing the karaoke microphone and bellowing, “Look, you fucking drunk bastards! Get the fuck out of here! Get on the fucking bus! Go! Or I’ll take your fucking passports from you and you’ll stay in fucking North Korea forever. FUCK OFF!” – a more high-stakes ending than a punch-up and a battered sausage outside the Sheffield Leadmill on a Friday night, that’s for sure.

9 February 2011:

On my first trip to North Korea in 2009 I asked my state-sanctioned guide (and very likely government spy) what the most popular song on the North Korea airwaves was at that moment. Mr Lee – a lithe, boyish gentleman with a clean-split centre-parting – sighed and told me it was a heroic ballad about being a diligent farmer. In the North they can’t get enough radio – every kitchen is fitted with one that can’t be switched off. It’s a government order, so from morning to night citizens must enjoy revolutionary hits and paeans celebrating the multifarious talents of Kim Jong Il (lest anyone forget). So even though Mr Lee may have secretly be craving South Korea’s Girl’s Generation, he and millions of others are forced to stick with what their leader gives them: boring revolutionary anthems about being a good socialist. But as more outside materials sneak under the radar, the tension between Kim’s socialist utopia and the real world is increasing.

Earlier in the morning Mr Lee had been sitting on the tour bus ferrying us around Pyongyang, avidly reading a copy of the New Yorker that a tourist had given him the week before. The issue featured a story about an author’s drunken homosexual awakening that had taken place on board a night train. Mr Lee read it with much curiosity. Clearly he wanted to know more about the world than just diligent farmers.

Pop music in North Korea hasn’t always been this boring – during the economic glory days of the 1970s and 80s, when the socialist North were well ahead of their southern neighbours, Kim Il Sung loosened the rules on what kind of entertainment could fly with the people. That all changed after the song Whistle caused so much popular frenzy that the state reclassified it as dangerous material and repressed it, returning airplay rights exclusively to the diligent farmers and their ilk. All this despite the song in question being about as provocative to western minds as a kitten doing a cute sneeze.

To indulge Mr Lee’s urge for outside culture and indeed my own curiosity as to his response, I showed him how to use my iPod. He embraced the challenge with enthusiasm. His first choice was unexpected – UK thrash urchins Gallows. Yet my surprise probably did not outweigh his as he went through what was evidently his first guitar thrash experience. The pained look on his face belied his polite disapproval of the sounds in his ears and he moved on swiftly. After a few more minutes of wheel-click browsing, he told me quite assertively that “Lethal Bizzle would not suit the Korean people” as it “has no proper melody”. Yet he warmed right up to Coldplay and listened to one of their albums from start to finish, further widening the sample that proves Chris Martin’s gang produce music so damningly average and inoffensive it can even pacify citizens living under a fear-inducing totalitarian regime.

1 Feb 2011:

During North Korea’s “arduous march” of the 90s, brought about by the collapse of the USSR and a series of natural disasters, illegal markets of smuggled goods sprang up across the country. It marked the beginning of a slow influx of outside culture still enjoyed by North Koreans today.

Charles Jenkins, a Korean war veteran who was captured and detained for 40 years, has witnessed this cultural transition. As a propaganda tool he was kept close to the elite and – weirdly – forced to become a film star. He escaped in 2004 and now lives in Japan. When I met him in 2008, he told me the only non-Korean music he came across before the 90s would be nationalist tomes imported from Soviet Russia. As a result, it wasn’t until the mid-90s that he discovered who Michael Jackson was, when a smuggled Jacko cassette tape found its way into Jenkins’s hands.

Although most North Koreans are still oblivious to MJ today – leaving them ill-equipped to offer an opinion on the authenticity of his posthumous releases – those who are allowed to interact with foreigners consume pop music enthusiastically. These days most students on the foreign relations course at Pyongyang’s Kim Il-sung University will at some point encounter MJ, while the penetration of South Korean pop music (and TV dramas) in North Korean cities is widely reported, with both enjoying a wide following despite the act of consuming them being an imprisonable offence.

On a recent trip to Pyongyang, a guide by the name of Mr Oh took great relish in his regular party trick of “accidentally” confusing North Korean revolutionary songs for flashy South Korean pop. “Whoops! It’s North Korean after all … what a shame, I mean South Korean is much better, just don’t tell any one,” he would say. We later discovered he was not a tour guide at all, but a government spy keeping an eye on the “evil” Americans in our entourage. He’d done tae kwon do at the Mass Games and is pictured in the official Pyongyang guide book. The guy was an absolute gun. The North Korean Arnold Schwarzenegger. No wonder the government let him listen to South Korean pop and wear a Paul Smith shirt.

27 January 2011:

If someone had fulfilled Pyongyang’s request to pack Eric Clapton off to North Korea, perhaps all that bother on the divided peninsula would never have started. That is what the hermit government of the north reckons, at least, as one of the less pressing Wikileak cables recently revealed that Kim Jong-il’s second son, Kim Jong-chol, was “a great fan” of the rock legend and that a Clapton performance in the capital “could be an opportunity to build goodwill”.

Using pop to build bridges is perhaps naive, especially in the context of a potential nuclear face-off, but maybe we shouldn’t rule out the idea. If you ask a North Korean their true feelings about pretty much anything they’ll stick to whatever the party line tells them they should think (which is why so many tourists get frustrated after probing about General Kim’s next move). But ask the right questions and the facade that greets most outsiders will occasionally be broached with genuine warmth. During trips I’ve made in and around the hermit kingdom over the past year, I’ve used one uncontroversial topic of conversation to do just that. It seems talking about music is one way for North Koreans to relate their perspectives on the world without being politically controversial. Pop diplomacy will not solve territorial disputes or prevent governments going head-to-head, but it does offer another perspective on North Koreans.

Pop weaves its way into North Korea in unexpected ways. Last September, I was held under 24-hour house arrest in the outpost of Raijin after refusing to pay a bribe. The most perturbing part of the experience was not the fact there was no guarantee of release, but that the hotel foyer we were held in had the EastEnders theme tune playing on loop for the duration of the internment through a croaky speaker. Perhaps the aim was mental attrition; to irritate us into paying bribes by reminding us of the east London we’d left behind and may never see again. It didn’t work – I’m from Putney.

Eccentric glimpses of the world North Korea left behind are not so few and far between – in this series I’ll be revealing more from inside the secret state: the truth about Michael Jackson’s North Korean debut; introducing the best of North Korean pop and revealing the Communist cadre’s opinion of Jarvis Cocker. Come join me for the ride.

Protestants protest: South Korea’s church militant

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MC09Dg01.html

Long ago, maybe around 1994, I took a slow train from Pusan – or Busan, if you insist – to Seoul. (No KTX bullet train in those days; though that’s been having its problems lately.) It was October, and I spent much of the journey just watching the colors of autumn roll by.

My seat companion was colorful too. A student recently qualified in Oriental medicine, he was about to go to China, then newly opened to South Koreans. But his real aim, he confided with some excitement, was not strictly medicinal: “Chinese people, they don’t know Jesus!”

This was my first encounter with what is now a global phenomenon. Koreans are tireless rankers. The world’s seventh-largest exporter of goods is also its second-largest exporter of missionaries, after the United States. According to the Korea World Missions Association (KWMA), their number has nearly doubled in five years from 12,159 in 2004 to 22,130 in 2009.

Asia has mostly proved stony ground for Christianity, but Korea is a fascinating exception – for reasons that would make another article. South Korea’s 8.6 million Protestants and 5.1 million Catholics, taken together – not that they always get along – outnumber its 10 million Buddhists. Mind you, the 47% who profess no religion may include many passive Buddhists.

South Korea today is Asia’s most Protestant nation, and evangelical with it. Many want to preach the gospel, as is their right. I’m a firm believer in a free market for faiths; aren’t you?

Well, obviously not if you’re a murderous bigot in Pakistan, or other countries where Islam seems afraid of the competition. In 2004 Iraqi jihadi thugs seized and brutally beheaded a young Korean, Kim Sun-il. They claimed he had conducted “annoying religious activities” under cover of his work as a translator. A harrowing video of him pleading in vain for mercy sharpened the already fierce debate in Seoul about the wisdom of sending troops to Iraq.

As this tragic case shows, evangelists not only put their own lives on the line but can impact on affairs of state. In 2007, 23 Korean missionaries were stupid enough to go to Afghanistan, of all places, defying an official warning from Seoul not to. The Taliban kidnapped them and killed two; a large ransom was paid for the rest. Such behavior is just plain irresponsible.

Yet they’re still at it. In January staff at the South Korean Embassy in Sana’a had to rush out to stop Korean missionaries singing hymns on the street in the Yemeni capital – for the third time in a month. Christian proselytizing is banned in Yemen; you can be jailed – or worse. In 2009 a Yemeni suicide bomb killed four Korean tourists, and a young Korean woman, Eom Young-sun, was among nine foreign religious medical volunteers kidnapped and murdered.

Here I make a distinction. Ms Eom was doing a worthy job, and knew the risks. I respect and mourn her. Similarly, I applaud those brave souls, many Christian, who help North Koreans in China on their long and perilous journeys to Seoul and freedom. Several such have been jailed in China, then deported. They are the lucky ones. At least two South Korean pastors in northeast China have been abducted by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) agents: Ahn Seung-woon in 1995, and Kim Dong-shik in January 2000. The latter is thought to have died of hunger and torture in 2001.

In my book, Ahn and Kim are – or were, God rest their souls – heroes. Whereas those hymn-singers in Sana’a are idiots. Some, reportedly, were students on vacation getting a cheap thrill – while putting at risks the lives of Korean business people who live and work in Yemen.

Heroes, idiots – and holy fools. Remember Robert Park? The young Korean-American who on Christmas Day 2009 marched into North Korea and a whole lot of trouble, calling on Kim Jong-il to repent. He claims to have been sexually tortured there. In interviews he is clearly not well, and latest reports are that he’s checked back into hospital. May he find healing.

Then there was Park’s copycat, Aijalon Mahli Gomes, who pulled the same stunt a month later. This time it took former US president Jimmy Carter, no less, to fly to Pyongyang to get him out. Gomes appears less unhinged than Park, so he has less excuse. Faith and compassion are all very well, but judgment and prudence are Christian virtues too. (And don’t even start me on Laura Ling and Euna Lee, who as far as I know haven’t yet claimed divine guidance for the irresponsible antics which required Bill Clinton to come rescue them from Kim Jong-il.)

Meanwhile, back in Seoul, Protestants are – well, protesting. Unusually, the target of their wrath is one of their own: none other than President Lee Myung-bak, whose own intense Presbyterian allegiances were well described in these pages by Sunny Lee – no relation, I assume; just kidding, Sunny – even before he took office three years ago. Since then Lee – the president – has managed to offend Buddhists in every way possible, as well as Catholics whose bishops have condemned his flagship US$20 billion plan to “restore” four major rivers as a potential ecological disaster – much as he likes to tout his supposed green credentials.

Undaunted, on March 3 Lee infuriated the Buddhists yet again, and was widely criticized in the Seoul press for insensitivity, when he and his wife were photographed kneeling at an annual Protestant prayer breakfast. As the left-wing Hankyoreh wittily put it, this “marked the first time a sitting South Korean president sat on his knees in a public place”.

Why was he there? Some might say the president is on his knees politically too. His fellow Protestants had been Lee’s loyal supporters – until now. So what prompted an influential religious leader like David Yonggi Cho – founder-leader of Yoido Full Gospel Church, the world’s largest single congregation – to declare war on Lee and threaten to topple him? Dear reader, allow me to me keep you in suspense for a little while, and to take you back in time.

Yoido Full Gospel Church: That rang a bell. But David Cho? I thought he was Paul Cho. And so indeed he used to be. But in 1992. “God showed him that Paul Cho had to die and David Cho was to be resurrected in his place.” In the same year Cho was elected Chairman of the World Assemblies of God Fellowship: the first non-American to head the planet’s largest Pentecostalist denomination, with 50 million members in 60 countries.

So a big fish, if a contentious one. Cho’s view that material wealth shows God’s blessing is not to all tastes, mine included. I once started writing a song, which got no further than this:

I don’t recall seeing Jesus with the winners;
He hung out with publicans and sinners.

Others say Cho runs a cult, and that his theology is heretical. His business practices and reluctance to retire (he is 75) have their critics too. But he is a mighty power in the land.

He was big already back in 1989, when on my fourth visit I decided it was time to seek out some Korean experiences which had so far eluded me. I resolved to do two things: Go to Yoido Full Gospel Church (YFGC), and get tear-gassed. Not both at the same time, you understand.

(While speaking of “typical” Korea, a quick aside: In over 20 trips, I have never eaten dog. Never looked for it, never been offered it; it’s just never crossed my path. Surprise you?)

I duly fulfilled my resolution, but can’t say I’d care to repeat either experience. Each in its own way I found choking. (Admittedly my preferred form of worship is an hour of Quaker silence, so horses for courses.) YFGC is totally over the top. Not just an organ, but a full 50-piece orchestra. The church seats 12,000, and is full up for seven Sunday services – with a further 20,000 following on TV in overflow chapels, according to The Economist in 2007.

People may praise God as they please, of course. And YFGC clearly pleases a lot of people. But the politics stuck in my craw. In that second summer of South Korea’s new democracy, two radicals – Moon Kyu-hyun, a turbulent priest still going strong; and a student, “flower of unification” Im Su-kyong, who has since repented – had illicitly sneaked off to Pyongyang.

This was a big deal at the time, especially to Pastor Cho. You’d think the world had ended. I’ll never forget his astonishing invocation: “Lord, save this nation which is heading for communism!” And the faithful, in their thousands, responding with a heartfelt “Amen!”

So much for Paul aka David Yonggi Cho’s political nous. 22 years later, it’s got no better. Only now, the threat is – had you guessed? – Islam. What’s got him and his ilk hot under the collar with Lee is a proposed bill to give tax relief to sukuk (Islamic bonds) – I don’t have to explain those in Asia Times Online, hopefully – the same as interest-bearing accounts receive.

Islamic finance is a trillion-dollar business. South Korea has heavy commercial involvement in the Muslim world, all the way from Indonesia to Libya. In the latter, even when it was a pariah (first time around), Korean firms won huge construction and other contracts. Yet there too a Korean pastor got himself arrested last year. It took four visits by Lee’s big brother and fixer-in-chief, Lee Sang-deuk, to free him. (There were other issues in play too.)

South Korean banks long to emulate the chaebol (conglomerates) like Samsung and Hyundai and go global. Specifically, they’d like to attract capital from the Middle East – which means having sukuk products in their portfolio. There may also be a link here, though this is denied, to a recent deal to build nuclear power plants in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Much touted initially, it now transpires that Seoul is having to lend half the US$20 billion cost.

This is the 21st century, right? It’s the age of globalization – on which South Korea depends more than most, and more than is healthy. Islamic finance may once have seemed strange to non-Muslims, but sukuk bonds are now a normal part of the landscape. In an interdependent world, anyway, we respect one another’s beliefs and practices. This is called civilization.

Not in Seoul, apparently. Another cleric has accused Muslim nations of fighting “economic jihad”, claiming in all seriousness that the planned legislation would enable them to wield oil money to promote the Islamization of Korea. Thus the Reverend Kiel Ja-yeon: no fringe nutcase, but the head of the Christian Council of Korea. It was he who organized the prayer breakfast. In similar vein, Yonggi Cho met finance minister Yoon Jeung-hyun February 24 and later bragged: “I told him this will be a life-or-death fight.”

Specifically, Cho threatened to mobilize the Protestant vote against candidates supporting the sukuk bill in by-elections on April 27. These aren’t crucial. Whatever happens, Lee’s ruling conservative Grand National Party (GNP) will keep control of the National Assembly. But with barely a year to go till the next general election in April 2012, they’ll be seen as a straw in the wind. A separate presidential election follows in December 2012; Lee can’t run again.

Hang on, though. In theory the GNP controls the assembly, but in practice they’ve already caved in to the backwoodsmen. Or backwoodswomen. Another implacable opponent of the bill is Lee Hye-hoon, a Christian GNP lawmaker and a rare woman in Korean politics. She has been quoted as saying that the 2.5% of returns from sukuk bonds which go to charity (zakat) that may be used to support terrorism.

Faced with this, on February 22 the GNP decided not to bring the bill forward for debate, at least until after the April by-elections. It remains to be seen how it fares then. The liberal opposition Democrats (DP) are no less craven: citing the alleged UAE nuclear link as an excuse, when everyone knows they too are scared of losing the bigot vote. The DP leader, Sohn Hak-kyu, was down on his knees with Lee at the same Protestant prayer breakfast.

All credit then to former premier Lee Hoi-chang, head of the small Liberty Forward Party (LFP). A Catholic, Lee is even more right-wing than his namesake the president. Yet his is a rare voice of sanity: “The constitution states that religion and politics are strictly separate. Churches should stay away from politics.” That brought instant criticism from the Council of Presbyterian Churches in Korea, who challenged the LFP leader to a public debate.

I’ll leave the last word – well, almost – to a columnist in the Hankyoreh. According to Jung E-gil, writing on March 3, both David Yonggi Cho and Kiel Ja-yeon have in the past marked Easter by carrying big wooden crosses, as if to re-enact the passion of Christ. But there was a difference. They bore no burden: these crosses were on wheels. No nails pierced their flesh; instead, padding protected their delicate skin and expensive suits. Jung quotes a Protestant online newspaper News and Joy: “Death waited at the end of Jesus’s march with the cross … whereas beautiful luxury cars were waiting after these men’s performance.”

Pharisees is the word, if I recall. Also: Render unto Caesar. Strange Christians, these.

Korea’s own Renaissance Woman: Shin Saimdang

Shin Saimdang is recognised as the greatest female artist in Korean history. In an era demanding Confucian female values, Shin Saimdang developed her own world, and continues to be a source of inspiration to poets and artists throughout Korea.

From February 2011 Korea.net magazine

Portrait of Shin Saimdang

Portrait of Shin Saimdang

On June 23, 2009, Korea issued its first ever 50 thousand won bill, and the first new currency denomination of any kind since 1973. Intense debate had surrounded the issue of whose face would adorn the new bill, with Kim Gu — a prominent political leader during the Japanese colonial period and a symbol of Korean independence — narrowly beating Korea’s greatest female artist, Shin Saimdang.

50 thousand won note, with Shin Saimdang

Following consultations between the government and the Bank of Korea, it was announced that Kim’s face would be reserved for the forthcoming 100 thousand won bill, while Shin would appear on the 50 thousand won bill. Shin was chosen not just for her numerous works of poetry, calligraphy and painting, but also for her role in overcoming discrimination and the limitations set on women at that time.

Shin (1504~1551) was born in the town of Gangneung, eastern Korea. She showed promise in poetry, painting, calligraphy and embroidery from a young age, but her greatest talent emerged in painting. She began painting at the age of 7 without any teachers, and mimicked the landscape paintings of Ahn Gyeon, the most prominent painter of her time.

Shin approached a range of subject matter in her works, which include such masterpieces as Pododo, Sansudo, Chochungdo and Jarido. Among all her paintings, however, Chochungdo, a depiction of grasses and insects drawn on an eight-fold folding screen, is considered her magnum opus.

Watermelons on the vine, from Shin Saimdang's Chochungdo

Watermelons on the vine, from Shin Saimdang's Chochungdo

In Chochungdo, Shin combines trivial everyday subject matter and transforms it into a work of art. Each fold includes plants and insects from which the name Chochungdo is derived: eggplants, grasshoppers, watermelons, field mice, cockscombs, dung beetles, poppies and lizards. One story has it that Shin’s creations were so elaborate and true-to-life that when, as a child, she painted a grasshopper on a ground cherry, a chicken came along and tried to eat it.

Shin painted a number of works with similar subject matter and used expression techniques. A technique called Molgolbeop (drawing the subject matter directly without outlines) was used for all the works containing grass and insects, with Shin drawing two or three plants in the center with a few insects surrounding them. Simple subjects, concise and stable composition, detailed and feminine expressions, and sense of color are all characteristics of Shin’s works.

Shin achieved considerable renown in her own lifetime, garnering praise from scholars and even from the king, Sukjong. In his book Paegwanjapgi, Joseon Dynasty scholar Eo Suk-gwon lavished praise on Shin’s work, saying: “Saimdang’s paintings of grapes, mountains and rivers are miraculous. Who shall rebuke such incredible paintings, and who shall say that such work is not fit for a woman?”

Shin was also a prodigiously talented calligrapher, famous for the traditional calligraphic style of Jamdumaje (literally, silkworm’s head and horse’s hoof). In 1868, Yoon Jong-eui, a late Joseon Dynasty scholar, engraved replicas of Shin’s calligraphy that were then stored in the Ojukheon residence. His postscript read, “Indeed one can see in the handwriting. Sincerity in each stroke, but with a style that is also deep, elegant, clean and calm.”

ART AND LIFE Shin’s real name was Shin In-seon. The pen name Saimdang, which she chose herself, was comprised of three Chinese characters: Sa meaning teacher, Im standing for Tairen and Dang meaning lady. “Tairen” was a legendary koreanwoman from Chinese history, who raised her son to greatness through prenatal education and rigorous schooling. Her son went on to become King Wen of the Zhou Dynasty.

In what was a severely restrictive environment for women, Shin flourished thanks to her inordinate talent and the influence of her family. In a society where boys typically received the lion’s share of educational opportunities, she enjoyed a tremendous amount of attention from her family, and was able to study to a very high level.

Shin’s mother stayed with her own parents after giving birth, which gave her a relatively free hand to educate her daughter. Shin also enjoyed encouragement from her husband, Lee Gong, who understood his wife’s artist talents and often showed her paintings to his friends. Though she married at the age of 19, Shin never submitted to Confucian notions of male superiority but rather stressed the importance of a relationship based on mutual respect.

Today, Shin is portrayed as a female role model for her artistic talent, education and character. As the mother of the great Joseon Dynasty scholar Yi I, she is also revered for her parenting skills. Shin’s fiercely independent life shows us that the human spirit can prevail over the social attitudes of a given time. It was precisely this truth of spirit that Sin pursued so tirelessly in her wonderful works of art.

Waterfowl from Shin Saimdang's Chochungdo

Waterfowl from Shin Saimdang's Chochungdo

Doing business in London’s Little Korea

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12170151
By Laurence Knight Business reporter, BBC News

Not your typical UK High Street

Not your typical UK High Street

Ever heard of New Malden? A lot of Koreans have.

The unobtrusive south-west London suburb contains the biggest population in Europe of natives of ths East Asian country.

Around 20,000 Koreans by some counts.

It is also this reporter’s home of the last 25 years – which means I arrived there about the same time the first Koreans were opening shop on the town’s High Street.

Yet for many non-Korean New Maldenites – myself included – our particular splash of London ethnic colour has remained enigmatic, a community seen far more than it is heard.

So I decided it was time to go out and meet the neighbours.

Fashion victim

First up is the Park Jun Beauty Lab.

Like Brick Lane and Chinatown, New Malden has its restaurants. But it is also home to numerous Korean coiffeurs.

“Korean hairdressers are very precise,” says the Beauty Lab proprietor, Mr Yong Hoon Kim.

“Maybe at colouring the English are better. But the cutting itself – the Koreans are very good at it.”
Mr Yong Hoon Kim of the Park Jun Beauty Lab, and his glamorous assistants Mr Kim says many of the stylists he brought over went on to become his competitors

Mr Kim says many of the stylists he brought over went on to become his competitors

Mr Kim says many of the stylists he brought over went on to become his competitors

Like nearly all of the town’s hairdressers, Mr Kim’s customers are predominately Korean.

The eponymous Park Jun, he assures me, is the most famous hairdresser in Korea, and has lent his name to a chain of 91 outlets worldwide, of which the New Malden branch is the first in Europe.

Mr Kim says his countrymen come from all over London to have their hair cut the New Malden way, although lately new hairdressers have set up in London’s West End, meeting the demand from students there.

But it seems he has become a victim of his own success. Mr Kim tells me that when he opened the salon in 1999, he only had one local competitor.

But as he brought over and trained up young stylists from the home country, one by one they left to set up their own rival businesses further down the High Street.

Branching out

Hairdressers are not the only Korean businesses built on their own community.

Just off the A3 dual carriageway is the hub of one of the town’s most successful firms – Korea Foods.
Ms Young A Hong stands in front of the checkout counters at the Korea Foods supermarket Ms Hong says British shoppers also come to the supermarket, with recipe books in hand

Ms Hong says British shoppers also come to the supermarket, with recipe books in hand

Ms Hong says British shoppers also come to the supermarket, with recipe books in hand

The 10-year-old company operates a clutch of warehouses packed full of noodles, tofu, kimchi (spicy pickled cabbage), and meat cut just the right Korean way.

These days, the wholesaler also runs a chain of six mini-markets across the UK, as well as a full-scale supermarket housed in part of its depot.

“Before this, our boss ran restaurants,” says the supermarket manager, Ms Young A Hong.

“He realised that, for the important distinctiveness of Korean food, many shops and restaurants were unable to get key ingredients.”

So he began importing these key items and delivering them in HGVs all across the UK.

As the years went by, Ms Hong says the firm found itself delivering more and more food to Japanese and Chinese customers, thanks to the overlap in cuisine and the popularity of Korean food among its geographic neighbours.

The wholesaler was outgrowing its original Korean customer-base. So in 2009, in the middle of the recession, the boss decided to expand into delivering Chinese foods as well.

“It was not planned – we just followed the needs of Chinese customers,” says Ms Hong. “But it had the effect that we did not experience a recession.”

And what of British customers? “Now the business is becoming famous for English people too. They bring recipe books to the store, and want special tips on what ingredients to buy.”

She says schools also arrange visits to see their tofu and ricecake plants. But the fact is that British buyers are far from becoming a mainstay of their demand.

(Made in) China

One of the town’s oldest Korean retailers is Mace, which – like a surprising number of shops – is not obviously foreign until you step inside and look more closely.

The 22-year-old store sells high quality consumer goods – garments, trinkets and above all porcelain – from the UK and Europe.

The Mace store The demand for authentic gifts has wained with the economic downturn and the weak won

The demand for authentic gifts has wained with the economic downturn and the weak won

The demand for authentic gifts has wained with the economic downturn and the weak won

But the shopkeeper – like most of her clients – is very much from Korea.

“Customers like to buy branded goods,” she explains, rolling off names such as Wedgewood, Ainsley, Royal Copenhagen and Limoges.

But apprently they only like authentic goods, genuinely made in the home country.

“It is becoming a common problem that a lot of production is being moved to China,” she says.

Her clients, it transpires, are typically executives of the big Korean banks and industrial firms.

Sent to the UK for a business trip, or on secondment for a few years, they come to her shop to pile up on gifts for friends and family for when they return home.

She says that Japanese and Chinese people also come, as well as a smattering of loyal British customers from Coombe – the wealthy end of town.

But business of late has been tough. “The Korean economy is very bad, as well as in England,” she says.

That means fewer business trips, which has hurt her, as well as the many restaurants that play host to business dinners.

The exchange rate does not help either. The Korean won was one of the few currencies to underperform the pound during the recession, although it has since recovered.

“When the pound is expensive, people send money home,” she explains. “They don’t buy here.”

Comings and goings

Business executives are only a small part of the Korean community.

To get a better idea of who the rest are, and why they chose to live in New Malden of all places, I go to Jin’s, one of a half-dozen Korean estate agents.

The straight-taking Mrs Hardy, owner of Jin's estate agents, says she is not a typical Korean

The straight-taking Mrs Hardy, owner of Jin's estate agents, says she is not a typical Korean

The straight-taking Mrs Hardy, owner of Jin’s estate agents, says she is not a typical Korean

The owner is the wry-humoured Jin Hardy – “Mrs Hardy” and not “Ms Jin” she corrects me, because her late and beloved husband was “a bloody Yorkshireman”.

Having arrived in the UK in 1975, she has seen the community develop from scratch.

In the late-80s there were just a few families and a couple of stores in the town. But over the next 10 years immigration boomed.

“In 1991 I set up the estate agents,” she explains. “Friends said I should do it, because so many Koreans speak no English.

“In 1996-97 it was really mad, spreading really fast,” she says. Some 250 big companies had set up in the UK, bringing people over.

Why did they choose New Malden? Neither Mrs Hardy nor salon-owner Mr Kim – another long-time resident – gives a specific reason.

Both mention the railway line into central London that originally spawned the town, as well as houses that had at one time seemed relatively cheap.

In any case, the boom did not last long. In 1997 a financial crisis struck Korea, and Mrs Hardy guesstimates that 60% of the population went home. It has taken many years for the numbers to recover.

And things have become tough again lately, not so much because of the recession, but rather thanks to stricter visa requirements. Yet the Koreans still come.

“Koreans are strong-headed, hard-working people,” says Mrs Hardy. “There are a million jobs out there,” she claims, suggesting that some English people do not want to take low paying jobs such as cleaning or building work.

Language barrier

Education is also a big plus for New Malden, according to Mrs Hardy, and not only because Korean parents eagerly send their children to the borough’s state schools.

Times have been tough for Koreans as well in the last two years

Times have been tough for Koreans as well in the last two years

Surprising as it may be to English ears, many Koreans come to the UK in the first place not only to learn the language, but specifically to get themselves – or their children – into the British education system.

That is what Jieun Park of the tuition support company Unimaster tells me: “The curriculum is viewed as strong. There is more sports, more art and drama.”

And she says Koreans value the less prescriptive British approach to teaching. “Koreans typically know the answers. But they do not understand the theories behind them.”

Sitting above a Chinese restaurant, the little college is one of a handful in New Malden that provides supplemental teaching across the entire school syllabus for students from as young as six, to help them overcome their language shortcomings.

A large chunk of their business is helping children as young as 13, who have been sent – alone! – to study at British schools.

While many are boarders at public schools, some are even sent to day schools, in which case the college provides a guardian in their parents’ absence.

She tells me that another attraction is the UK’s universities, the best of which rank much more highly than Korea’s.

The college provides coaching – for British students too – for university applications as well as for the 11+.
Cultural barrier?

The language barrier that Unimaster helps to bridge should not be underestimated, one shopkeeper tells me.

“The first and the last problem is the language,” he says, because Korean and English are so utterly different.

Unusually for a Korean retailer, almost none of the customers at his corner shop are of his own nationality.

But despite this, he still struggles slightly to maintain conversation and apologises for his limited language skills.

“All people in Korea are interested in learning English,” he says. “They pour money into education fees. However, my English is above the average!”

This, he says, is why local Koreans have their slightly unfair reputation for being aloof, and it is why Koreans rely on their own community for everything from dental work to accountancy.

It brings to mind the possibly apocryphal tale of a restaurant that put up a controversial “No English” sign, only for it later to transpire that the owners merely meant that they did not speak the language.

“If we can overcome this, then Koreans are very friendly,” says the shopkeeper. “We want to participate in everything, but we cannot.”

Yet cultural issues may also play a part in making the Korean community somewhat insular.

Mrs Hardy at Jin’s says that most Koreans are not very direct people.

“They are quite innocent. Very nice,” she says.

Indeed, her own unusual straight-talking has earned her the epithet “the Godmother”, she says.

And perhaps many Koreans feel the English are unfriendly and not worth getting to know.

Ms Park, who grew up through British schools herself, says bullying by locals is common, and Korean children typically make friends with other international students instead.

The shopkeeper says that back home, England is viewed as a “gentleman’s country”.

But for him the illusion was shattered when he came face-to-face with a 14-year-old who demanded alcohol and cigarettes, only to swear at him when he was firmly declined.

In Korea, he says, people are more respectful of their elders.

The secrets of my brilliant Korea

Please respect FT.com’s ts&cs and copyright policy which allow you to: share links; copy content for personal use; & redistribute limited extracts. Email ftsales.support@ft.com to buy additional rights or use this link to reference the article – http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ca8b7760-19e0-11e0-b921-00144feab49a.html

Seoul greeted me in the usual fashion early on Thursday morning: a ridiculously long drive into the city (I had too much luggage to try out the new high-ish speed train to Seoul Station), a warm welcome and my favourite room at the Park Hyatt, and a schedule that left little time for coffee, let alone pee breaks.

As we wove through the streets of the South Korean capital trying to avoid the chronic gridlock, my colleague Ariel and I chatted about the lack of holiday hangover compared with the west: everyone is back at work, nobody’s making idle chit-chat about the presents their children didn’t like and there’s just the vaguest nod to the start of a new year. By the close of business on Thursday, I felt quite happy that the holidays had come to a firm stop and that I didn’t have to relive them repeatedly for clients or colleagues.

It was so nice to cut out the chit-chat and get on with business that I thought this could be a new Korean cultural export – let’s dispense with niceties and pre-amble and get down to business. If we get on famously, then we can drink nice wine and gorge ourselves on bibimbap and bindaetteok later. Korea Inc. might also consider exporting the following:

1. A uniform mentality: Japan might have the best-dressed workers on its building sites but the Koreans come first when it comes to kitting-out staff at department stores and airlines. It’s hard to top the outfits for the girls and boys at Shinsegae or the women in taupe working the aisles on Asiana.

2. The warm sounds of Winterplay and W & Whale: if you add anything to your playlist this year, track down the melodic, dreamy and gently poppy tunes of these two Korean acts.

3. K is for cruising: given South Korea’s knack for hospitality and shipbuilding, I continue to wonder why one of the major chaebol business conglomerates haven’t combined the two and launched a cruise line to take on the Americans and Italians and own the Asian cruise market.

4. K is also for culture: given the innovation taking place in the pages of Korean magazines, I wonder how long it will be until the country’s more innovative media show dithering western publishers how to produce healthy, lively magazines.

5. Oksusu cha: Korean corn tea is just what the doctor ordered: like many a warm beverage, it’s supposed to cure myriad ailments. With the right marketing, could evolve into a holistic movement of its own.

Sulwhasoo

6. Sulwhasoo: for consumers seeking a skin miracle in a bottle or simply some great-looking packaging for the bathroom shelf, this premium range of skincare products has a distinctly fragrant Korean top-note (warm and earthy) and just might give you the complexion of a K-Pop star.

7. Girls Generation: speaking of K-Pop, it’s worth losing a few minutes on YouTube watching this ensemble of leggy girls belting out their hit single “Run Devil Run”.

8. Incheon airport’s management: this is a team that could do European air travellers a favour and take over some airports – Brussels would be a good place to start, followed by Vienna, Malpensa and Geneva.

9. Bindaetteok (savoury pancakes): these have all the elements needed to become a global fast-food favourite.

10. Korea’s major department stores: Shinsegae, Lotte, Hyundai could all do with taking their acts on the road to show consumers what it means to be a real store full of departments with all the service and trimmings. Lotte’s so far made a half-hearted attempt but there’s plenty of scope for it and its competitors to go global.

Tyler Brûlé is editor-in-chief of Monocle

US embassy cables: China ‘would accept’ Korean reunification

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/249870

Monday, 22 February 2010, 09:32
S E C R E T SEOUL 000272
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, JA”>JA”>JA, CH
SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

——-

1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea’s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy. Beijing had “no will” to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies — and the DPRK characterized as “the most incompetent official in China” — had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.

VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations…

——————————————

2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea’s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in “two to three years.” Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy; there was “no substance” to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry’s “briefing” to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiarui’s visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had “basically read a Xinhua press release,” Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.

3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea “than most people believe.” Beijing had “no will” to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies and the DPRK leadership “knows it.” Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the “brink of collapse,” the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

—————————————–

4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was “a very bad thing” that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s delegation. XXXXXXXXXXXX said it appeared that the DPRK “must have lobbied extremely hard” for the now-retired Wu to stay on as China’s 6PT chief. [NAME REMOVED] complained that Wu is the PRC’s XXXXXXXXXXXX an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who “knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn’t speak English.” Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming — to anyone willing to listen — that the PRC’s economic rise represented a “return to normalcy” with China as a great world power.

…China’s “New Generation” of Korea-Hands…

———————————————

5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials XXXXXXXXXXXX stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun.XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control.XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chun said, were ready to “face the new reality” that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state — a view that since North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.

…PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario…

———————————————

6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly “not welcome” any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun XXXXXXXXXXXX said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a “benign alliance” — as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chundismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China’s strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea — not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could “strengthen the centrifugal forces in China’s minority areas.”

…and Japan

————

7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s control. Chun asserted that, even though “Japan’s preference” was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS

US embassy cables: Kim Jong-il’s power weakens after stroke

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/243031
Guardian 30 Nov 2010

Monday, 11 January 2010, 02:51
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000005
SIPDIS
PASS TO EAP/CM, EAP/K, INR
EO 12958 DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS CM, ECON, EFIN, EIND, EMIN, ENRG, PGOV, PINS, PREL
SUBJECT: FURTHER INSIGHTS ON PRC-DPRK TRADE: DECISIONS, DISPUTES, AND
BACK-DOOR DEALS
REF: A. 10SHENYANG 003 B. 09SHENYANG 167
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman for Reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d)

1. (S) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff XXXXXXXXXXXX that Kim Jong-il has recently reversed decisions and struggled to implement policies, showing increasing indecisiveness. XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX also reported that the children of high-ranking DPRK and Chinese officials hijack deals and aid projects for their own aggrandizement. Chinese state electric companies are currently bidding to build the grid for the DPRK’s planned large-scale increase in power generation and transmission capacity, but apart from the goal to build 100,000 new apartments in Pyongyang, few of the DPRK’s other objectives for 2012 will likely be achieved. Construction of the bridge from Dandong to Sinuiju, seems set to begin in 2010, however, China paying for both the bridge and a road on the DPRK side. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that North Koreans having connections and/or money, continue to receive permission to work in Northeast China, despite reports of a recent general recall. End Summary.

PROMISING THE MOON TO “THE SUN”

——————————-

2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX PolOff met again with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Kim Jong-il has become increasingly indecisive since his stroke and other health problems. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed to a recent decision to recall students, scholars, and scientists working or studying in China as a result of a single student’s defection in Beijing. XXXXXXXXXXXX said business and trade groups with interests in Northeast China had pressured Kim Jong-il to reverse the decision, which he apparently did, and companies in Northeast China are currently developing “positions needing to be filled” to enable those who left the country to get new visas.

3. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, not only does Kim Jong-il decide to reverse policies on his own, but officials also chart their own course as different factions competing for Kim’s attention, making it difficult for Kim to set a firm, clear direction. Wary of China’s increasing hold on precious minerals and mining rights in the DPRK, many North Korean officials oppose mineral concessions as a means to attract Chinese investment. However, the former Consul General of the DPRK’s Shenyang Consulate, in an effort to fund the construction of the plan to build 100,000 new apartments in Pyongyang, continues to offer mining and fishing rights to Chinese investors. He attracted more than RMB 12 billion in investment, more than enough to protect himself from the direct attacks of these opponents. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, over-reporting of actual value is a common phenomenon on the part of North Koreans charged with securing foreign investment. For instance, a commitment of RMB 10 million is reported to Pyongyang as a commitment of USD 10 million or more and the actual sum (the RMB 10 million) is reported as a first tranche. After the initial investment is realized, the central government is told that the foreign investor demands further preferences in order to inject more money. The reporting officials count on the central government either taking additional steps to attract the extra investment or doing something to upset the Chinese investor. In the latter case, the official can blame the lack of realizing the investment on political factors out of his control. XXXXXXXXXXXX provided no examples of the DPRK central government acquiescing to the demand for additional concessions.

PRC-DPRK INVESTMENT DISPUTES: NOT JUST WITHIN THE DPRK

——————————————— ———

4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said Chinese state-owned enterprises have placed restrictions on investing in North Korea but that a number of privatized Chinese companies in which the state remains a significant shareholder have invested in the DPRK. Disputes with North Korean counterparts develop all the time, XXXXXXXXXXXXnoted. Saying: “It was hard to say” how such disputes are resolved, XXXXXXXXXXXXgave the impression they are seldom, if ever, resolved. Investment disputes related to North Korea also

SHENYANG 00000005 002 OF 002

occur between competing investors in China. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, for example, two Chinese companies – Shandong Guoda Gold Company, Ltd. and Zhejiang-based Wanxiang Group – are battling for access to Huishan Copper Mine, the biggest copper mine in the DPRK. Huishan, near the DPRK-China border is rich in gold, silver, and other valuable metals as well. Though MOFCOM approved both joint-venture deals, each company wants to be the sole developer. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes Wanxiang, which has close ties to Premier Wen Jiabao, will likely win out, Shandong Guoda receiving a payment to quietly go away. Without naming names, XXXXXXXXXXXX also suggested the strong possibility that someone had made a payment (on the order of USD 10,000) to secure the Premier’s support.

PRINCELINGS BEHAVING BADLY

—————————

5. (S) According toXXXXXXXXXXXX, the children of high-ranking North Korean and Chinese officials hijack the most favorable investment and aid deals for their own enrichment. When the child of a high-ranking official hears of a Chinese aid proposal to North Korea, he will travel to North Korea to convince the relevant official to follow his instructions for implementing the aid project. He will then use his connections to request proposals from Chinese companies to develop the project, returning to North Korea to convince the relevant official to select the favored company. At each step, money changes hands, and the well-connected Chinese go-between pockets a tidy sum. For the offspring of officials in the DPRK, there are also ample opportunities to work in China. In a typical situation, a DPRK official will alert another official to an opportunity for the second official’s child to work in China for a DPRK-Chinese joint venture. After signing a contract, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX it is a cheap, easy process to obtain the necessary permit from the Chinese provincial Bureau of Labor and Social Security. He said the system is similar to the “ting xin, liu zhi” system in China in the 1980s, in which officials retained their government position with a suspended salary while going to work for a private company.

6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX has seen a number of similarities between the DPRK and China since his first visit in 1998. He compared the impact of the famine on North Koreans to the impact the Great Leap Forward (GLF) had on Chinese in the countryside. Both incidents forced individuals to lose faith in the government’s ability to provide a basic standard of living and created a sharp instinct for self-preservation. He also sees similarities between the GLF and current plans in the DPRK to become a strong country by 2012. During his previous meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke of plans to build 100,000 apartments in Pyongyang by 2012. North Korea also plans to increase electricity generation capacity by building coal-fired power plants and hydropower plants, and to increase transmission capacity by extending grids to all secondary cities. Chinese electric companies are currently bidding on the grid projects. Despite the need for increased electricity in North Korea, XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is almost impossible that North Korea will reach its goals in the next few years. The focus more likely will be on the apartment blocks as these are big, physical things that people can see as a mark of progress. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes the long-planned bridge from Dandong to Sinuiju will begin construction next year and that China will pay for the entire project, including a highway on the North Korean side of the border (Ref B).

WICKMAN

US embassy cables: China reiterates ‘red lines’

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/204917

Thursday, 30 April 2009, 13:07
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 001176
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2034
TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, PARM, PHUM, KUNR, CH, TW, KN, KS,
JA”>JA”>JA, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HE DISCUSSES G-20, DPRK,
IRAN, AF/PAK, UNSC REFORM, TAIWAN, TIBET WITH CHARGE
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i. Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

——-

1. (C) Taiwan’s participation as an observer at the upcoming May World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings demonstrated what could be achieved based on “one China, very broadly interpreted,” Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) He Yafei said at an April 30 working lunch hosted by the Charge d’Affaires. In his capacity as G-20 Sherpa, VFM He said he would ask for appropriate meetings in Washington to discuss the dates and agenda of the next G-20 summit. VFM He reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington: On North Korea, China encouraged the United States to re-engage the DPRK, but if the Six-Party Talks were suspended for an extended period, we should consider maintaining engagement in other ways. On Iran, Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by Washington and had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume a positive role in the region. On Afghanistan/Pakistan, VFM He asked to see a list of items that would be transported via the proposed Northern Distribution Network, given that “non-lethal” is a broad and vague term.

2. (S) Summary Continued: VFM He raised concerns over China’s “core interests” of Tibet and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which he said could “derail” bilateral cooperation. The Charge raised the Liu Xiaobo and Gao Zhisheng human rights cases, to which VFM He replied with standard language about Chinese law. The Charge asked for assistance in expediting the exit from China of two North Koreans from the U.S. Embassy compound; VFM He promised to assist. The Charge urged China to press North Korea to release the two detained American journalists; VFM H said China would. VFM He expressed concern over building “momentum” on UNSC reform and asked the United States not to be “proactive” on the matter. The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to affect other parts of our support for each other’s practical needs including residential leases and asked for VFM He’s assistance in stopping this trend. The Charge and VFM He agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. End Summary.

TAIWAN OBSERVERSHIP AT WHA

————————–

3. (C) The agreement allowing Taiwan to participate as an observer at the World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings in Geneva in May was “one step forward” toward better cross-Strait relations and demonstrated what could be achieved through consultations based on “one China, very broadly interpreted,” Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) He Yafei said at an April 30 working lunch hosted by the Charge d’Affaires. Cross-Strait relations were “improving,” and as they did, China hoped the United States would feel “less burdened, frustrated and nervous,” VFM He said. The Charge congratulated VFM He on the agreement, noting its timeliness in light of concerns over the H1N1 outbreak, while expressing hope that both sides would continue to take steps to increase mutual trust.

IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL VISITS

——————————-

4. (C) The Charge and VFM He agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. Both concurred that Chief of Naval Operations ADM Roughead’s visit to China was a success. The Charge emphasized that, as President Obama told Foreign Minister Yang, the United States wanted to move relations between our two militaries forward. VFM He agreed that State Councilor Liu Yandong’s visit, including her meeting with Secretary Clinton, had been productive. VFM He said Liu came away “very impressed” by her interaction with Secretary Clinton and wanted very much to “follow up” on the issues they discussed such as education, something very basic and important to the people of both countries.

5. (C) Although we recognize the importance of the proposed visit by Politburo Member and CCP Organization Department

BEIJING 00001176 002 OF 005

Head Li Yuanchao, it would be easier to arrange a successful visit if Li could postpone his travel to a less busy time, the Charge said. VFM He replied that the visit of Li, a “future leader of China,” was “very important,” so China hoped the United States would provide a full schedule of meetings with senior leaders despite the fact that those leaders recently met with State Councilor Liu. The Charge urged VFM He to arrange a useful schedule for Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, including a trip to Tibet or Tibetan areas, noting that the Speaker was also particularly interested in climate change and environmental issues. China would treat Speaker Pelosi’s visit as a type of “state visit,” VFM He replied. Nevertheless, given her “tight schedule,” the Speaker would likely “not have time” to visit Tibet, VFM He said.

6. (C) Reviewing the upcoming meetings between Presidents Obama and Hu this year, VFM He noted that, over the past 30 years, the U.S.-China relationship had been driven by high-level visits to a greater degree than other bilateral relationships. With these meetings between our two presidents in mind, both sides should be “careful” and act in ways that benefit the long-term interests of the bilateral relationship. Our two presidents would meet several times in the coming months, including at the G-8, G-20 and APEC summits, after which China anticipated President Obama would visit China. We should plan our work for the bilateral relationship in the year ahead with the President’s visit to China in mind.

G-20: DATES AND TOPICS

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7. (C) VFM He stated that, he would ask to meet with NSC’s Michael Froman in Washington and was considering requesting an appropriate meeting with the Treasury Department. The topics would include the dates of the next G-20 meeting, as well as the agenda.

8. (C) In the first two G-20 Financial Summits, U.S. and Chinese positions had been close, closer even than the United States and Europe, VFM He noted. Views on major issues such as the need for fiscal stimulus and reform of international financial institutions were similar. Leading up to the London Summit, VFM He felt that the U.S.-U.K.-China “troika” had been effective: Beijing could persuade the developing countries, Washington could influence Japan and South Korea, and London could bring along the Europeans.

9. (C) The first two G-20 summits, according to VFM He, had succeeded in boosting confidence and agreeing on measures to help international financial institutions cope with the crisis. Now, the G-20 had entered an implementation period. He outlined four objectives that he intended to discuss with Froman:

A) Establish what stimulus and macroeconomic policy coordination the G-20 economies needed to implement to ensure economic recovery;

B) Strengthen the message against protectionism so that leaders did not “break their promises as soon as they returned home”;

C) Set a clear timetable for IMF reform, establishing whether the New Arrangement to Borrow (NAB) decisions had any relation to future quota; and

D) Reforming the international monetary system, vis-a-vis the dollar and an alternative reserve currency such as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

10. (C) Expounding on this last topic, VFM He stated that a stable U.S. dollar was good for China, and Beijing had no interest in “destabilizing the system.” The system, however, was “not perfect and needs reform.” He said China had a huge stake in how the United States managed the dollar. Further, VFM He suggested that the RMB could become a component of the SDR. Mentioning that the RMB could compose two percent of the SDR value, VFM He noted that this was more of a symbolic than practical change.

11. (U) Note: VFM He’s comments on the Strategic and Economic Dialogue will be reported septel.

VFM HE’S WASHINGTON VISIT: DPRK, IRAN, AF/PAK

———————————————

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12. (C) VFM He reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington, including North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan. On North Korea, VFM He hoped to hold “informal consultations” in Washington on how generally to approach the North Koreans, not just through the Six-Party Talks. Washington and Beijing nevertheless needed to discuss how to maintain momentum in the Six-Party Talks so as to preserve our common interest in stability of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a “spoiled child” in order to get the attention of the “adult.” China therefore encouraged the United States, “after some time,” to start to re-engage the DPRK. In this regard, it was good that the New York channel remained open, VFM He observed. Noting that Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth would visit Beijing in May, VFM He said that, if the Six-Party Talks would be on hold for an extended period, then the Six Parties needed to find ways to continue to engage the DPRK and each other, either bilaterally or even perhaps trilaterally. The Charge noted that we should be careful not to reinforce Pyongyang’s bad behavior.

13. (C) VFM He also hoped to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue in Washington. Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by Washington. China had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume playing a positive role in the region. Though such an Iranian role made moderate Arab countries “jittery,” VFM He said, this should be a matter the United States could “manage.” What was essential was to get Iran involved positively in the region again.

14. (C) VFM He said he also hoped to discuss Afghanistan/Pakistan. The Charge stated that, even though XXXXXXXXXXXX was unable to announce new money for Afghanistan at the April 17 Pakistan Donors’ Conference, China still had an opportunity to contribute to the security and stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. One way to do so would be to agree to a re-supply route via China for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On the re-supply route question, VFM He said China would like to see a list of items that would be transported on the proposed route, noting that “non-lethal” is a broad and vague term.

TIBET AND TAIWAN AS “CORE INTERESTS”

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15. (C) VFM He raised concerns over China’s “core interests” of Tibet and Taiwan, which he said could “derail” bilateral cooperation. On Tibet, China had heard “rumors” that the Dalai Lama would attend a “seminar” in the United States in late September or early October, and that President Obama was “likely” to meet with him then. Noting that there was no need for both sides to reiterate our respective positions on Tibet, VFM He said the critical question was whether both sides would agree to “take care” of each other’s “core interests.” When considering such sensitive issues in the context of the bilateral relationship, they could be viewed either as “obstacles” or as “core interests.” It did not matter whether one side “liked or disliked” such matters; rather, in a “mature, close and important” bilateral relationship such as ours, the question was whether the key interests for each side would be accommodated. The United States had its core interests, VFM He asserted, such as U.S. naval vessels that had operated near the Chinese coast. Both sides agreed to “step down” over that issue, despite the strongly held views of the Chinese public. Regarding the Dalai Lama, China hoped the United States would deny him a visa, and if not, then agree to hold no official meetings with him, including no meeting with President Obama.

16. (C) The Charge expressed concern with China’s defining Tibet as a “core issue” with the apparent expectation that others would “step back.” Instead, our two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an attempt to resolve our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet is a part of China. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious leader and Nobel Laureate, and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity. Future meetings by U.S. officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out. Moreover, there were serious concerns among the U.S. public, the Administration and Congress over the situation in Tibetan areas of China. China should take steps to address Tibetans’ legitimate grievances and engage the Dalai Lama’s representatives in productive dialogue. Denying a visa to the Dalai Lama was not being contemplated.

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17. (C) Another issue that could “derail” relations was arms sales to Taiwan, VFM He said. China had long opposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially advanced weapons sales. China was concerned by reports of possible “very important” and “potent” arms sales to Taiwan, including 60 Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 C/D fighter aircraft. Such arms sales were a “very serious issue” for China, AFM He said. The Charge replied that there had been no change to our one China policy based on the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In accordance with the TRA, the United States made available to Taiwan defense articles that allowed Taiwan to maintain a credible defense. The Charge urged China to take steps to reduce military deployments aimed at Taiwan.

HUMAN RIGHTS: LIU XIAOBO, GAO ZHISHENG

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18. (C) The Charge raised two human rights cases, inquiring as to the status, location and treatment of dissident writer and Charter 08 signatory Liu Xiaobo and rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng. VFM He replied that, as a sign of the “maturity” of our bilateral relationship, he had “repeatedly” listened to our concerns regarding these two cases. Both cases would be handled “according to law” and in accordance with China’s legal/judicial system. Such cases were “sensitive” and should be handled “carefully,” VFM He said, pledging that he nevertheless would look into the cases “to the extent possible.”

NORTH KOREAN “GUESTS”

———————

19. (S) The Charge emphasized the importance of expediting exit procedures from China for two North Koreans who had entered the Embassy compound and asked for VFM He’s assistance in doing so. VFM He said he would look into the matter.

U.S. JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN DPRK

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20. (C) The Charge urged China to press the DPRK to release the two American journalists detained in North Korea. VFM He replied that the United States could “rest assured” that China would do so.

UNSC REFORM

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21. (C) China was concerned by “momentum” that was building on UN Security Council reform, which was “not good” for the P-5, VFM He said. China wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform and not be “proactive” on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 “club” should not be “diluted,” VFM He said. If we end up with a “P-10,” both China and the United States would “be in trouble.” Moreover, it would be difficult for the Chinese public to accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Charge replied that the Administration had not completed its policy review on UNSC expansion, so we do not yet have a position on specific proposals. Nonetheless, the United States believed that UN members should be allowed to state their positions freely and openly without undue P-5 influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while no decision had been made about which countries to support for permanent membership on the UNSC, it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council that did not include Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN budget.

COCA II: AVOIDING A “TRADE WAR”

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22. (C) The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to leak into other areas. The Charge asked VFM He to speak with the appropriate PRC officials to stop this trend before significant damage was done. The COCA II team from Washington held good discussions in Beijing last week with MFA DG for Administrative Affairs Li Chao regarding the new CG Guangzhou complex. The U.S. Embassy today had formally invited DG Li to Washington in May for further talks. One serious problem, the Charge noted, was the Chinese having moved to block new housing leases for the U.S. Embassy in

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Beijing in an apparent attempt to gain leverage on office properties. VFM He said this situation sounded like a “trade war.” The Charge asked VFM He to help stop this matter before it led to a downward cycle. VFM He said he believed real progress had been made and differences narrowed during the most recent round of COCA II talks and that China did not want a “trade war” over COCA II issues. He pledged to “look into” the matter. PICCUTA

US embassy cables: Former Singapore PM on ‘psychopathic’ North Koreans

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/210110
(Flabby old chap)

Thursday, 04 June 2009, 09:08
S E C R E T SINGAPORE 000529
EO 12958 DECL: 06/04/2029
TAGS OVIP”>OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, MNUC, ECON, SN, CH,
KN
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG’S MAY 30, 2009
CONVERSATION WITH SINGAPORE MINISTER MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Daniel L. Shields. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (SBU) May 30, 2009; 6:30 p.m.; The Presidential Palace; Singapore.

2. (SBU) Participants:

United States

————-

The Deputy Secretary Glyn T. Davies, EAP Acting Assistant Secretary Daniel L. Shields, CDA (Notetaker)

SINGAPORE

———

Minister Mentor (MM) Lee Kuan Yew Chee Hong Tat, Principal Private Secretary to MM Cheryl Lee, Country Officer, Americas Directorate, MFA

3. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Steinberg used his meeting with Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons and do not want North Korea to collapse. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad than a North Korea that has collapsed. MM Lee asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s answer was that “they can survive on their own.” The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” MM Lee also offered views on the Chinese economy, Taiwan, Chinese leaders, and U.S.-China relations. End Summary.

China and North Korea

———————

4. (S) Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew on May 30 on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual international security forum held in Singapore. The Deputy Secretary used the meeting with MM Lee to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Chinese do not want North Korea, which China sees as a buffer state, to collapse. The ROK would take over in the North and China would face a U.S. presence at its border. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad for China than a North Korea that has collapsed, he stated.

5. (S) MM Lee said he asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s Delphic answer was that “they can survive on their own.” MM Lee said he interpreted this as meaning that even if China cut off aid, the DPRK leadership would survive. This is a leadership that has already taken actions like killing ROK Cabinet Members in Burma and shooting down a KAL flight. If they lose power, they will end up facing justice at The Hague, like Milosevic. They have been so isolated for so long that they have no friends, not even Russia. They have not trusted China since the Chinese began cultivating ties with the ROK, given China’s interest in attracting foreign investment, he said. The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee expressed worry about the effect on Iran if the DPRK persists. MM Lee said he believes the DPRK can be contained and will not proliferate, but Iran has very high ambitions, ties to Shiite communities outside Iran, and oil wealth.

6. (S) The Deputy Secretary noted that North Korea’s decisions will have an impact in Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” The Chinese must have factored this into their calculations and concluded that the prospect of Japan with nuclear weapons is less bad than losing North Korea as a buffer state. The Chinese take a long-term view and must think that within a few years the DPRK’s current leadership will be gone and there will be new leadership, with new thinking. But there will still be a North Korea, he said.

7. (S) MM Lee said he wishes the USG well in its efforts on North Korea, but he would be surprised if the North Koreans agree to give up nuclear weapons. They might give up a first-strike capacity, but they want nuclear weapons in case the USG decides to seek regime change. They are psychopathic types, with a “flabby old chap” for a leader who prances around stadiums seeking adulation. MM Lee noted that he had learned from living through three and a half years of Japanese occupation in Singapore that people will obey authorities who can deny them food, clothing and medicine.

8. (S) MM Lee said the ROK, after seeing what had happened with German unification, does not want immediate unification with the DPRK. There is “nothing there” in the DPRK, other than a military organization. Kim Jong-Il has already had a stroke. It is just a matter of time before he has another stroke. The next leader may not have the gumption or the bile of his father or grandfather. He may not be prepared to see people die like flies. China is calculating all this. They have their best men on the job. They want to help the United States to advance common objectives. But they do not want the South to take over the North, MM Lee said.

Chinese Economy

—————

9. (C) Regarding the Chinese economy, MM Lee said the global economic crisis has hit many countries, but the feel on the ground differs considerably from place to place. The Chinese economy is reportedly in the doldrums, but when MM Lee visited Jiangsu Province on May 24, his impression was one of continued prosperity. Shanghai has been harder hit, with container port traffic down 30-35 percent, similar to the situation in Singapore. There is no sign of deep unrest in China. The Chinese are very confident they will be able to sustain eight percent growth. The government is pumping resources into the economy, with a focus on developing Western China. Whether such policies can be sustained for three to four years is unclear, but China can certainly sustain these policies for at least a year, he said.

10. (C) MM Lee stated that in the absence of a social safety net in China, the Chinese savings rate is 55 percent, exceeding even Singapore’s 50 percent level. Consumption accounts for only 35 percent of Chinese GDP, as opposed to 70 percent of U.S. GDP. The Chinese leadership may be loath to shift permanently to a more consumption-oriented economy, but the leadership will do so temporarily, if only to avoid unrest. 20 million people have moved back to the countryside because of economic dislocations. The government is providing microfinance to facilitate the transition. The pragmatists are in charge. There is nothing Communist about it. They just want to preserve one party rule. The Deputy Secretary expressed concern that current Chinese policies designed to counter the economic crisis could undermine reform. MM Lee said this cannot be helped. China wants to prevent riots like the ones that happened in Guangzhou in March when Hong Kong-connected enterprises suddenly shut down, he said.

Taiwan

——

11. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked MM Lee for his assessment of Taiwan. MM Lee said former President Chen Shui-bian had left Taiwan in a weak economic position, which had enabled President Ma Ying-Jeou to come to power with his pledge to strengthen the economy through means including expanding the three links with China. In Beijing, former President Jiang Zemin was wedded to his eight-point approach, but President Hu Jintao was more flexible. Jiang wanted to show he was a great man by solving the Taiwan issue in his lifetime, but Hu is more patient and does not have any fixed timeline. In Chinese domestic politics, Hu had wanted Vice Premier Li Keqiang from the Communist Youth League to emerge as his successor, not Vice President Xi Jinping, but Hu did his calculations and accepted Xi when it became clear that Xi had the necessary backing from the rest of the leadership. Similarly, on Taiwan, Hu will be pragmatic. It does not matter to Hu if it takes 10 years or 20 or 30. The key is building links with Taiwan. As in the case of Hong Kong, if necessary the tap could be turned off, he said.

12. (C) In this context, MM Lee said, Hu could live with Ma’s positions on the ’92 consensus and on not addressing the reunification issue during his term in office. What mattered to Hu was that Taiwan not seek independence. If that happened, China has 1,000 missiles and is building its capacity to hold the U.S. fleet at a distance. The implicit question for Taiwan’s leaders is if that is what they want, MM Lee said.

13. (C) MM Lee stated that the alternative is Mainland investment in Taiwan stocks and property. The Mainland has already assured Hong Kong that it will help out economically. The Mainland has not said this to Taiwan, but the Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Director, Wang Yi, did urge Chinese companies to invest in Taiwan. In four years Taiwan’s economy will pick up and Ma will win re-election. The DPP lacks strong potential candidates. Su Zhen-chang is promising, but seems unlikely to be able to win. Meanwhile, even the traditionally DPP-supporting farmers in Taiwan’s South need China’s market for vegetables and other products. Taiwan’s continued participation in the World Health Assembly depends on Beijing. Beijing’s calculation seems to be to prevent Taiwan independence in the near term, then bring Taiwan “back to China,” even if it takes 40 or 50 years. MM Lee said he is looking forward to visiting Fujian Province, where preparations are underway for a new southern economic area linked with Taiwan.

Xi Jinping

———-

14. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked if in the future a leader like Xi Jinping would continue the policies on Taiwan followed by Hu Jintao. MM Lee responded affirmatively. Xi is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang’s influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes.

Wang Qishan

———–

15. (C) MM Lee said Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom the MM saw in connection with celebrations in May of the 15th anniversary of Singapore-China Suzhou Industrial Park, is an exceptional talent, very assured and efficient. Wang handled SARS superbly when he was in Hainan. He excelled in coordinating the Beijing Olympics. Li Keqiang may not get the Premiership and the Party is looking for a way to keep Wang on past his 65th birthday until he is 70. MM Lee said he had met first Wang back in the 1990s but had forgotten their meeting. This time when they met, Wang told Lee he had reviewed the records of all Lee’s meeting with Chinese leaders going back to the days of Deng Xiaoping to see how Lee’s thinking had developed. Wang told Lee he respects him as a consistent man.

China’s Rise

————

16. (C) MM Lee said China is following an approach consistent with ideas in the Chinese television series “The Rise of Great Powers.” The mistake of Germany and Japan had been their effort to challenge the existing order. The Chinese are not stupid; they have avoided this mistake. China’s economy has surpassed other countries, with the exceptions of Japan and the United States. Even with those two countries, the gap is closing, with China growing at seven-nine percent annually, versus two-three percent in the United States and Japan. Overall GDP, not GDP per capita, is what matters in terms of power. China has four times the population of the United States. China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China’s close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, he stated.

17. (C) MM Lee said China will not reach the American level in terms of military capabilities any time soon, but is rapidly developing asymmetrical means to deter U.S. military power. China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, raw materials, and food. This is why China is working with South Africa on the China-Africa Development Fund. China also needs open sea lanes. Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma.

Build Ties with Young Chinese

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18. (C) MM Lee said the best course for the United States on China is to build ties with China’s young people. China’s best and brightest want to study in the United States, with the UK as the next option, then Japan. While they are there, it is important that they be treated as equals, with the cultural support they may need as foreigners. Why not have International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs for China? Why not have Chinese cadets at West Point alongside Vietnamese cadets and Indian cadets? America’s advantage is that it can make use of the talent of the entire world, as in Silicon Valley. China still tends to try to keep the foreigners in Beijing and Shanghai. MM Lee noted that his own experience as a student in the UK had left him with an enduring fondness for the UK. When he spent two months at Harvard in 1968, an American professor had invited him home for Thanksgiving. This was not the sort of thing that happened in the UK, and Lee had realized he was dealing with a different civilization. In the future, China’s leaders will have PhDs and MBAs from American universities, he predicted.

19. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message.

Visit Embassy Singapore’s Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm

SHIELDS

For the Kims, the weakest link is family

By Aidan Foster-Carter
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LJ22Dg01.html

I’m a sociologist, by discipline. Or indiscipline, do I hear you sneer? True, my subject has its share of what one eminent sociologist, Garry Runciman, has called ”attitude and platitude”. Plenty of obfuscating jargon, too. Nor is it half as trendy as when I first got hooked, back in 1968 – when I mixed it up with Marxism. These days, subjects like psychology, history and even economics (despite our present discontents) are more highly regarded than sociology.

But my trade has its uses too, as I shall now try to demonstrate. Take Kim Jong-eun, newly crowned dauphin of North Korea. A communist monarchy: that’s a strange beast indeed, and a contradiction in terms. But sociology, I contend, may shed some light here. What is going on? How on earth did it come to this? And can such a peculiar system survive?

Trotsky saw it coming
Let’s start with Trotsky. Lev Davidovich Bronstein (1879-1940), who took the name Trotsky, was by profession a revolutionary, not a sociologist. Before they joined forces to lead the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, he had criticized Lenin’s methods and in particular his elitism.

Despite starting out as democrats, intellectuals who believe they have history on their side tend to get the idea that they know best. The people’s will becomes whatever they say it is. We are progress, we must prevail. You, conversely, who beg to differ, are an enemy of the people, on the wrong side of history – so shut up, or else. (A word for this is ”vanguardism.”)

The young Trotsky’s critique of such arrogance – before he sold the pass and joined the club, seduced by the smell of power – was sociologically sharp, prescient, and indeed fateful:

”In inner-party politics, these methods lead, as we shall yet see, to this: the party organization substitutes itself for the party, the central committee substitutes itself for the organization, and, finally, a ‘dictator’ substitutes himself for the central committee.”

Which is exactly what came to pass. Having seized power, the Bolsheviks betrayed hopes of democracy by quashing all who disagreed with them: not just counter-revolutionaries, but fellow socialists. Before long, the suppression spread to within their own ranks. The logical conclusion was the monster Stalin – whose agents murdered Trotsky in his Mexican exile.

Had Trotsky lived to see the further perversion of communism that is North Korea, he might have taken this further. Soviet Stalinism spawned mini-Stalins elsewhere. Even as the USSR repudiated Stalin, his Korean epigone Kim Il-sung moved in the other direction: to cement control. Moreover the Great Leader resolved that his system should not perish with him.

And it hasn’t. Kim Il-sung was no sociologist, but he understood what it took to grab power and build a tyranny that lasts. Trotsky’s three stages – three substitutions, in his word – take us from democracy to dictator. But history doesn’t end there. The tyrant must secure his power: both in his lifetime and especially after he has gone. Succession is the Achilles’ heel here.

Looking at how North Korea has managed to endure, three factors appear essential. One is force, pure and simple. With all pretence of democracy gone, Mao’s dictum becomes the bottom line: Power grows out of the barrel of a gun. North Korea’s relentless militarization is thus no surprise, nor is its formalization by Kim Jong-il as Songun (military-first policy): even twisting Marxist theory to make soldiers, not workers, the revolution’s driving force.

Unlikely generals

How far Songun has come was clear from the rare conference on September 28 of the nominally ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). At least the WPK now has a Poliburo and a Central Committee (CC) again; both had atrophied since Kim Il-sung died in 1994. And of course the main point was to hail the new princeling. But first things first. On the eve of the meeting Kim Jong-eun – aged 27, with no known military experience – was made a four-star general.

So was his equally civilian aunt Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong-il’s younger sister, whose field is light industry. Only then did Kim Jong-eun acquire Party rank: as a CC member and (crucially) as joint vice-chairman of the WPK’s Central Military Committee (CMC). (Connoisseurs of comparative communism may care to note that China’s vice-president Xi Jinping, widely seen as President Hu Jintao’s successor, acquired exactly the same position on October 18.)

But back to North Korea. Nephew and aunt look an unconvincing pair of generals – what do real soldiers make of this? – but the symbolism and pecking order are clear. What counts in Pyongyang these days is the Korean People’s Army (KPA). And while Kim Il-sung as an ex-guerilla had the kudos to control the KPA, his pampered son lacked that clout. Indeed, when the Dear Leader dies an actual military takeover looks a distinct possibility. That isn’t the Kims’ plan, however, so two additional strategies have been devised to try to prevent this.

One is family rule. Kim Il-sung took that step as early as 1966. The last time the WPK held a delegates’ meeting like the one we have just seen in Pyongyang – 44 years ago: due process is not North Korea’s forte – it was to be told the startling news that their leader had picked his younger brother Kim Yong-ju – later out-maneuvered by Kim Jong-il, but thought to be still alive at age 90 – as successor. That stuck in some throats, even of those who had seen how ruthlessly Kim purged his foes a decade earlier – they used Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech denouncing Stalin to try to get rid of him, but failed. The lucky ones managed to flee to the USSR and China. Thereafter Kim’s cult of personality grew apace, but extending this to his brother was a step too far for some. Those rash enough to voice objections were duly purged.

Communist monarchy
Communist monarchy: what a grotesque paradox. Yet there is a double logic to this. First, at the end of the day who can you trust? Especially in a culture that prizes filial piety, your own family looks the best bet. Kim Jong-il certainly thinks so, promoting not only his son but his sister – Kim Kyong-hui also becomes a full Politburo member – and of course her husband Jang Song-taek, now an alternate Politburo member as well as a vice-chair of the National Defense Commission (NDC), the highest executive body of state outranking the Cabinet.

Second: In a state barely 60 years old, but preceded by centuries of Confucian monarchy and (more immediately) four decades of emperor-worship under Japanese occupation (1905-45), keeping it in the Kim family presses powerful buttons. Or to put it more sociologically, this mode of essentially patriarchal legitimation of rulers is familiar, indeed deeply ingrained.

On October 8 Yang Hyong-sop, a veteran Politburo member aged 85, told Associated Press Television News (APTN): ”Our people take pride in the fact that they are blessed with great leaders from generation to generation… Our people are honored to serve the great president Kim Il-sung and the great general Kim Jong-il. Now we also have the honor of serving young general Kim Jong-eun.”

He sounded deeply traditional: a loyal courtier to his kings. But North Korea’s communist origins mean it can’t admit it has become a monarchy, so this isn’t quite enough. Both the ruler, and even more his successor, have to justify their rule in some other way. This is the third factor, and it takes two forms – or more precisely, stages.

The first is a cult of personality: originated by Stalin, extended by Mao, and pushed to its extremes by Kim Il-sung. Hey, if a guy claims absolute right to rule, he’d better be special. This is what the German sociologist Max Weber called charisma: a term which has entered the language in a looser sense. Or if he’s not so special, you make up stories to pretend he is. These may be ludicrous, but woe betide anyone rash enough to giggle or cast aspersions.

Yet as Weber saw, as a mode of rule charisma has problems. Unlike traditional authority – a monarchy proper, for instance – charisma is vested in just one exceptional individual. What happens when they die? The challenge, in Weber’s rather ugly term, is to routinize charisma.

Immortal presidents
Well, North Korea has done that. One way is to make the hero immortal. Kim Il-sung is still ”eternal president”, despite being dead for 16 years. The final step, logical enough, is to turn adoration into veneration and in effect create a religion. Again the recent WPK meeting is a case in point. Pouring into Pyongyang from every corner of the land, what was the first thing the delegates did? Before the conference came an act of worship. As a group, they all visited the ”sacred temple of Juche”. That’s how the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) refers to Kumsusan Memorial Palace: where Kim Il-sung lived and worked, and where even now his embalmed corpse keeps a glass eye on things. KCNA noted that the delegates ”paid high tribute” even to Kim’s statue, and ”made deep bows to the president” in person.

Weird, yet it makes a kind of sense. To sum up so far. Trotsky’s grimly accurate forecast of what happens when an elite thinks it knows better than the people it purports to represent – first the party, then a clique, and finally a dictator – is only half the story. For the dictator to hold onto power, even after his death, entails three further steps: militarization, family rule, and a quasi-religious cult. Or at least that’s what North Korea’s peculiar evolution suggests.

Two caveats. This isn’t a complete sociology of power in North Korea, obviously. A fuller account would look more at the role of ideology. This too has mutated far from communism into what Brian Myers bluntly calls ”race-based nationalism”. His book The Cleanest Race examines North Korea’s internal propaganda. The story the regime tells its people about the world and their place in it is even nastier, narrower and more noxious than you’d imagine. Read it, especially if tempted to believe that this regime genuinely wants to make peace.

Can it last?
Second, I dare to hope for a happy ending. Kim Il-sung’s sociological nous has kept the state he created alive longer than many (me included) had expected. But can it go on for ever?

That I doubt. A full answer would loose more hares than there’s room for here. In the 21st century, refusing market reforms is a recipe for self-destruction. Abroad, North Korea’s old game of militant mendicancy, despite some success from the Sino-Soviet dispute right up to the six-party talks, is past its sell-by date; other powers are fed up and won’t play any more.

But just to stick to the processes already mentioned, these too are far from foolproof. The weakest link is familism. Past history, in Korea or anywhere – think of the Borgias in Italy – suggests that monarchies or other forms of family rule can be riddled by strife. Some crown princes just aren’t up to the job. People plot, and before you know it the knives are out.

Specifically, promoting a third son over his elder siblings is asking for trouble. What does number one son think? On October 12 he told us. Interviewed in Beijing by Japan’s Asahi TV, Kim Jong-nam broke ranks, saying: ”Personally, I am against third-generation dynastic succession”. Adding that he didn’t care, and would help little brother ”while I stay abroad”, doesn’t make this any less of a bombshell. Kim Jong-nam has gone off-message, big time.

Nor is he the only one. Even in Pyongyang the mask is slipping. The WPK conference and subsequent military parade seem to have passed off smoothly, but dissent is growing. One recent visiting group (which included a Korean-speaker) heard a full-scale row between their guides – it was evening, and drink had been taken – as to what right Kim Jong-eun had to be foisted on them as leader. That is still dangerous talk; but many more will be thinking it. The young general has much to prove, and may not have long to do so. Interesting times.

Aidan Foster-Carter is honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University, and a freelance consultant, writer and broadcaster on Korean affairs. A regular visitor to the peninsula, he has followed Korea for over 40 years.