Why Does Rage Define ‘Parasite’ and Other Popular East Asian Movies?

Thessaly La Force
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/t-magazine/asia-movies-parasite.html

Many thriller and horror films from Japan, China and South Korea reveal a complicated relationship between those societies and the ancient tenets of Confucianism.

THE CENTRAL OBJECT in the director Bong Joon Ho’s newest film, “Parasite,” which won the Palme d’Or at this year’s Cannes Film Festival, is a suseok, or an ornamental rock. Scholar’s rocks, as they are also called, represent the unity of humans and the cosmos as venerated in Confucianism. They are formed by nature into aesthetically pleasing shapes — and, as we soon learn in “Parasite,” are harbingers of good luck. The film opens with the Kim family, who live in a basement apartment on a dead-end street in Seoul. They are broke and unemployed, resorting to folding pizza boxes for a nearby restaurant to make money. By chance, the son of the family, Ki-woo, is visited by a former classmate, Min, who is quitting his gig as an English tutor to a wealthy schoolgirl to study abroad and wants Ki-woo to take over. Before leaving, Min gives the Kims a suseok that once belonged to his grandfather. Fortune is such an abstract idea to the struggling Kims that Ki-woo’s mother, Chung-sook, wonders why Min couldn’t have just brought them something to eat instead.

And yet, whether through coincidence or the rock’s ancient powers, the moment the suseok enters the Kims’ lives, their luck changes. Ki-woo arrives at the home of the Park family, a Modernist palace set in the upper-class Seongbuk-dong neighborhood situated high above the rest of the city. Going by the name Kevin, he shows the sweet and gullible Mrs. Park a doctored diploma, which she dismisses — personal recommendations matter more than paperwork. Her other child is a difficult and artistic little boy, and Ki-woo slyly suggests that Mrs. Park hire an art tutor he knows, Jessica, who is in fact his sister, Ki-jung. Soon, through a series of subtle deceptions and maneuvers, the Kims infiltrate every part of the Park household’s staff: Their father, Ki-taek, takes over as chauffeur after the Kims lead the Parks to believe that their previous driver is a sexual deviant; their mother replaces the housekeeper, Moon-gwang, after the Kims convince the Parks (falsely, of course) that Moon-gwang has tuberculosis.

In this way, the Kims turn the Parks into a financial life raft, and their scheme seems perfectly sound until they discover an even lower-class leech living among them: the former housekeeper’s husband, who, hunted by loan sharks, has been stashed away by his wife in a subbasement that even the Parks aren’t aware exists. The room is heavily symbolic — the poorer the person is in “Parasite,” the farther underground he dwells — and yet it is also a practicality: Rooms such as this, we are told, are a common amenity in wealthy homes, a safeguard against nuclear attack, perhaps, or a place to hide your worst secrets. This discovery throws the Kims’ plans into disarray and, like Chekhov’s gun, the suseok returns, not as a symbol of fortune but as a weapon, setting off an explosion of violence with a Shakespearean-level death toll.

If a desire for wealth propels “Parasite,” then class differences are the film’s foundation. Mrs. Park is “nice because she’s rich,” says Chung-sook, observing what money actually affords people. And yet the suseok is a metaphor for something more ancient — the Confucian philosophy that still influences South Korean society, a place where fundamental beliefs about obedience and respect have been manipulated to create a highly wealthy and functional economy, one in which women are not considered equal to men and where there is an ever-widening divide between rich and poor: the result of a relentless pursuit of rapid economic growth.

Like South Korean cinema, the staples of East Asian and some Southeast Asian cinema are steeped in florid personal vengeance narratives — from Akira Kurosawa’s 1957 “Throne of Blood,” an adaptation of Macbeth, to Kim Ki-young’s psychosexual 1960 thriller “The Housemaid” (and its equally disturbing 2010 remake by Im Sang-soo) to the vengeful ghosts of Japan’s 1998 horror film “Ringu” to the ultraviolence of Park Chan-wook’s vengeance trilogy, which includes the acclaimed 2003 movie “Oldboy.” These films are among the most violent and gruesome in cinematic history: gothic spectacles of anger and obsession. They present families and relationships that seemingly obey the tenets of a harmonious society. But eventually, something goes wrong, harmony is disrupted and violence ensues. All of the films contain elements of exoticism: Submissive women are seduced; a man eats a live octopus. These details reveal, in part, why these movies surprise and delight American audiences. But below the surface is a deeper rupture. These movies both reinforce certain Confucian values and simultaneously combat stereotypes about Asians: that they are obedient, dutiful, loyal, timid and fearful. Of course, nothing could be further from the truth.

Just as Alfred Hitchcock invented an entirely new genre of film by channeling European wartime anxiety, films such as “Parasite” challenge globalization and its effects. The Park family displays their wealth not just in their ability to afford a full-time staff but also in their embrace of Western culture. Mr. Park works for a multinational company; Mrs. Park casually drops English words into her speech. Yet what powers the story is the profound rage that runs beneath all the characters’ lives, an infection about to erupt.

CONFUCIANISM ORIGINATED IN ancient China with the scholar and philosopher Confucius, who was born in 551 B.C. After being formally adopted as a political ideology during the Han dynasty (from 206 B.C. to A.D. 220), a golden age of learning and law whose influence lasted for nearly two millenniums, it traveled east, first to Korea and then Japan, by means of its own popularity but also the dominance of the Chinese Empire. Confucianism proposes the idea that people are fundamentally good, that we are capable of improving ourselves through education and self-cultivation. It emphasizes loyalty, sacrificing one’s own goals and satisfaction in order to maintain traditional hierarchies and the status quo: A citizen is faithful to his country, the son to the father, the wife to her husband, the younger brother to his older brother. In more contemporary times, the philosophy has re-emerged as a political ideology: In 2013, President Xi Jinping of China made a pilgrimage to Qufu, Confucius’s hometown, and promised to make “the past serve the present.” But it has also occasionally been used — much in the way democratic ideals are employed to promote a neoliberal, Western agenda — to justify the larger mechanics of political maneuvering. On the one hand, it’s surprising that these East Asian societies that so value obedience should have perfected the revenge narrative in popular culture, though on the other, it isn’t at all: When the idea of obedience is used to justify authoritarian governments and socially rigid hierarchies, rebellion is never far-off.

But why is cinema, in particular, such a powerful tool for telling stories of rage and revenge? The contemporary literature of East and Southeast Asia also touches on these topics: The 2007 South Korean novel “The Vegetarian,” by Han Kang, tells of a wife’s revulsion to meat that upends her place in society; the short stories of the Japanese writer Taeko Kono, whose violent fantasies of disemboweling toddlers can be difficult to read, speak to a deep-seated rage of being an independent woman in 1960s Japan. But fear is more easily manufactured with movies, a visual medium that lends itself well to making the gruesome and ridiculous seem possible.

Movies are also easier to export. Martial arts films of the ’60s and ’70s required little in the way of dialogue — the plot was advanced by a well-choreographed fight. Similarly, these revenge films rely on a lexicon of violence: Nearly every culture understands the danger of a hidden gun, of looking into dark corners during the middle of the night. And as disparate as these films can be, they’ve also created visual tropes of their own: Eyeballs and ears are gouged with blunt objects, people are shot point blank, people fling themselves from buildings. Women — thin and unsparing, tough and uninterested in sex — often take center stage. Sex, incidentally, is rarely a focal point, but when it is, it is in service of character development or humor — “Buy me drugs,” Mrs. Park coos to her husband in “Parasite” in the middle of the act, in a scene that is as bizarre as it is pathetic. By contrast, in American horrors and thrillers, a woman who has been sexualized onscreen is usually the first to die.

THE REVENGE NARRATIVE of East Asian cinema is often rooted in the breaking of tradition. Jia Zhangke’s 2013 “A Touch of Sin” examines what happens when individuals choose to confront corruption and inequality. It tells four loosely intermingled stories of a group of ordinary Chinese citizens; the first centers on Dahai, a poor villager in Northern China’s Shanxi Province, who is angry that the village boss of the local coal mine hasn’t fairly distributed the profits from its sale. What follows is a classic sequence of violence, in which Dahai, rifle in hand, enacts bloody revenge against each person who has caused him distress — from the coal mine owner to the idiot farmer who savagely whips his horse. It’s hard not to cheer for Dahai, who represents a simple desire for equality, as he leaves a path of bodies behind him — here is someone who seems to be broadcasting his anguish beyond his private enemies and onto society as a whole.

Which is to say that the morality in “A Touch of Sin,” as in “Parasite,” is askew. This, too, has become one of the major emblems in today’s Asian cinema. Near the end of Chan-wook’s 2005 “Lady Vengeance,” a young woman named Lee Geum-ja, who has been wrongfully imprisoned for 13 years for the death of a 5-year-old boy, finally has the man actually responsible for the crime tied up before her. She offers the assembled group of parents whose children were also murdered by the man a choice: They can hand the case over to the detective (who is also present) or they can solve the problem themselves. They choose the latter, and the resulting scene is at once violent, cathartic, therapeutic, restorative but also utterly grotesque and horrifying.

It’s telling that most of these films, unlike most of Western cinema, rarely incorporate an authority figure such as the police or a judge — if they do appear, it is often as an accessory. The fight for justice nearly always happens on the individual level, but in the interest of a shared goal of vengeance, which is both a repudiation of Confucianism as well as an embrace of it. If Western films depict vigilantism as romantic, East Asian films embrace the idea that the individual is sometimes the best person to answer to his wrongs. Western horrors and thrillers operate with and against Puritanical values — evil is innate and must be purged, purity is often defiled and can never be recovered. But the Analects, an ancient text composed of ideas and sayings directly attributed to Confucius, espouses the transformative power of virtue. Nothing should be coerced, nothing forced. Confucius said: “Not to mend one’s ways when one has erred is to err indeed.” Justice is more complex when one has been wronged, and when morality becomes disconnected from a clear set of laws. In a Confucian society, where there is no distinct sense of heaven or hell, where a deity will not necessarily punish you for your sins and where citizens must ultimately manage one another, these movies suggest a different course of action. Violence is not necessarily immoral, if done for the right reasons. Just be aware of what such actions ultimately do to one’s self. As Confucius also said: “Recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with kindness.”

THERE IS A Korean word, han, that has been used to describe the violence of Asian cinema. The word doesn’t have an English equivalent but encompasses feelings such as suffering, anger, resignation, grief, pain, longing and revenge. The term became popular in the 1970s, as Koreans advocated for a kind of cultural authenticity. But its origins are from the Japanese occupation of Korea in the early 20th century, when the Japanese art critic Yanagi Soetsu described the artworks of Korea he admired as possessing a kind of “beauty of sorrow.” In the ’70s, the poet Kim Chi Ha likened han to a “people eating monster,” saying that “accumulated han is inherited and transmitted, boiling in the blood of the people.” “Han” may be a distinctly Korean term, but it is the one that best describes contemporary Asian cinema writ large as it attempts to reckon the present with its past — it stands for a collective trauma, a larger idea of suffering that can move through generations and settles into the bedrock of history. Today, the idea of loyalty, of obedience and self-improvement, can seem hopelessly outdated, as can the idea of achieving a collective harmony in the face of poverty and greed. Rage is a destructive emotion in this equation, but within art, it is also radical and, in rare moments, elucidating. The best of these films understand that the outcome of pitting people against one another can be violent, that it will invariably end badly. But they also understand that a repressive society can transform individuals into monsters.

In “Parasite,” none of the families involved are responsible for the inequality of the society that has made their situations so different, and neither are they necessarily best equipped to answer for it. These films appeal to a need to confront a deeply inflexible world. They’re not interested in showing the hero’s journey that results in both victory and a personal transformation. Which is why we cheer for our doomed protagonists even when we know that tragedy is inevitable. These films make us recognize that our desires and our impulses — our sense of what is wrong and right, but also what we irrationally want — are often rooted in a past that can be hard to see, like the edges of a riverbed from which a beautiful limestone rock was once lifted.

https://twitter.com/muqingmq/status/1199018928535568385

I Grew Up Around Korean Beauty Products. Americans, You’ve Been Had.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/opinion/sunday/korean-beauty-products-america.html

By Euny Hong

I admit it: I use Korean snail slime face serum. It’s purported to contain anti-aging properties. I have no opinion as to whether snails are particularly young-looking, but my experience is that their excretions do work on humans. That aside, as someone who grew up among Korean beauty products, I find the world’s sudden fascination with Korean skin care, and its now-famous 12-step regimen, to be comical.

Dozens of articles in the Western press claim that Korean beauty innovation is 10 years ahead of the rest of the world. So … in beauty terms, South Korea is in the year 2027?

It gets better: “K-beauty,” as it is often called, is not just futuristic; it’s ancient as well. According to at least three English-language beauty websites, Korean skin care rituals date back to some purported document from 700 B.C. If Koreans have had a 12-step skin care program for 2,700 years, I’m not sure why they decided to sit on it until the 1990s. But no matter.

In the last six years, Korean cosmetics in the United States have gone from nonexistent to almost mainstream. According to data from Kotra, Korea’s trade promotion agency, K-beauty exports to the United States more than doubled from 2014 to 2016. The global cosmetics chain Sephora started carrying K-beauty products in 2011. Other retail chains followed suit, including Urban Outfitters, Ulta and the drugstore chain CVS, all of them touting products with ingredients like chrysanthemum and ginseng. How did Americans come to view South Korea as this beautiful-skinned Eden, when, until a few decades ago, it was impoverished and chokingly polluted.

I lived in Seoul from ages 12 to 18. South Korea was still a developing country when I arrived in 1985, when its inflation-adjusted per capita G.D.P. was about one-fourth of what it is today. Its growing pains showed in the country’s dodgy goods.

These days, K-beauty products come in sculptured packaging and smell like an upscale spa. But when I was growing up, Korean skin creams were all the same shade of toilet-paper pink, and they smelled like Glade PlugIns. Any Korean with means used French and American cosmetics (and the Japanese brand Shiseido). No one had ever heard of such a thing as a 12-step regime.

That all changed in the early 1990s. South Korea became wealthy; the quality of everything from cars to CD players improved. Then, in 1998, spurred by the Asian financial crisis, the Korean government altered its economic strategy, branching out from heavy industry and electronics-focused conglomerates into pop culture businesses. Korea was rebranded a “cool” country.

Most of this new “coolness” took the form of mass-produced and exported cinema, television and pop music. But all Korean industries benefited. The popular Korean beauty chains Innisfree and the Face Shop both opened in the early 2000s — around the same time that we first started hearing about the Korean triple cleanse.

Until very recently, K-beauty’s presence in the West was largely a matter of prestige, not money. It was the Asian market that really mattered, especially China. It still does: In 2016, China bought about 38 percent of K-beauty exports and Hong Kong 30 percent, according to Kotra.

But geopolitics may be forcing the K-beauty industry to pivot westward. South Korea has been rethinking the precariousness of an export strategy that is too dependent on China, a country that is not only allied with North Korea, but is also becoming a direct competitor in manufacturing and of late, pop culture and television dramas.

Korean industry got a glimpse of the perils of mixing politics and trade in July 2016, when South Korea announced that it would deploy the American-made Thaad missile defense system. China perceived the move as hostileand threatened sanctions; in March, Chinese tourism in South Korea was down 40 percent from the same month in 2016, resulting in an estimated loss of $6.5 billion in revenue.

South Korea put the Thaad project on hold this June, and the two nations appear to be on better terms now. Still, the backlash gave Korean business a fright and an impetus to seek out new markets. It’s no coincidence that South Korea’s top boy band, BTS, chose this year to make a splashy American debut, while the Korean bakery chain Paris Baguette announced recently that it was planning to open at least 300 more stores in the United States by 2020.

And K-beauty, too, has moved aggressively. Innisfree, which offers products from the volcanic Korean island of Jeju, opened a Manhattan branch in September. AmorePacific, one of South Korea’s oldest beauty companies, plans to open 100 American branches of its retail chain Aritaum, a sort of Korean Sephora, within the next three years.

It’s clear what the K-beauty industry wants from the West: a market that isn’t fraught with messy geopolitics. But what explains why K-beauty has been embraced in the West with such gusto? Has the old Orientalist belief in ancient Asian beauty secrets struck again? There are certainly echoes of this in the marketing. Sulwhasoo, part of the AmorePacific family, advertises its products as containing “Korean herbal medicine drawn from Asian wisdom.”

Or is it because Korean women themselves, with their glowing complexions, are serving as walking advertisements for the power of K-beauty? If so, America, you’ve been had: ginseng and Jeju volcano water are not the whole story behind that flawless skin.

For the past several years, beauty-obsessed South Korea has been among the world’s capitals of cosmetic surgery. Some 20 percent of Korean women have had some form of work done.

Then, there’s Botox. Several Korean news outlets this year reported a studyfinding that 42 percent of Korean women ages 21 to 55 have had either Botox or filler injections.

Many wrinkle creams worldwide contain retinol, a vitamin A derivative that is harmless in small doses but not large ones. Some Korean cosmetics contain concentrations of retinol as high as 3.8 percent — about twice that of their highest-concentrated American counterparts.

Ancient beauty secrets, or Accutane? Korean doctors prescribe isotretinoin-based acne medicine “indiscriminately,” to quote the Korean daily JoongAng Ilbo, despite the risk of serious side effects.

If there are such things as “Korean beauty secrets” they seem to amount to this: Put a lot of time, money and energy into your skin, and you’ll probably see results (just don’t export too much to China).

But what do I know? I’m the one putting snail slime on my face.

——————

Euny Hong is the author of “The Birth of Korean Cool: How One Nation Is Conquering the World Through Pop Culture.”

Korea Execution Is Tied to Clash Over Businesses

By CHOE SANG-HUN and DAVID E. SANGER
Published: December 23, 2013

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/world/asia/north-korea-purge.html

SEOUL, South Korea — The execution of the uncle of Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, had its roots in a firefight between forces loyal to Mr. Kim and those supporting the man who was supposed to be his regent, according to accounts that are being pieced together by South Korean and American officials. The clash was over who would profit from North Korea’s most lucrative exports: coal, clams and crabs.

North Korean military forces were deployed to retake control of one of the sources of those exports, the rich crab and clam fishing grounds that Jang Song-thaek, the uncle of the country’s untested, 30-year-old leader, had seized from the military. In the battle for control of the fishing grounds, the emaciated, poorly trained North Korean forces “were beaten — very badly — by Uncle Jang’s loyalists,” according to one official.

The rout of his forces appears to have been the final straw for Mr. Kim, who saw his 67-year-old uncle as a threat to his authority over the military and, just as important, to his own family’s dwindling sources of revenue. Eventually, at Mr. Kim’s order, the North Korean military came back with a larger force and prevailed. Soon, Mr. Jang’s two top lieutenants were executed.

The two men died in front of a firing squad. But instead of rifles, the squad used antiaircraft machine guns, a form of execution that according to South Korean intelligence officials and news media was similar to the one used against some North Korean artists in August. Days later, Mr. Jang himself was publicly denounced, tried and executed, by more traditional means.

Given the opaqueness of North Korea’s inner circle, many details of the struggle between Mr. Kim and his uncle remain murky. But what is known suggests that while Mr. Kim has consolidated control and eliminated a potential rival, it has been at a huge cost: The open warfare between the two factions has revealed a huge fracture inside the country’s elite over who pockets the foreign currency — mostly Chinese renminbi — the country earns from the few nonnuclear exports its trading partners desire.

Only a few months ago Mr. Jang was believed to be the second most powerful man in North Korea. In fact, American intelligence agencies had reported to the White House and the State Department in late 2011 that he could well be running the country behind the scenes — and might edge out his inexperienced nephew for control. In part that was based on his deep relationship with top officials in China, as well as his extensive business connections there.

His highly unusual public humiliation and execution on Dec. 12 set off speculation about the possibility of a power struggle within the secretive government. But in recent days a more complex, nuanced story has emerged.

During a closed-door meeting on Monday of the South Korean National Assembly’s intelligence committee, Nam Jae-joon, the director of the National Intelligence Service, disputed the North’s assertion that Mr. Jang had tried to usurp his nephew’s power. Rather, he said, Mr. Jang and his associates had provoked the enmity of rivals within the North’s elite by dominating lucrative business deals, starting with the coal badly needed by China, the North’s main trading partner.

“There had been friction building up among the agencies of power in North Korea over privileges and over the abuse of power by Jang Song-thaek and his associates,” Mr. Nam was quoted as saying. Mr. Nam’s comments were relayed to the news media by Jeong Cheong-rae and Cho Won-jin, two lawmakers designated as spokesmen for the parliamentary committee.

In interviews, officials have said that the friction described in general terms to the South Korean Parliament played out in a violent confrontation in late September or early October, just north of the western sea border between the Koreas.

There, the North harvests one of its major exports: crabs and clams, delicacies that are also highly valued by the Chinese. For years the profits from those fishing grounds, along with the output from munitions factories and trading companies, went directly to the North Korean military, helping it feed its troops, and enabling its top officers to send cash gifts to the Kim family.

South Korea was a major market for the North’s mushrooms, clams, crabs, abalones and sea cucumbers until the South cut off trade with the North after the sinking of a South Korean Navy ship in 2010, forcing the North Korean military to rely on the Chinese market.

But when Mr. Kim succeeded his father two years ago, he took away some of the military’s fishing and trading rights and handed them to his cabinet, which he designated as the main agency to revive the economy. Mr. Jang was believed to have been a leading proponent of curtailing the military’s economic power.

Mr. Jang appears to have consolidated many of those trading rights under his own control — meaning that profits from the coal, crabs and clams went into his accounts, or those of state institutions under his control, including the administrative department of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, which he headed.

But this fall, the long-brewing tensions that arrangement created broke into the open. Radio Free Asia, in a report last week that cited anonymous North Korean sources, reported that Mr. Kim saw North Korean soldiers malnourished during his recent visits to islands near the disputed western sea border. They say he ordered Mr. Jang to hand over the operation of nearby fishing grounds back to the military.

According to accounts put together by South Korean and American officials, Mr. Jang and his associates resisted. When a company of about 150 North Korean soldiers showed up at the farm, Mr. Jang’s loyalists refused to hand over the operation, insisting that Mr. Jang himself would have to approve. The confrontation escalated into a gun battle, and Radio Free Asia reports that two soldiers were killed and that the army backed off. Officials say the number of casualties is unknown, but they have received similar accounts.

It is hard to know exactly how large a role the episode played in Mr. Jang’s downfall — there is more money in coal than in seafood — but Mr. Kim was reportedly enraged when he heard of the clash. Mr. Nam said that by mid-November his agents were already reporting that Mr. Jang had been detained. The Dec. 12 verdict noted that Mr. Jang “instructed his stooges to sell coal and other precious underground resources at random.”

Mr. Nam said the fact that such behind-the-scenes tensions had spun so far out of control that Mr. Kim had to order his own uncle’s execution raised questions about the government’s internal unity.

“The fissure within the regime could accelerate if it further loses popular support,” the lawmakers quoted Mr. Nam as saying.

Mr. Jang was the husband of Kim Kyong-hui, the only sister of Mr. Kim’s father, the longtime leader Kim Jong-il. Mr. Nam told the committee Monday that Mr. Kim’s aunt had retained her position in the hierarchy, even while the purge of Mr. Jang’s other associates continued. But he denied news reports in South Korea and Japan that some of Mr. Jang’s associates were seeking political asylum in Seoul and Beijing.

Mr. Nam pointed to Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, the top political officer in the North Korean People’s Army, and Kim Won-hong, the head of the North’s secret police and its intelligence chief, as the government’s new rising figures since Mr. Jang’s execution, the two lawmakers said.

A Writer Evokes Loss on South Korea’s Path to Success

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/08/world/asia/shin-kyung-sook-mines-south-koreas-sense-of-loss.html

LIKE so many South Korean parents at the time, Shin Kyung-sook’s mother saw education as her daughter’s best chance of escaping poverty and backbreaking work in the rice fields. So in 1978 she took her 15-year-old daughter to Seoul, where Ms. Shin would lie about her age to get a factory job while attending high school at night to pursue her dream of becoming a novelist.

Seoul-bound trains at the time, like the one mother and daughter boarded that night, picked up many young rural South Koreans along the way — part of the migration that fueled South Korea’s industrialization but forever changed its traditional family life.

It is that social upheaval that Ms. Shin evoked in her most famous novel to date, “Please Look After Mom,” which earned her the 2011 Man Asian Literary Prize and a commercial success attained by few other Korean writers. (Sales in South Korea passed two million this spring, and the book has been published in 19 other countries, including the United States.)

That book and a more recent one, “I Will Be Right There,” about friendship and love set in the country’s political turmoil of the 1980s, are part of a body of work over three decades that has set Ms. Shin apart as one of the most accomplished chroniclers of modern South Korea.

“In her novels, readers have the chance to pause and reflect upon the other side of their society’s breakneck race for economic growth, what they have lost in that pursuit and upon people who were left behind in the mad rush,” said Shin Soo-jeong, a professor of Korean literature at Myongji University in Seoul.

In “Please Look After Mom,” an elderly woman from the countryside travels to Seoul to visit her adult children and gets lost in what is quite literally a mad rush: the scramble to get on a Seoul subway. Reviewers have called her disappearance a metaphor for the profound sense of loss in a society that hurtled from an agrarian dictatorship to an industrialized democracy within a single and often tumultuous generation.

That feeling has not overwhelmed South Koreans’ pride in their country’s accomplishments, notably its rise from abject poverty to the world’s 13th-largest economy. But the sense of loss taps into a growing unease over some of the costs of that success, especially a widening gap between rich and poor and a generation of elderly people left largely to fend for themselves as their adult children work in cities.

The filial guilt that suffuses the novel is universal, but also has a particularly Korean spin.

Until a generation ago in South Korea, at least one adult child — usually the eldest son and his family — lived with aging parents until their deaths. Now, a growing number of older people live alone in their rural villages or in the nursing homes that are springing up across the country. Often, they have little money left, having invested their savings in their children’s educations with the expectation that the children would prosper and eventually care for them.

The children, meanwhile, living in a hypercompetitive society where people work some of the longest hours in the world, often lament that they are too harried to visit their elderly parents. Many also fear using too much vacation time, afraid of being seen as disloyal to their companies.

IN what Ms. Shin says is probably the most important sentence in her novel, the missing mother expresses what many guilt-ridden readers imagine as their own mothers’ sense of helplessness at having been effectively abandoned by their children. In a scene in which the old woman imagines meeting her own dead mother, she wonders: “Did Mom know? That I, too, needed her my entire life?”

Ms. Shin’s life, which tracked the trajectory of her country’s rise, prepared her well for her role as an interpreter of her generation. Born in the countryside like so many characters in her novels, Ms. Shin, 49, now lives in an expensive residential district in Seoul. Her husband is a college professor as well as a poet and literary critic. They have no children.

From an early age, she was a voracious reader, hiding herself away with books her elder brothers brought home. (She was the fourth of six children.) By the time she was 15, she was increasingly certain she wanted to write for a living.

After their arrival in Seoul on that night train in 1978, her mother left her in the care of an older brother in a crammed room in a slum. While he worked in a government office by day and attended college at night, Ms. Shin worked in an audio and television parts factory and attended high school in the evenings.

She was one of the youngest employees in the factory, where she witnessed the labor discontent that sometimes rocked South Korea as its economy galloped ahead but many workers toiled in sweatshop conditions.

“The girl sitting next to me at the night school had no fingerprints; she worked all day wrapping candies in a confectionery,” Ms. Shin said in an interview. “Most of my classmates sent part of their meager wages back home to support their little brothers’ and sisters’ education. When they came to class, they were so tired most of them dozed.”

At her own factory, a clash involving one of the country’s growing number of labor unions turned violent as managers deployed their own security guards, who joined with the police in cracking down on workers organizing for higher pay and better conditions.

Ms. Shin stayed inside, amid the idled conveyor belts, taking her mind off the mayhem by copying a new novel about the urban poor in longhand.

In the end, Ms. Shin was the only one in her high school class to win admission to college, as a creative writing major. She eventually wrote about life at the factory in “A Lone Room,” one of her most acclaimed novels. Its French translation won the Prix de l’Inaperçu in 2009.

“I wonder what would have become of me in those days if I hadn’t had the goal of becoming a writer to hang on to,” she said. “I was determined that one day I would write about what I saw and felt.”

FOR several years after college, she supported her writing with odd jobs: writing scripts for a classical music radio station and reading books to blind people. But by 1993, she was successful enough to be able to write novels and short stories full time.

She also was able to fulfill a personal promise: to repay her own mother’s sacrifices for her children. The day they went to Seoul, she remembers, her mother’s face was etched with weariness.

“I promised myself then that one day I would write a beautiful book for Mom,” she said.

That book, “Please Look After Mom,” solidified her standing as one of South Korea’s finest living novelists and won her accolades.

Her mother’s reaction was decidedly more muted, typical of a generation of women who pushed their children hard to succeed but were accustomed to restraining their own emotions, even when those children met or exceeded their family’s high expectations.

As Ms. Shin recounted, “She only said, ‘My dear, you have done well.’ ”

A North Korean Corleone

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/opinion/sunday/a-north-korean-corleone.html

WHAT kind of deal do you make with a 20-something who just inherited not only a country, but also the mantle of one of the world’s most sophisticated crime families? When Kim Jong-un, who is thought to be 28 or 29, became North Korea’s leader in December after the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, he became the de facto head of a mafia state.

How the new leader combines the roles of head of state and mafia don will influence the regime’s future behavior. Crime bosses have different incentives, and dealing with them requires different policies. And any deal — including last week’s agreement by North Korea to suspend its nuclear program in exchange for American food aid — will eventually falter if that reality is ignored.

Kim Jong-un confronts the same problem faced by every dictator: how to generate enough money to pay off the small group of elite supporters — army generals, party and family — who keep him in power. Other autocrats use oil wealth or parcel out whole industries to cronies.

But whoever rules North Korea has less to work with than most. The country defaulted in the 1970s, losing access to international credit, and Soviet subsidies ended with the cold war. In the 1990s, the founder and “eternal president,” Kim Il-sung, died just as a series of natural disasters devastated food production. The country has been an economic and humanitarian basket case ever since.

Kim Jong-il, who began training to run the country in the 1970s and inherited it after his father’s death, came up with an unconventional solution: state-sponsored organized crime. Counterfeit cigarettes and medicine, drugs, insurance fraud, fake money, trafficking people and endangered species — for decades, the Kim regime has done it all. Its operations became so extensive and well coordinated that American officials nicknamed it the “Soprano state,” after the hit HBO television series.

In the 1970s, after the default, North Korea used diplomats as drug mules to keep embassies running. When that got them kicked out of multiple countries and the economy tanked in the 1990s, Kim Jong-il began producing drugs at home, thereby avoiding a major cost plaguing drug lords elsewhere: law enforcement.

He managed these operations through Bureau 39, a mysterious office under the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party. But to create plausible deniability, he outsourced distribution to Russian mafia, Japanese yakuza and Chinese triad gangs, who met North Korean military forces for drug drops at sea. The regime also manufactured the world’s best counterfeit dollars — so good that they reportedly forced the Treasury to redesign the $100 bill — and used a crime ring connected to the Official Irish Republican Army, a Marxist offshoot of the I.R.A., to launder them in Europe. They even made fake Viagra.

The Agreed Framework that froze North Korea’s nuclear program in October 1994 didn’t stop these activities; they actually increased. Despite its other benefits, the framework didn’t address the fundamental hard currency needs of the North Korean leadership.

This criminal legacy means that Kim Jong-un has even more on his plate than one might think. In addition to running a country that is an economic and humanitarian disaster and a geopolitical hot spot, he also has to manage a global criminal racket. That’s a lot for any 20-something to handle. (As “Sopranos” fans know, A. J.’s taking over for Tony might not have been good for business.)

Despite the seemingly stable transition so far, Kim Jong-un is under pressure. Elite party members who supported his father will be skeptical of his untested ability to fulfill his side of their cash-for-support bargain. And North Korea needs more money than usual this year to celebrate the anniversaries of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. (In the ’70s, one of the first things Kim Jong-il used foreign currency for was a campaign to glorify his father.) Any sign that Kim Jong-un can’t satisfy supporters could crack the facade of elite solidarity.

What’s an aspiring kingpin to do?

First, find the money. Kim Jong-un seems to have done that. One of the last photos released of Kim Jong-il shows him riding a supermarket escalator. Behind him are Kim Jong-un and Jon Il-chun, manager of the infamous Bureau 39.

Second, control the people who earn the money. Illicit activity brings the risk of freelancing, especially when you’re forced to let others do the distribution. As North Korea outsourced the drug trade, its profit margins dropped — and more and more insiders skimmed off the system to line their pockets. Today, reports indicate that methamphetamine is widely used in North Korea (partly because it dulls hunger pains), and the state is cracking down on the trade it once monopolized. Even Kim Jong-il couldn’t maintain perfect control and had to send operatives abroad to retrieve misbehaving agents. These are delicate tasks easily botched by a novice.

Finally, keep the money coming. Criminal activity was never North Korea’s ultimate objective; the aim was always hard currency. Kim Jong-un needs cash without political conditions to stay in power. But there aren’t many good options for getting it these days, which is why North Korea is likely to pursue new and expanded forms of illicit activity.

Criminal activities are attractive because other sources of money have strings attached. Remittances from defectors, which have risen recently, don’t go to leaders, and they let in information. North Korea could bank on economic reform or Chinese aid, but reform won’t necessarily provide money for the elite, and aid makes Pyongyang uneasily dependent on Chinese patronage.

The cardinal fear of national security experts — which partly motivated last week’s agreement — is that Pyongyang will make money through nuclear proliferation. After all, North Korea is alleged to have helped build the Syrian nuclear reactor that Israel destroyed in 2007. But it may be hard for North Korea to find a buyer; tests of its plutonium warheads have been a questionable technical success, and their uranium-enrichment program may not be advanced enough to make them an attractive seller.

That leaves crime. Last week’s deal does not change the probability that North Korea will engage in it. And new lines of business probably won’t look like the old ones; North Korea’s schemes are creative and highly adaptable.

When drugs and counterfeit dollars got too much exposure, the regime shifted toward cigarettes and insurance fraud. Last summer, South Korean authorities discovered North Korea’s involvement in a hacking ring that exploited online gaming sites to win points and exchange them for cash, making $6 million in two years. Given that cybercriminals across the world gross over $100 billion annually, a country with decent cyberwarfare capabilities could probably do well for itself.

Or could North Korea go legit? Publicly at least, there haven’t been major seizures of its drugs or counterfeit currency in several years, leading analysts to speculate that targeting the country’s illicit finances successfully crippled those particular earning schemes. And Kim Jong-il’s death does give North Korea an opportunity to get out of the game.

BUT legitimacy won’t solve Kim Jong-un’s problem. Right now his survival is guaranteed by hard currency, and the best source of it is illicit activity. That’s why previous American efforts sought to shut off these activities: to convince the regime it had to reform itself to survive.

That didn’t go quite far enough. Shutting down those activities works only so long as North Korea can’t find new ones. The key to survival was not any one illicit activity but the ability to adapt from one to another — an ability that, with Kim Jong-il gone, likely rests with just a few trusted people. Those people, their loyalties and their relationships are now Kim Jong-un’s biggest vulnerability. If North Korea loses its capacity to adapt, it will lose the ability to make money illicitly — and will have to choose reform.

For America to make successful deals with North Korea, we must first grasp that its leader faces not just a dictator’s problems, but those of a mafia boss. And if you make a deal with the Godfather, you must not overlook the interests of the consigliere standing behind him.

Sheena Chestnut Greitens is a doctoral candidate in government at Harvard and a fellow at the United States Institute of Peace and at the Miller Center, University of Virginia.

The Caged Bird Sings – A review of The Old Garden

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/books/review/Myers-t.html

Hwang Sok-yong. Photo by Park Jae-Hong

Hwang Sok-yong. Photo by Park Jae-Hong

THE OLD GARDEN
By Hwang Sok-yong
Translated by Jay Oh
539 pp. Seven Stories Press. $30

One must never speak ill of nonchronological storytelling in America, where it is considered innately more serious than the other kind. But it is worth pondering the fact that flashbacks are nowhere more common than in North Korea. A writer will start with a woman getting a medal, say, then explain how she got there; this approach leaves less room for intellectual uncertainty and divergent responses. I make the point because although Hwang Sok-yong’s “Old Garden” was written south of the 38th parallel, it resembles a North Korean narrative in structural as in ideological ways. This is not a good thing. If I never read another mournful account of the fall of the Berlin Wall, it will be too soon.
Park Jae-Hong

“The Old Garden” begins interestingly enough. The description of a former political prisoner’s first day of freedom after almost 20 years, when the mere sight of open space exhausts him, is vivid and moving. (Hwang, one of South Korea’s most famous novelists, was himself a dissident who served prison time after an unsanctioned visit to the North.) Unfortunately the protagonist, Hyun Woo, soon learns that his lover and comrade Yoon Hee has died of cancer, whereupon the novel starts going back and forth in time. We read her letters to him, his cards to her, and so on. Much of this correspondence is of the implausible kind in which the recipient is reminded in great detail of shared experiences, but the transition to Yoon Hee’s notebooks from the 1980s does not help matters. To recount the student movement’s struggle against Chun Doo Hwan in such a disjointed and meandering fashion is to take all the drama out of it.

Jay Oh’s translation is basically functional, but it feels too youthful and distinctly American. The standard Korean expression for “24 hours a day” is rendered into English as “24/7,” a word meaning “shy” becomes “totally embarrassed,” and so on; this is hardly how a middle-aged man emerging from a long prison term would express himself. Other characters are made to swear in ways that could not seem less Korean: “Jesus, my mouth is watering.” The original at least has more gravitas — but that’s about it. Especially baffling is the author’s choice of a narrator. Hyun Woo is a man for whom “everything is unexciting and ordinary,” and he obviously wants us to feel the same way.

Indeed, the students’ opposition to the Chun regime is taken so much for granted that they barely seem to think at all, let alone engage in moral or philosophical debate. Does Hwang know how fatuous they sound? His later novel “The Guest” (which preceded this one into English translation) is a more nuanced affair, but here there is little sign of a critical or ironic distance between the author and his characters. When Hyun Woo says the Kwangju massacre of 1980 made him realize “our enemy was not the North,” we are evidently to agree that this was the only possible conclusion. And when another man explains his newfound sympathy for Pyongyang with the words “I just decided to be on their side, O.K.?” (the Valley Girl tones of the translation are not always inappropriate), we are to feel something other than the urge to hurl him across the DMZ. Yoon Hee, who is clearly the author’s favorite, grows more insufferable with every page. Having chosen to live in West Berlin, she is horrified when East Germany collapses, and worries that North Korea may follow suit. “This is not the solution. At least they had the correct beginning, didn’t they?”

The striving for simplicity and emotionality among students bewildered by long reading lists is, as the historian Ernst Nolte once wrote, “almost disgustingly easy to explain.” Harder to understand is why a man of Hwang’s age and experience would want to present this striving as something the world needs more of. (According to the publisher, Hwang is organizing a “peace train” that will go from Paris through North to South Korea — though I suspect he wants to stay on until Stockholm.) Having studied in Seoul in the mid-1980s, and witnessed the bravery of the demonstrators on many occasions, I was ready to like Hwang’s characters for helping to end military rule. Alas, he has so little apparent respect for the ensuing bourgeois democracy that he describes them cursing the transition to it. The hunch that we are dealing here with an ideology even sillier than Marxism is confirmed in one of Yoon Hee’s lines: “It’s a fight that has continued for over a hundred years since we opened up the port.” In other words, Korea’s problems began when it ceased to be the Hermit Kingdom. The penny drops: this is how the students could have fought so heroically against a pro-American dictator in Seoul, yet found so little cause to criticize the paranoid nationalist thugs in Pyongyang. “The Old Garden” thus raises an interesting question despite itself. Should we admire these people for making South Korea less like North Korea, if they were aiming for the opposite effect?

B. R. Myers, the author of “A Reader’s Manifesto,” is a researcher at Dongseo University in South Korea. His forthcoming book, “The Cleanest Race,” is about North Korea’s worldview.

Mr Vengeance

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/magazine/09park.html
Ian Buruma, 9 April 2006

09chanwook.190Park Chanwook does not look like a violent man. When he isn’t wearing glasses, his soft, round face resembles that of a gentle Tang dynasty Buddha. He speaks quietly and smiles a lot, more like a hip college professor than the director of an ultraviolent revenge trilogy. Pinned on the walls of his office in Seoul, among the movie posters and postcards, are photographs of his wife and 12-year-old daughter. His wife, whom he met at a university film club in the 1980’s, reads all his scripts and is his most trusted adviser. Their daughter has seen most of his films. A nice, quiet, reflective family man, then, this 42-year-old director who also happens to be a master of imagery at times so brutal that it is almost unbearable to watch.

Sitting in his office not long ago, we talked about violence, or more specifically about Park’s terror of violence. “In my films, I focus on pain and fear,” he said. “The fear just before an act of violence and the pain after. This applies to the perpetrators as well as the victims.” To illustrate his point, Park described a scene from his last film, “Lady Vengeance,” in which the father of a kidnapped and murdered child finally has the kidnapper at his mercy, tied to a chair in an abandoned schoolhouse. The father is there with his family and relatives of the child murderer’s other young victims. They all patiently wait their turns to wreak a terrible revenge on the defenseless killer.

“The father,” Park continued, “has picked up his ax. His daughter tries to restrain him. The audience expects her to say something like, ‘No, don’t do it!’ Instead, she asks him to leave the victim alive, so the rest of the family can also have a go at him. The audience laughs. The next shot shows the father with his ax dripping blood, terrified of what he has just done. The audience can’t be cynical anymore and regrets having laughed at the preparation for such a brutal act.”

Park didn’t smile while he told me this. Violence, for him, is a serious business. He may have a disturbing way of manipulating the viewers’ emotions, but as he explained to me, the focus of his work is not “the beauty or humor of violence.” As far as his films are concerned, he thinks of himself “as an ethical man.” To Park, the psychology of the perpetrator is as important as that of the victim. His main characters are often a bit of both.

Their suffering might easily be written off as a black farce were the gory details not piled up with such relentless, and in the end often numbing, force. The second film of his trilogy, “Oldboy” (2003), follows a man who is suddenly released after 15 years of solitary confinement. We see him stuffing a live octopus down his throat, battling a gang of armed thugs in a narrow corridor, cutting off his own tongue with a pair of scissors and slithering across a bloody floor in a final deadly encounter with the man who had him locked up. Ah, yes, and along the way, he commits incest with his daughter.

Park’s daughter was allowed to see “Lady Vengeance” but not “Oldboy,” because of the incest. A faint, slightly embarrassed smile illuminated Park’s face. “If it had been a mother and son,” he said, “I might have felt better about it, but since it is about a father and daughter, I would have felt awkward.”

09chanwook.2.190Park’s films are usually classed as “Asian Extreme,” something of a catchall term for a new crop of hyperviolent films made in South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong and Thailand that have garnered a cult following not just in Asia but also in Europe and the United States. The films take many of the elements of exploitation flicks and twist them — the violence is stylized and inventive, the plots often tinged with political attitudes. Both Takashi Miike’s postapocalyptic yakuza epic, “Dead or Alive,” and Fruit Chan’s macabre parable of the beauty industry, “Dumplings,” use extreme situations to underscore social ills. The two filmmakers were included along with Park in an anthology of the genre, “Three. . .Extremes,” released in the United States last year. Park has become the most modish figure in the world of Asian Extreme. Art houses and college festivals have been quick to screen installments of his revenge trilogy, his films win prizes at festivals and he was rated on the taste-making Web site aintitcool.com as the No. 1 filmmaker of 2002 and 2003. But he has also received more mainstream acceptance. In 2004, he won the Grand Prix at Cannes for “Oldboy.” Universal bought the rights to remake it and tapped Justin Lin, a 33-year-old Taiwan-born American director, with one hit behind him, to direct it.

Park is also enormously popular in Korea. In 2003, more than three million Koreans went to see “Oldboy.” Three years earlier, his feature film, “Joint Security Area” — a tale of two South Korean border guards who sneak across the cease-fire line to fraternize with their counterparts in North Korea — was one of the highest-grossing films in South Korean history. (“Joint Security Area” is also scheduled to be remade for an American audience, by David Franzoni, a writer and producer of “Gladiator,” with the story reimagined on the United States-Mexico border.)

In large part, Park’s success is a product of a newly energized Korean cinema, part of the so-called Korean Wave, which first swept Asia and then Europe and the United States. The end of Korea’s military dictatorship in the late 1980’s meant the end of rigid censorship, and the country’s film industry, once tightly controlled, began to attract a much wider audience. (Korea’s minister of culture was until recently Lee Chang-dong, whose own film “Oasis” won an award at Venice in 2002.) Many of the new Korean films are explicitly violent — Kang Je-gyu’s terrorist-thriller hit “Shiri”; Kim Ki-duk’s hard-boiled noirs; “A Tale of Two Sisters,” Kim Jee-woon’s horror smash — but not all. Some deal with sex, at times of a rather unusual kind, like the protracted love scene between septuagenarians in “Too Young to Die,” which initially prompted the Korea Media Rating Board to declare the film unfit for public viewing. Some are subtle human dramas set in the past. There are comic films, too, and then there are the television tear-jerkers, like “Winter Sonata,” which reduced millions of Japanese, as well as Koreans, to weekly floods of tears.

South Korea offers the kind of state support that many filmmakers would envy. Since 1966, Korean theaters have been required to show Korean films a certain number of days a year. The figure has been set at 146 days since 1984. (The number was halved during negotiations last month for a U.S.-Korea free-trade agreement, which prompted widespread protests from the local film industry.) The largest distributor of Korean films, CJ Entertainment, is also the owner of one-third of the country’s multiplexes, and its parent company helps to finance the productions of studios like Park’s, Moho Film. But the ease of financing and distribution do not account entirely for the success of local films, which often outperform Hollywood blockbusters, a sign, perhaps, of Korea’s new mood of cocky nationalism. “We are feeling confident,” Park said, “perhaps a bit too confident.”

There appear to be almost no limits on what can be shown in Korean films. I asked Park whether there were any taboos left in cinema at all. He thought for a while and shook his head. The only thing, he said, was a category called “outside ratings.” If the sex and violence are too extreme, then a movie can be shown only in restricted cinemas. I asked him whether any films were ever criticized for their political content anymore.

Well, Park said, “when ‘Joint Security Area’ was released, the public was quite shocked, because the North Koreans were portrayed as human beings and not monsters, but this actually helped the film commercially.” But of course “you can’t praise North Korean politics. That would be very scandalous.” Was that the only thing? Yes, Park replied, that was it. Otherwise, there was no longer any censorship. I was surprised, perhaps still haunted by memories of recent authoritarianism, and pressed him again. He reconsidered, shutting his eyes in thought. Well, he said, “there is one thing that can never be said in Korea. You could never say that the Japanese occupation of Korea had been beneficial. That would create even more hostility than a movie praising North Korea. It would be like telling Jews that the Holocaust didn’t exist.”

From a man who revels in moral ambiguities, this was a surprising statement. The Japanese occupation lasted from 1910 until the end of World War II, and it was often brutal, but it was no Holocaust. Much of the Korean elite collaborated, as they later would with postwar dictatorships, because the occupation brought benefits too: railroads, schools, industry, efficient administration. Park admitted that the paradoxes of collaboration could be interesting and said that there were books and novels that dealt with such cases but that they couldn’t yet be touched in the movies. It is a curious notion: you can show the most terrible violence in Korean films, even children being tortured, but the cherished myths of nationalist history have to be left untouched.

Children, especially little girls, play a big role in Park’s imagination. They often die by drowning, torture or other violent means. In the short film “Cut,” Park’s contribution to “Three . . . Extremes,” he tells the story of a successful, well-liked movie director who comes home one night to find his wife tied to her grand piano by an intruder, an extra on one of the director’s films. The extra threatens to chop off the wife’s fingers one by one (she’s a pianist) if the director doesn’t agree to kill a kidnapped child, huddling in terror on the couch.

It may be that there is no contradiction between Park the quiet, loving family man and Park the master of cruelty. His films can be read as the nightmares of a doting father. This comes out most clearly in “Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance” (2002), the first film in his revenge trilogy and perhaps his darkest. A deaf-mute kidnaps the small child of his former boss, a ruthless businessman who once fired him. But that is not the reason for the kidnapping. The deaf-mute man needs to raise money for his dying sister, who needs a kidney transplant. His girlfriend, a member of a vaguely left-wing terrorist group, argues that the kidnapping will actually be a blessing to the father and child, for after the ransom is paid, they will be so happy to be together again. But when the sister finds out what he has done, she kills herself. And before the child can be returned, she accidentally drowns in a river, and the enraged father slices the kidnapper’s Achilles’ tendons and lets him bleed to death. Some of that scene is filmed underwater, making the killing more sinister, the water turning a dark crimson.

“Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance” was, for Park, a rare commercial failure. I asked him why. “In the first half of the film,” he explained, “the audience invests a lot of emotion on the deaf-and-dumb kidnapper. Then, in the second half, things are reversed. The audience now has to identify with the father. I find the structure of this movie interesting, because it forces the audience to identify with the perpetrator as well as the victim. And the audience doesn’t necessarily like doing this.”

When I first met Park in New York, after the U.S. premiere of “Lady Vengeance” at the New York Film Festival last fall (it will be released in U.S. theaters later this month), he said that only a psychiatrist could explain his preoccupation with horror and violence. In fact, however, his background offers some clues. Park’s first ambition was to be not a filmmaker but an art critic. As a student of philosophy at Sogang University in Seoul, he was mainly interested in aesthetics. Since this was barely taught at his university, he devoted himself to photography and watching films. In an interview, Park once described what happened next: “Then one day, I saw Hitchcock’s ‘Vertigo.’ During the movie, I found myself screaming in my head, ‘If I don’t at least try to become a movie director, I will seriously regret it when I’m lying in my deathbed!’ After that, akin to James Stewart when he was blindly chasing after some mysterious woman, I searched aimlessly for some kind of irrational beauty.” Park’s films, even, or perhaps especially, in the most violent scenes, have a haunting beauty whose aesthetic owes something to Hitchcock, to be sure. One scene in “Oldboy,” of the hero chasing his younger self up a stairway, rather like Jimmy Stewart in “Vertigo,” is a direct homage to the master of suspense. But Park has a visual language all his own too: sequences that even in their violence are often dreamlike (a half-man, half-dog pulled through the snow by the female lead in “Lady Vengeance” or the protagonist of “Oldboy” mutely embracing his daughter in a snowy wood); richly textured interiors and images built around a single color, to eerie, symbolic effect.

I asked Park what kinds of films he grew up watching. He said that as a child he’d had little opportunity to go to the cinema. Born in 1963, Park was raised in the last grim decades of the military dictatorship, when Seoul was still under curfew. Japanese films were not allowed to be shown in Korea, because the wounds of colonial rule were still raw. Park’s movie education came from Hollywood classics on television. “If I had grown up seeing films by Kurosawa, Mizoguchi or Ozu,” he said, “I might be a different kind of person.” Instead, he watched “Shane,” “High Noon,” “The Man From Laramie” and his favorite film, “Apache,” with Burt Lancaster as the last Apache warrior. At first, he said, “seeing Lancaster play an Indian was ridiculous, but then the idea of one man taking on the white race made me cry.” The image of Lancaster, “half-naked like Tarzan, rolling about in the desert, being cut and bruised by rocks and stones, is still vivid in my mind. I can still feel it.”

Images of physical suffering are clearly important to Park. They move him. And the images that stick in his memory appear to be mostly from Western movies. Such cross-cultural pollination is not a new phenomenon. Akira Kurosawa’s samurai movies were an inspiration to many Western directors. John Sturges’s “Magnificent Seven,” starring Steve McQueen, was a remake of Kurosawa’s “Seven Samurai,” and “A Fistful of Dollars,” directed by Sergio Leone, the great Italian maestro of the spaghetti western, was a version of Yojimbo. Less well known is Kurosawa’s own debt to Hollywood: his samurai films were inspired by John Ford’s westerns. Park is openly in awe of certain Western filmmakers. When he was awarded the Grand Prix for “Oldboy” (the jury was headed by Quentin Tarantino) at Cannes, he told the audience: “I met Roman Polanski at a party, and we had our photograph taken together. That was already such an honor that I really didn’t expect to win a prize.”

And yet, despite sharing some of Polanski’s morbid obsessions, or Tarantino’s Hollywood flash, Park’s films seem to belong to a different tradition, one more rooted in East Asia — manga (Japanese comics), anime (the Japanese form of animation that, in its adult guise, can take on a cyberpunk feel) and kung fu films, but also the computer games spread around the world from Tokyo and Seoul, are part of this tradition. Park says that young Koreans “no longer have a problem with Japanese popular culture.” “Oldboy” was in fact based on a Japanese manga, by Tsuchiya Garon and Minegishi Nobuaki. In manga, as in the traditional Japanese woodblock print that could be considered its forerunner, everything, including the sex and violence, is wildly exaggerated. And scenes are cut, not seamlessly as in a Hollywood movie, but more, as Park once put it, “like a knife cutting through tofu.” “Oldboy,” Park’s most mangalike film, is a kind of visual circus full of violent excess, at once beautiful and painful to watch.

This taste for the grotesque and the absurd can also be found in the stylized Chinese, Korean and Japanese theater, which depend on deliberately exaggerated effects and theatrical gestures. Kabuki, Chinese opera and the Korean masqued dance theater called Talchum are never meant to be realistic. Where the Japanese excelled in stylized violence — murder, ritual suicides, battle scenes — Koreans have a long tradition of humorous social satire. Like anime, Korean and Japanese computer games are part of this stylized theatrical tradition and appear to have influenced Park’s work as much as his early viewings of Hitchcock. Bending reality through digital effects, which allows the camera to jump around and move through space at dizzying speeds or to cut out an entire side of a building to follow the hero in a fight sequence in one continuous take, a technique common to side-scrolling video games, are just some of the things that make Park’s films resemble computer games.

“Funny you should say that,” Park responded when I brought up the subject of computer games. “I can see why my films remind people of computer games, but I’ve never played one. Actually, I was approached by a Japanese designer of a PlayStation game called Metal Gear Solid. When I met him, I found that there was nothing really to talk about. But I was told that I was idolized in the world of computer games.”

09chanwook.3.190There is another explanation for Park’s violent preoccupations, one based less on aesthetics than on political circumstances. He was at college in the mid-80’s, the height of the student demonstrations against the military regime. Confrontations with the riot police often had an oddly ritualistic character: the screaming students charging like a rebel army, the clouds of tear gas and the inevitable retreat. The worst brutalities didn’t actually happen in the streets, in front of the world’s television cameras, but in army barracks and police jails, where students were sometimes beaten to death.

Park, always the bookish movie buff, stayed away from the demonstrations. He was too afraid. This left him with feelings of guilt and fear that he was never able to shake off. “Young people set fire to themselves,” he recalled. “Others were taken away to be tortured. Some fell off buildings. The fear of violence made a big impression on me.” Since the 80’s, he said, “young people have fallen into two distinct groups. Those who participated actively are proud of their sacrifices. They changed society, but they also feel deprived, because they were unable to enjoy their youth. Then there are the others, who feel guilty for not having taken part. We enjoy our freedoms without having done anything to earn them. One of the worst legacies of military dictatorship is that it polarized a whole generation.”

Guilt, as well as fear, is one of the themes that run through all of Park’s movies. The bloodiest acts are carried out by people whose rage is fueled by guilt — for kidnapping a child, an act committed by the protagonists in both “Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance” and “Lady Vengeance,” or cheating on a wife, like the movie director in “Cut.” Often, the brutality of his characters is fueled by class resentment — the fury of poor, marginalized people against the newly rich. Student politics of the 80’s are also reflected in such themes as the black market for human organs, brutal prison conditions, the sexual exploitation of women and the summary dismissal of factory workers. Perhaps Park, with all his talent for manipulation, is really a moralist, working out his feelings of rage, fear and guilt in scenes of cinematic horror. By doing so, he has hit a nerve in a country whose history of colonial rule, civil war and military dictatorship has burdened many people with these emotions.

I met Park again on a wintry afternoon in a fashionable European-style restaurant in Kangnam-gu, a newly developed area of Seoul that matches the mood of his films: it is a slickly modern district of Internet cafes, wine bars, design companies and high-end boutiques. Park was dressed casually in black, as usual, but was in a more jovial mood than I’d seen him in before. We were now on his home turf. Sitting next to him was the lead actor of “Oldboy,” an affable baby-faced man named Choi Min-sik. A big star in South Korea, Choi first made his reputation as a theater actor and became famous for a variety of movie roles: a 19th-century painter, a North Korean agent, a trumpet-playing music teacher and a gangster. He has made two films with Park, playing the vengeful victim in “Oldboy” and the child-killer in “Lady Vengeance.” For someone who could be a pampered movie star, he has submitted to some remarkably grueling scenes, not just gobbling up live octopuses, but standing in icy rivers, crawling in pools of blood and being pummeled and beaten and slashed by more than a dozen men in single long takes. This last, a scene in “Oldboy,” was the hardest, Choi said. Park giggled: “Every time I called ‘cut,’ Choi would look up at me with his sad puppy eyes, and I had to tell him to carry on.” I asked Choi whether he thought there was a sadist lurking in the heart of every film director. “In his case,” Choi said, “absolutely.” Park giggled again. “Only with male actors.”

The two men seemed to have an extraordinary rapport. Choi collaborated closely with Park on the script for “Oldboy.” “We talked throughout the process of making the script,” Choi said. “This was not a case of a famous actor wanting to get his way. When you work together on a script, you have to have enormous respect and trust for each other.” Park later explained to me that he typically works on scripts by getting a lot of input from others. He has two computers on his desk, one for himself and one for his collaborators, who take part in the writing. These can be actors or other members of his staff. Ideas are thrown back and forth, lines added or deleted, narratives revised, until finally the result passes the eyes of Park’s wife. The process can be remarkably fast. “Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance,” Park told me, was written in 20 hours of nonstop work.

I wondered what, precisely, Choi’s input on “Oldboy” had been. I knew that Choi had played Hamlet on the stage. In Asia, “Hamlet” is usually interpreted as a revenge play. I asked him whether this was because Korean theater was often about revenge. He replied that the “Hamlet” production he starred in interpreted the play that way, but both he and Park quickly assured me that this had nothing to do with Korean tradition. Japanese theater is often about revenge, but Korean culture, in Park’s words, is “more about forgiving — forgiving too easily, in fact.”

Despite this rather sweeping statement, Park, quite rightly, is wary of being pinned down to generalities about culture or tradition. I had mentioned the word han to him in New York, the word that Koreans often use to define their national character. Han, like most clichés claiming to explain national character, is not easy to translate. It means something like “long-smoldering resentment about past wrongs.” I thought it might shed some light on Park’s obsession with revenge. But Park was quick to dismiss it: “We don’t like to use that kind of language anymore,” he said. It reminded him of traditional society, when women were said to carry lifelong grudges because they couldn’t have children.

Still, there are elements in Park’s films that seem particular to Korean and Japanese culture. One is the almost casual appearance of ghosts. In Park’s trilogy, murdered children haunt the guilty consciences of the living. The drowned daughter in “Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance,” for example, appears in her father’s apartment days after drowning, with water dripping from her body. (Water, perhaps not incidentally, often has sinister connotations in East Asia; bad spirits frequently emerge from swamps and lakes.) I asked Choi whether Korean ghosts were usually benign or vengeful. He said that traditionally they were both. He mentioned a mythical Korean character in the shape of a 100-year-old fox who often disguises herself as a woman. The fox is envious of humans and capable of doing them harm. But she also wants to make peace with them. “Western ghosts,” Choi said, “are evil, but Korean ghosts are about making peace. That is part of our Korean psyche.”

“Yes,” Park said with a straight face, “and I’m thoroughly sick of that. That’s why I make movies about revenge, as a reaction.” Choi smiled and nudged Park in the ribs, as if his director were a naughty child. But the fox story was interesting. I thought of the characters in Park’s movies, the good father who murders the kidnapper of his daughter, the angelic woman who exacts her hideous revenge against a child-killer in “Lady Vengeance,” the “old boy” who is tormented by his own efforts to take revenge against a tormentor. Like the fox-woman, they are all soaked in moral ambiguity.

One thing conspicuously lacking in Park’s fearful world of murder and revenge is sexual passion. There are sex scenes in his movies, to be sure: incest in “Oldboy”; men masturbating to the sound of a moaning woman in the apartment next door in “Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance”; lesbian prison scenes in “Lady Vengeance.” But none of these scenes are joyful or even erotic. Passion, in Park’s films, is between fathers and daughters, or between siblings. With one possible exception: “Joint Security Area.”

There is undoubtedly passion in it — between the men. As the two South Korean border guards become increasingly comfortable slipping across the cease-fire line to visit their North Korean counterparts, they drink and sing, exchange presents and horse around like little kids. When they are discovered by a North Korean officer, two North Koreans are killed in the shootout that ensues. One of the South Koreans manages to get back to the South Korean side safely. The other is wounded. Rather than implicate his buddies, on both sides of the border, one of the men ends up committing suicide.

“Joint Security Area” is a melodrama that perfectly expresses the modishly left-wing nationalism that grips many young South Koreans today: North Koreans are depicted as mostly nice, gentle people; much of the brutality is in the South; and the partition of Korea is the work of foreigners. What is remarkable about this film is not the passionate male bonding but the sentimentality. Even Park loses his hard-boiled airs when it comes to national sentiment.

Violence, of course, can be a form of passion, and sometimes perhaps the only form of human communication. Park’s films describe a world without much physical contact, a society in which the traditional comforts, and constrictions, of family relations, or any collective social life, have disappeared; in which individuals are locked in their private spaces, communicating through the Internet or other mechanical devices. South Korea is one of the most wired societies in the world. Earlier, in Park’s office, I asked him if violence, even imaginary violence, was perhaps an exaggerated response to this virtual new world, an extreme form of human contact.

Park didn’t answer my question immediately, but took his time, screwing up his eyes, working up a coherent answer, and then went off on a political riff on the nature of modern society. “Because of capitalism,” he said, “relationships between people and their communities — family, or clan, or region — have largely broken down, especially in Asia.” He had told me earlier that compared with filmmakers in the West, Koreans were “more sensitive about the tensions between individuals and society.” The characters in his films, he said, were “bound to feel lonely and isolated from the world.” That is why he often shows them communicating by e-mail or mobile phones, instead of actually seeing one another. “This puts a distance between people, leading to misunderstandings, which is interesting.”

The same could be said of any modern society, but then Park told me a story that showed how much tradition can matter, even in cyberspace: “A young woman, working in our office, fell in love with a man through the Internet. The young man was so taken with her that he not only scrutinized her blog but followed all the links in her blog as well. He traced her family relationships, but also her entire private history, including her boyfriends going back to high-school days. Not only their names, but even their digital pictures came up through the links. In the end, he knew everything about her, without having to hire a detective.”

Park continued: “You might find this invasion of privacy a bit scary, but young Koreans like it. It is, in a way, a revival of village life, a revival of community, where everyone knows everything about everyone else.” But it is a peculiar community, where human intimacy takes place without physical contact. I returned to my question about violence. “Yes,” Park said, “violence is a form of communication, whether good or bad — that isn’t the issue. It is symbolic of a kind of human communication.”

Park’s films, then, reflect the virtual nature of our contemporary world, as well as the Korean past, soaked in blood and guilt and oppression. Park has responded to harsh political issues in the way East Asian writers, painters and playwrights have so often done before, by expressing their violent emotions in fantasy, by stylizing cruelty and exorcising fears by acting them out in a world of irrational beauty. Perhaps it is this, more than anything, that has made Korean, Chinese and Japanese directors into such masters of the absurd. Park’s next film will feature a combat cyborg who falls in love with a thief of human souls — in a mental hospital. Things cannot get much stranger than that.