Alex Hogan in the Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/series/pyongyang-goes-pop

29 March 2011: Despite there being no internet access in North Korea outside the offices of the few western companies (you can count them on one hand), Pyongyang’s embassy enclosure and a couple of very high-up officials, digital materials still have ways of spreading.

The state runs a nationwide intranet for the exchange of sanctioned material, while USB drives and CD-Rs are becoming more and more common among college and middle school students. It is through these means that the trade in illicit and anti-state media such as the sexy Wangjaesan girls in hot pants is exchanged and passed on, while the ever-growing traffic between North Korea and China has increased opportunities for the cross-border smuggling of pirated films and music from Hollywood and Seoul.

Although these outside cultural influences can be spotted in small doses here and there, North Koreans are understandably loth to admit it. The high-end Japanese-built tourist tour buses shuttling foreigners around Pyongyang are aeons more advanced than the rusting hulks North Korea has been using for average citizens since the 1970s. But ask most Koreans and you’ll find that they are not Japanese. Until they break down, that is, when they become “shitty imperial Japanese technology”.

Given this push/pull attitude to things from the outside, it’s perhaps no surprise that western pop songs penned in a more “communist” vein can ease the North Korean listener into a new state of openness and ease inter-cultural tension. By pop in a communist vein I do, of course mean, Jarvis Cocker.

North Koreans find Pulp’s Common People very, very funny. When one 24-year-old of wealthy descent living in Pyongyang heard the song, he creased up in hysterics as he tried to understand why rich people would pretend to be poor because they thought it was cool. He did concede, however, that he was happy such a song could be so popular, as it suggested people in the west could appreciate the revolutionary spirit of communism after all. You can kind of see what he was getting at.

On hearing about the Rage Against the Machine Christmas No 1 story, the same North Korean said he felt “proud and overjoyed that a socialist band could be the greatest force for good in the British nation,” despite him not quite grasping the concept of record sales or The X Factor or the fact the band is American. He didn’t particularly like Killing in the Name, either.

At times throughout my travels in North Korea, I’m sure I’ve been misunderstood by the locals. Likewise, I have no doubt misunderstood the motivations and explanations that locals brought to the table when I confronted them with pop as the world gives it to us. But the process itself of discussing pop has always eased the initial standoff that North Koreans are trained to have set as their autopilot, and reminded me of the humanity of the people held in the grip of the government’s ongoing tyranny. So, if you find yourself caught up in the regime any time soon, for your sake and theirs, find out what their verdict on the new Kanye record is, won’t you?

10 march 2011: All pop music in North Korea is sanctioned by the state, so if you don’t like songs about The Importance of Fertiliser or Uniting Happily Under the Powerful Juche Idea, then tough – go and listen to the frogs croaking down on the river bank instead. Of the bands permitted, two of North Korea’s most famous are the Pochonbo Electronic Ensemble and Wangjaesan Light Music Band, who have been churning out pro-socialist revolutionary singles for decades.

Wangjaesan were reportedly conceived by the ever-talented Kim Jong-il, who handpicked the group’s members. He’s not just a despotic dictator, you know – he has a reputation in his homeland as being quite the artisan. As well as his taste for fine light music, he’s also a cultured film producer, as this monster movie he made in the 80s tastefully proves.

Pochonbo, meanwhile, have kept themselves busy as Wangjaesan’s main contenders by clocking up 140 albums, some of them with specially created English-language cover art so they can be sold to tourists in the many gift shops Koreans insist on taking you to at every opportunity (only hard currency, Euros or fine imported cigars accepted).

There was mild controversy last year when a secret video featuring Wangjaesan’s female dance troupe entered the public domain. The video was being privately circulated among the elite, but reached the North Korean public before making it over the border to China – and therefore the world. Normally seen in traditional, body-cloaking hangbok dresses as they perform polite folk numbers, this little clip revealed unprecedented levels of sexiness in Pyongyang, as the girls popped up in sparkly hot pants and did the splits. Western displays of decadence like this are illegal but, given Kim Jong-il’s alleged love of pornography, perhaps he turned a blind eye to this one.

22 February 2011:

I’ve written before about Pyongyang’s only nightclub, the Taedong Diplo. Despite it only having one CD to its name, it’s still your best bet for catching Koreans co-mingling with Western music. Unfortunately, this Western music normally involves little more than playing the aforementioned CD (the incessant call of Trance Hits 1993 on loop) or someone sticking on the karaoke edition of the Titanic soundtrack, which North Korean students dig big-time thanks to its frequent showing in Pyongyang’s universities as an example of western culture (according to Korean ideology, industrial revolution: good. Leonardo DiCaprio drowning: better).

This grim legacy of disco downers was all to change, however, on the night DJ Ian Steadman turned up last year, coming fully prepared to man the mic long past the 10pm electricity curfew with a bag of indie hits.

Just prior to Ian’s debut on the decks, visitors to the club were treated to the airing of a new CD held in the North Korean pop vaults – Madonna’s Die Another Day from the soundtrack to the James Bond movie in which James Bond is, er, held captive in North Korea (it’s veiled threats like this that make doing things in the country so much fun).

After this, it was Steadman’s time to step up. What was quite probably North Korea’s first ever indie disco saw a handful of drunken local guides and a large group of foreign tourists dancing to a playlist that included Buraka Som Sistema, Hot Chip and Talking Heads. According to current trends, it seems indie couldn’t be hitting North Korea at a better time. The ever-reliable North Korean Economy Watch recently reported that skinny jeans are all the rage in Pyongyang these days. We’re not sure if this was entirely down to fashion reasons, though, and those holding their breath for a full-scale hipster revolution will have to wait a little longer for the fixie bikes and lens-free glasses to roll through. After all, the other top consumer products listed alongside trouserwear were reportedly pig-intestine rolls and, er, human manure.

According to Steadman, it was TV on The Radio’s Dancing Choose that elicited the biggest response, with one North Korean vigorously grabbing his arm and demanding to know where he could get a copy of this “very, very, very good band”.

If only all nights out in North Korea were so successful. My last visit to the same club culminated in an angered security guard unexpectedly pulling the plug on the music, grabbing the karaoke microphone and bellowing, “Look, you fucking drunk bastards! Get the fuck out of here! Get on the fucking bus! Go! Or I’ll take your fucking passports from you and you’ll stay in fucking North Korea forever. FUCK OFF!” – a more high-stakes ending than a punch-up and a battered sausage outside the Sheffield Leadmill on a Friday night, that’s for sure.

9 February 2011:

On my first trip to North Korea in 2009 I asked my state-sanctioned guide (and very likely government spy) what the most popular song on the North Korea airwaves was at that moment. Mr Lee – a lithe, boyish gentleman with a clean-split centre-parting – sighed and told me it was a heroic ballad about being a diligent farmer. In the North they can’t get enough radio – every kitchen is fitted with one that can’t be switched off. It’s a government order, so from morning to night citizens must enjoy revolutionary hits and paeans celebrating the multifarious talents of Kim Jong Il (lest anyone forget). So even though Mr Lee may have secretly be craving South Korea’s Girl’s Generation, he and millions of others are forced to stick with what their leader gives them: boring revolutionary anthems about being a good socialist. But as more outside materials sneak under the radar, the tension between Kim’s socialist utopia and the real world is increasing.

Earlier in the morning Mr Lee had been sitting on the tour bus ferrying us around Pyongyang, avidly reading a copy of the New Yorker that a tourist had given him the week before. The issue featured a story about an author’s drunken homosexual awakening that had taken place on board a night train. Mr Lee read it with much curiosity. Clearly he wanted to know more about the world than just diligent farmers.

Pop music in North Korea hasn’t always been this boring – during the economic glory days of the 1970s and 80s, when the socialist North were well ahead of their southern neighbours, Kim Il Sung loosened the rules on what kind of entertainment could fly with the people. That all changed after the song Whistle caused so much popular frenzy that the state reclassified it as dangerous material and repressed it, returning airplay rights exclusively to the diligent farmers and their ilk. All this despite the song in question being about as provocative to western minds as a kitten doing a cute sneeze.

To indulge Mr Lee’s urge for outside culture and indeed my own curiosity as to his response, I showed him how to use my iPod. He embraced the challenge with enthusiasm. His first choice was unexpected – UK thrash urchins Gallows. Yet my surprise probably did not outweigh his as he went through what was evidently his first guitar thrash experience. The pained look on his face belied his polite disapproval of the sounds in his ears and he moved on swiftly. After a few more minutes of wheel-click browsing, he told me quite assertively that “Lethal Bizzle would not suit the Korean people” as it “has no proper melody”. Yet he warmed right up to Coldplay and listened to one of their albums from start to finish, further widening the sample that proves Chris Martin’s gang produce music so damningly average and inoffensive it can even pacify citizens living under a fear-inducing totalitarian regime.

1 Feb 2011:

During North Korea’s “arduous march” of the 90s, brought about by the collapse of the USSR and a series of natural disasters, illegal markets of smuggled goods sprang up across the country. It marked the beginning of a slow influx of outside culture still enjoyed by North Koreans today.

Charles Jenkins, a Korean war veteran who was captured and detained for 40 years, has witnessed this cultural transition. As a propaganda tool he was kept close to the elite and – weirdly – forced to become a film star. He escaped in 2004 and now lives in Japan. When I met him in 2008, he told me the only non-Korean music he came across before the 90s would be nationalist tomes imported from Soviet Russia. As a result, it wasn’t until the mid-90s that he discovered who Michael Jackson was, when a smuggled Jacko cassette tape found its way into Jenkins’s hands.

Although most North Koreans are still oblivious to MJ today – leaving them ill-equipped to offer an opinion on the authenticity of his posthumous releases – those who are allowed to interact with foreigners consume pop music enthusiastically. These days most students on the foreign relations course at Pyongyang’s Kim Il-sung University will at some point encounter MJ, while the penetration of South Korean pop music (and TV dramas) in North Korean cities is widely reported, with both enjoying a wide following despite the act of consuming them being an imprisonable offence.

On a recent trip to Pyongyang, a guide by the name of Mr Oh took great relish in his regular party trick of “accidentally” confusing North Korean revolutionary songs for flashy South Korean pop. “Whoops! It’s North Korean after all … what a shame, I mean South Korean is much better, just don’t tell any one,” he would say. We later discovered he was not a tour guide at all, but a government spy keeping an eye on the “evil” Americans in our entourage. He’d done tae kwon do at the Mass Games and is pictured in the official Pyongyang guide book. The guy was an absolute gun. The North Korean Arnold Schwarzenegger. No wonder the government let him listen to South Korean pop and wear a Paul Smith shirt.

27 January 2011:

If someone had fulfilled Pyongyang’s request to pack Eric Clapton off to North Korea, perhaps all that bother on the divided peninsula would never have started. That is what the hermit government of the north reckons, at least, as one of the less pressing Wikileak cables recently revealed that Kim Jong-il’s second son, Kim Jong-chol, was “a great fan” of the rock legend and that a Clapton performance in the capital “could be an opportunity to build goodwill”.

Using pop to build bridges is perhaps naive, especially in the context of a potential nuclear face-off, but maybe we shouldn’t rule out the idea. If you ask a North Korean their true feelings about pretty much anything they’ll stick to whatever the party line tells them they should think (which is why so many tourists get frustrated after probing about General Kim’s next move). But ask the right questions and the facade that greets most outsiders will occasionally be broached with genuine warmth. During trips I’ve made in and around the hermit kingdom over the past year, I’ve used one uncontroversial topic of conversation to do just that. It seems talking about music is one way for North Koreans to relate their perspectives on the world without being politically controversial. Pop diplomacy will not solve territorial disputes or prevent governments going head-to-head, but it does offer another perspective on North Koreans.

Pop weaves its way into North Korea in unexpected ways. Last September, I was held under 24-hour house arrest in the outpost of Raijin after refusing to pay a bribe. The most perturbing part of the experience was not the fact there was no guarantee of release, but that the hotel foyer we were held in had the EastEnders theme tune playing on loop for the duration of the internment through a croaky speaker. Perhaps the aim was mental attrition; to irritate us into paying bribes by reminding us of the east London we’d left behind and may never see again. It didn’t work – I’m from Putney.

Eccentric glimpses of the world North Korea left behind are not so few and far between – in this series I’ll be revealing more from inside the secret state: the truth about Michael Jackson’s North Korean debut; introducing the best of North Korean pop and revealing the Communist cadre’s opinion of Jarvis Cocker. Come join me for the ride.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/249870

Monday, 22 February 2010, 09:32
S E C R E T SEOUL 000272
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, JA”>JA”>JA, CH
SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

——-

1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea’s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy. Beijing had “no will” to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies — and the DPRK characterized as “the most incompetent official in China” — had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.

VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations…

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2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea’s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in “two to three years.” Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy; there was “no substance” to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry’s “briefing” to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiarui’s visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had “basically read a Xinhua press release,” Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.

3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea “than most people believe.” Beijing had “no will” to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies and the DPRK leadership “knows it.” Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the “brink of collapse,” the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

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4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was “a very bad thing” that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s delegation. XXXXXXXXXXXX said it appeared that the DPRK “must have lobbied extremely hard” for the now-retired Wu to stay on as China’s 6PT chief. [NAME REMOVED] complained that Wu is the PRC’s XXXXXXXXXXXX an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who “knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn’t speak English.” Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming — to anyone willing to listen — that the PRC’s economic rise represented a “return to normalcy” with China as a great world power.

…China’s “New Generation” of Korea-Hands…

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5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials XXXXXXXXXXXX stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun.XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control.XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chun said, were ready to “face the new reality” that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state — a view that since North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.

…PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario…

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6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly “not welcome” any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun XXXXXXXXXXXX said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a “benign alliance” — as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chundismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China’s strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea — not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could “strengthen the centrifugal forces in China’s minority areas.”

…and Japan

————

7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s control. Chun asserted that, even though “Japan’s preference” was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/204917

Thursday, 30 April 2009, 13:07
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 001176
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2034
TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, PARM, PHUM, KUNR, CH, TW, KN, KS,
JA”>JA”>JA, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HE DISCUSSES G-20, DPRK,
IRAN, AF/PAK, UNSC REFORM, TAIWAN, TIBET WITH CHARGE
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i. Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

——-

1. (C) Taiwan’s participation as an observer at the upcoming May World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings demonstrated what could be achieved based on “one China, very broadly interpreted,” Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) He Yafei said at an April 30 working lunch hosted by the Charge d’Affaires. In his capacity as G-20 Sherpa, VFM He said he would ask for appropriate meetings in Washington to discuss the dates and agenda of the next G-20 summit. VFM He reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington: On North Korea, China encouraged the United States to re-engage the DPRK, but if the Six-Party Talks were suspended for an extended period, we should consider maintaining engagement in other ways. On Iran, Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by Washington and had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume a positive role in the region. On Afghanistan/Pakistan, VFM He asked to see a list of items that would be transported via the proposed Northern Distribution Network, given that “non-lethal” is a broad and vague term.

2. (S) Summary Continued: VFM He raised concerns over China’s “core interests” of Tibet and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which he said could “derail” bilateral cooperation. The Charge raised the Liu Xiaobo and Gao Zhisheng human rights cases, to which VFM He replied with standard language about Chinese law. The Charge asked for assistance in expediting the exit from China of two North Koreans from the U.S. Embassy compound; VFM He promised to assist. The Charge urged China to press North Korea to release the two detained American journalists; VFM H said China would. VFM He expressed concern over building “momentum” on UNSC reform and asked the United States not to be “proactive” on the matter. The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to affect other parts of our support for each other’s practical needs including residential leases and asked for VFM He’s assistance in stopping this trend. The Charge and VFM He agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. End Summary.

TAIWAN OBSERVERSHIP AT WHA

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3. (C) The agreement allowing Taiwan to participate as an observer at the World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings in Geneva in May was “one step forward” toward better cross-Strait relations and demonstrated what could be achieved through consultations based on “one China, very broadly interpreted,” Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) He Yafei said at an April 30 working lunch hosted by the Charge d’Affaires. Cross-Strait relations were “improving,” and as they did, China hoped the United States would feel “less burdened, frustrated and nervous,” VFM He said. The Charge congratulated VFM He on the agreement, noting its timeliness in light of concerns over the H1N1 outbreak, while expressing hope that both sides would continue to take steps to increase mutual trust.

IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL VISITS

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4. (C) The Charge and VFM He agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. Both concurred that Chief of Naval Operations ADM Roughead’s visit to China was a success. The Charge emphasized that, as President Obama told Foreign Minister Yang, the United States wanted to move relations between our two militaries forward. VFM He agreed that State Councilor Liu Yandong’s visit, including her meeting with Secretary Clinton, had been productive. VFM He said Liu came away “very impressed” by her interaction with Secretary Clinton and wanted very much to “follow up” on the issues they discussed such as education, something very basic and important to the people of both countries.

5. (C) Although we recognize the importance of the proposed visit by Politburo Member and CCP Organization Department

BEIJING 00001176 002 OF 005

Head Li Yuanchao, it would be easier to arrange a successful visit if Li could postpone his travel to a less busy time, the Charge said. VFM He replied that the visit of Li, a “future leader of China,” was “very important,” so China hoped the United States would provide a full schedule of meetings with senior leaders despite the fact that those leaders recently met with State Councilor Liu. The Charge urged VFM He to arrange a useful schedule for Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, including a trip to Tibet or Tibetan areas, noting that the Speaker was also particularly interested in climate change and environmental issues. China would treat Speaker Pelosi’s visit as a type of “state visit,” VFM He replied. Nevertheless, given her “tight schedule,” the Speaker would likely “not have time” to visit Tibet, VFM He said.

6. (C) Reviewing the upcoming meetings between Presidents Obama and Hu this year, VFM He noted that, over the past 30 years, the U.S.-China relationship had been driven by high-level visits to a greater degree than other bilateral relationships. With these meetings between our two presidents in mind, both sides should be “careful” and act in ways that benefit the long-term interests of the bilateral relationship. Our two presidents would meet several times in the coming months, including at the G-8, G-20 and APEC summits, after which China anticipated President Obama would visit China. We should plan our work for the bilateral relationship in the year ahead with the President’s visit to China in mind.

G-20: DATES AND TOPICS

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7. (C) VFM He stated that, he would ask to meet with NSC’s Michael Froman in Washington and was considering requesting an appropriate meeting with the Treasury Department. The topics would include the dates of the next G-20 meeting, as well as the agenda.

8. (C) In the first two G-20 Financial Summits, U.S. and Chinese positions had been close, closer even than the United States and Europe, VFM He noted. Views on major issues such as the need for fiscal stimulus and reform of international financial institutions were similar. Leading up to the London Summit, VFM He felt that the U.S.-U.K.-China “troika” had been effective: Beijing could persuade the developing countries, Washington could influence Japan and South Korea, and London could bring along the Europeans.

9. (C) The first two G-20 summits, according to VFM He, had succeeded in boosting confidence and agreeing on measures to help international financial institutions cope with the crisis. Now, the G-20 had entered an implementation period. He outlined four objectives that he intended to discuss with Froman:

A) Establish what stimulus and macroeconomic policy coordination the G-20 economies needed to implement to ensure economic recovery;

B) Strengthen the message against protectionism so that leaders did not “break their promises as soon as they returned home”;

C) Set a clear timetable for IMF reform, establishing whether the New Arrangement to Borrow (NAB) decisions had any relation to future quota; and

D) Reforming the international monetary system, vis-a-vis the dollar and an alternative reserve currency such as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

10. (C) Expounding on this last topic, VFM He stated that a stable U.S. dollar was good for China, and Beijing had no interest in “destabilizing the system.” The system, however, was “not perfect and needs reform.” He said China had a huge stake in how the United States managed the dollar. Further, VFM He suggested that the RMB could become a component of the SDR. Mentioning that the RMB could compose two percent of the SDR value, VFM He noted that this was more of a symbolic than practical change.

11. (U) Note: VFM He’s comments on the Strategic and Economic Dialogue will be reported septel.

VFM HE’S WASHINGTON VISIT: DPRK, IRAN, AF/PAK

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12. (C) VFM He reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington, including North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan. On North Korea, VFM He hoped to hold “informal consultations” in Washington on how generally to approach the North Koreans, not just through the Six-Party Talks. Washington and Beijing nevertheless needed to discuss how to maintain momentum in the Six-Party Talks so as to preserve our common interest in stability of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a “spoiled child” in order to get the attention of the “adult.” China therefore encouraged the United States, “after some time,” to start to re-engage the DPRK. In this regard, it was good that the New York channel remained open, VFM He observed. Noting that Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth would visit Beijing in May, VFM He said that, if the Six-Party Talks would be on hold for an extended period, then the Six Parties needed to find ways to continue to engage the DPRK and each other, either bilaterally or even perhaps trilaterally. The Charge noted that we should be careful not to reinforce Pyongyang’s bad behavior.

13. (C) VFM He also hoped to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue in Washington. Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by Washington. China had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume playing a positive role in the region. Though such an Iranian role made moderate Arab countries “jittery,” VFM He said, this should be a matter the United States could “manage.” What was essential was to get Iran involved positively in the region again.

14. (C) VFM He said he also hoped to discuss Afghanistan/Pakistan. The Charge stated that, even though XXXXXXXXXXXX was unable to announce new money for Afghanistan at the April 17 Pakistan Donors’ Conference, China still had an opportunity to contribute to the security and stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. One way to do so would be to agree to a re-supply route via China for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On the re-supply route question, VFM He said China would like to see a list of items that would be transported on the proposed route, noting that “non-lethal” is a broad and vague term.

TIBET AND TAIWAN AS “CORE INTERESTS”

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15. (C) VFM He raised concerns over China’s “core interests” of Tibet and Taiwan, which he said could “derail” bilateral cooperation. On Tibet, China had heard “rumors” that the Dalai Lama would attend a “seminar” in the United States in late September or early October, and that President Obama was “likely” to meet with him then. Noting that there was no need for both sides to reiterate our respective positions on Tibet, VFM He said the critical question was whether both sides would agree to “take care” of each other’s “core interests.” When considering such sensitive issues in the context of the bilateral relationship, they could be viewed either as “obstacles” or as “core interests.” It did not matter whether one side “liked or disliked” such matters; rather, in a “mature, close and important” bilateral relationship such as ours, the question was whether the key interests for each side would be accommodated. The United States had its core interests, VFM He asserted, such as U.S. naval vessels that had operated near the Chinese coast. Both sides agreed to “step down” over that issue, despite the strongly held views of the Chinese public. Regarding the Dalai Lama, China hoped the United States would deny him a visa, and if not, then agree to hold no official meetings with him, including no meeting with President Obama.

16. (C) The Charge expressed concern with China’s defining Tibet as a “core issue” with the apparent expectation that others would “step back.” Instead, our two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an attempt to resolve our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet is a part of China. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious leader and Nobel Laureate, and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity. Future meetings by U.S. officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out. Moreover, there were serious concerns among the U.S. public, the Administration and Congress over the situation in Tibetan areas of China. China should take steps to address Tibetans’ legitimate grievances and engage the Dalai Lama’s representatives in productive dialogue. Denying a visa to the Dalai Lama was not being contemplated.

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17. (C) Another issue that could “derail” relations was arms sales to Taiwan, VFM He said. China had long opposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially advanced weapons sales. China was concerned by reports of possible “very important” and “potent” arms sales to Taiwan, including 60 Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 C/D fighter aircraft. Such arms sales were a “very serious issue” for China, AFM He said. The Charge replied that there had been no change to our one China policy based on the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In accordance with the TRA, the United States made available to Taiwan defense articles that allowed Taiwan to maintain a credible defense. The Charge urged China to take steps to reduce military deployments aimed at Taiwan.

HUMAN RIGHTS: LIU XIAOBO, GAO ZHISHENG

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18. (C) The Charge raised two human rights cases, inquiring as to the status, location and treatment of dissident writer and Charter 08 signatory Liu Xiaobo and rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng. VFM He replied that, as a sign of the “maturity” of our bilateral relationship, he had “repeatedly” listened to our concerns regarding these two cases. Both cases would be handled “according to law” and in accordance with China’s legal/judicial system. Such cases were “sensitive” and should be handled “carefully,” VFM He said, pledging that he nevertheless would look into the cases “to the extent possible.”

NORTH KOREAN “GUESTS”

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19. (S) The Charge emphasized the importance of expediting exit procedures from China for two North Koreans who had entered the Embassy compound and asked for VFM He’s assistance in doing so. VFM He said he would look into the matter.

U.S. JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN DPRK

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20. (C) The Charge urged China to press the DPRK to release the two American journalists detained in North Korea. VFM He replied that the United States could “rest assured” that China would do so.

UNSC REFORM

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21. (C) China was concerned by “momentum” that was building on UN Security Council reform, which was “not good” for the P-5, VFM He said. China wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform and not be “proactive” on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 “club” should not be “diluted,” VFM He said. If we end up with a “P-10,” both China and the United States would “be in trouble.” Moreover, it would be difficult for the Chinese public to accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Charge replied that the Administration had not completed its policy review on UNSC expansion, so we do not yet have a position on specific proposals. Nonetheless, the United States believed that UN members should be allowed to state their positions freely and openly without undue P-5 influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while no decision had been made about which countries to support for permanent membership on the UNSC, it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council that did not include Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN budget.

COCA II: AVOIDING A “TRADE WAR”

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22. (C) The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to leak into other areas. The Charge asked VFM He to speak with the appropriate PRC officials to stop this trend before significant damage was done. The COCA II team from Washington held good discussions in Beijing last week with MFA DG for Administrative Affairs Li Chao regarding the new CG Guangzhou complex. The U.S. Embassy today had formally invited DG Li to Washington in May for further talks. One serious problem, the Charge noted, was the Chinese having moved to block new housing leases for the U.S. Embassy in

BEIJING 00001176 005 OF 005

Beijing in an apparent attempt to gain leverage on office properties. VFM He said this situation sounded like a “trade war.” The Charge asked VFM He to help stop this matter before it led to a downward cycle. VFM He said he believed real progress had been made and differences narrowed during the most recent round of COCA II talks and that China did not want a “trade war” over COCA II issues. He pledged to “look into” the matter. PICCUTA

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/210110
(Flabby old chap)

Thursday, 04 June 2009, 09:08
S E C R E T SINGAPORE 000529
EO 12958 DECL: 06/04/2029
TAGS OVIP”>OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, MNUC, ECON, SN, CH,
KN
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG’S MAY 30, 2009
CONVERSATION WITH SINGAPORE MINISTER MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Daniel L. Shields. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (SBU) May 30, 2009; 6:30 p.m.; The Presidential Palace; Singapore.

2. (SBU) Participants:

United States

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The Deputy Secretary Glyn T. Davies, EAP Acting Assistant Secretary Daniel L. Shields, CDA (Notetaker)

SINGAPORE

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Minister Mentor (MM) Lee Kuan Yew Chee Hong Tat, Principal Private Secretary to MM Cheryl Lee, Country Officer, Americas Directorate, MFA

3. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Steinberg used his meeting with Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons and do not want North Korea to collapse. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad than a North Korea that has collapsed. MM Lee asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s answer was that “they can survive on their own.” The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” MM Lee also offered views on the Chinese economy, Taiwan, Chinese leaders, and U.S.-China relations. End Summary.

China and North Korea

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4. (S) Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew on May 30 on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual international security forum held in Singapore. The Deputy Secretary used the meeting with MM Lee to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Chinese do not want North Korea, which China sees as a buffer state, to collapse. The ROK would take over in the North and China would face a U.S. presence at its border. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad for China than a North Korea that has collapsed, he stated.

5. (S) MM Lee said he asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s Delphic answer was that “they can survive on their own.” MM Lee said he interpreted this as meaning that even if China cut off aid, the DPRK leadership would survive. This is a leadership that has already taken actions like killing ROK Cabinet Members in Burma and shooting down a KAL flight. If they lose power, they will end up facing justice at The Hague, like Milosevic. They have been so isolated for so long that they have no friends, not even Russia. They have not trusted China since the Chinese began cultivating ties with the ROK, given China’s interest in attracting foreign investment, he said. The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee expressed worry about the effect on Iran if the DPRK persists. MM Lee said he believes the DPRK can be contained and will not proliferate, but Iran has very high ambitions, ties to Shiite communities outside Iran, and oil wealth.

6. (S) The Deputy Secretary noted that North Korea’s decisions will have an impact in Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” The Chinese must have factored this into their calculations and concluded that the prospect of Japan with nuclear weapons is less bad than losing North Korea as a buffer state. The Chinese take a long-term view and must think that within a few years the DPRK’s current leadership will be gone and there will be new leadership, with new thinking. But there will still be a North Korea, he said.

7. (S) MM Lee said he wishes the USG well in its efforts on North Korea, but he would be surprised if the North Koreans agree to give up nuclear weapons. They might give up a first-strike capacity, but they want nuclear weapons in case the USG decides to seek regime change. They are psychopathic types, with a “flabby old chap” for a leader who prances around stadiums seeking adulation. MM Lee noted that he had learned from living through three and a half years of Japanese occupation in Singapore that people will obey authorities who can deny them food, clothing and medicine.

8. (S) MM Lee said the ROK, after seeing what had happened with German unification, does not want immediate unification with the DPRK. There is “nothing there” in the DPRK, other than a military organization. Kim Jong-Il has already had a stroke. It is just a matter of time before he has another stroke. The next leader may not have the gumption or the bile of his father or grandfather. He may not be prepared to see people die like flies. China is calculating all this. They have their best men on the job. They want to help the United States to advance common objectives. But they do not want the South to take over the North, MM Lee said.

Chinese Economy

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9. (C) Regarding the Chinese economy, MM Lee said the global economic crisis has hit many countries, but the feel on the ground differs considerably from place to place. The Chinese economy is reportedly in the doldrums, but when MM Lee visited Jiangsu Province on May 24, his impression was one of continued prosperity. Shanghai has been harder hit, with container port traffic down 30-35 percent, similar to the situation in Singapore. There is no sign of deep unrest in China. The Chinese are very confident they will be able to sustain eight percent growth. The government is pumping resources into the economy, with a focus on developing Western China. Whether such policies can be sustained for three to four years is unclear, but China can certainly sustain these policies for at least a year, he said.

10. (C) MM Lee stated that in the absence of a social safety net in China, the Chinese savings rate is 55 percent, exceeding even Singapore’s 50 percent level. Consumption accounts for only 35 percent of Chinese GDP, as opposed to 70 percent of U.S. GDP. The Chinese leadership may be loath to shift permanently to a more consumption-oriented economy, but the leadership will do so temporarily, if only to avoid unrest. 20 million people have moved back to the countryside because of economic dislocations. The government is providing microfinance to facilitate the transition. The pragmatists are in charge. There is nothing Communist about it. They just want to preserve one party rule. The Deputy Secretary expressed concern that current Chinese policies designed to counter the economic crisis could undermine reform. MM Lee said this cannot be helped. China wants to prevent riots like the ones that happened in Guangzhou in March when Hong Kong-connected enterprises suddenly shut down, he said.

Taiwan

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11. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked MM Lee for his assessment of Taiwan. MM Lee said former President Chen Shui-bian had left Taiwan in a weak economic position, which had enabled President Ma Ying-Jeou to come to power with his pledge to strengthen the economy through means including expanding the three links with China. In Beijing, former President Jiang Zemin was wedded to his eight-point approach, but President Hu Jintao was more flexible. Jiang wanted to show he was a great man by solving the Taiwan issue in his lifetime, but Hu is more patient and does not have any fixed timeline. In Chinese domestic politics, Hu had wanted Vice Premier Li Keqiang from the Communist Youth League to emerge as his successor, not Vice President Xi Jinping, but Hu did his calculations and accepted Xi when it became clear that Xi had the necessary backing from the rest of the leadership. Similarly, on Taiwan, Hu will be pragmatic. It does not matter to Hu if it takes 10 years or 20 or 30. The key is building links with Taiwan. As in the case of Hong Kong, if necessary the tap could be turned off, he said.

12. (C) In this context, MM Lee said, Hu could live with Ma’s positions on the ’92 consensus and on not addressing the reunification issue during his term in office. What mattered to Hu was that Taiwan not seek independence. If that happened, China has 1,000 missiles and is building its capacity to hold the U.S. fleet at a distance. The implicit question for Taiwan’s leaders is if that is what they want, MM Lee said.

13. (C) MM Lee stated that the alternative is Mainland investment in Taiwan stocks and property. The Mainland has already assured Hong Kong that it will help out economically. The Mainland has not said this to Taiwan, but the Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Director, Wang Yi, did urge Chinese companies to invest in Taiwan. In four years Taiwan’s economy will pick up and Ma will win re-election. The DPP lacks strong potential candidates. Su Zhen-chang is promising, but seems unlikely to be able to win. Meanwhile, even the traditionally DPP-supporting farmers in Taiwan’s South need China’s market for vegetables and other products. Taiwan’s continued participation in the World Health Assembly depends on Beijing. Beijing’s calculation seems to be to prevent Taiwan independence in the near term, then bring Taiwan “back to China,” even if it takes 40 or 50 years. MM Lee said he is looking forward to visiting Fujian Province, where preparations are underway for a new southern economic area linked with Taiwan.

Xi Jinping

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14. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked if in the future a leader like Xi Jinping would continue the policies on Taiwan followed by Hu Jintao. MM Lee responded affirmatively. Xi is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang’s influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes.

Wang Qishan

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15. (C) MM Lee said Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom the MM saw in connection with celebrations in May of the 15th anniversary of Singapore-China Suzhou Industrial Park, is an exceptional talent, very assured and efficient. Wang handled SARS superbly when he was in Hainan. He excelled in coordinating the Beijing Olympics. Li Keqiang may not get the Premiership and the Party is looking for a way to keep Wang on past his 65th birthday until he is 70. MM Lee said he had met first Wang back in the 1990s but had forgotten their meeting. This time when they met, Wang told Lee he had reviewed the records of all Lee’s meeting with Chinese leaders going back to the days of Deng Xiaoping to see how Lee’s thinking had developed. Wang told Lee he respects him as a consistent man.

China’s Rise

————

16. (C) MM Lee said China is following an approach consistent with ideas in the Chinese television series “The Rise of Great Powers.” The mistake of Germany and Japan had been their effort to challenge the existing order. The Chinese are not stupid; they have avoided this mistake. China’s economy has surpassed other countries, with the exceptions of Japan and the United States. Even with those two countries, the gap is closing, with China growing at seven-nine percent annually, versus two-three percent in the United States and Japan. Overall GDP, not GDP per capita, is what matters in terms of power. China has four times the population of the United States. China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China’s close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, he stated.

17. (C) MM Lee said China will not reach the American level in terms of military capabilities any time soon, but is rapidly developing asymmetrical means to deter U.S. military power. China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, raw materials, and food. This is why China is working with South Africa on the China-Africa Development Fund. China also needs open sea lanes. Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma.

Build Ties with Young Chinese

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18. (C) MM Lee said the best course for the United States on China is to build ties with China’s young people. China’s best and brightest want to study in the United States, with the UK as the next option, then Japan. While they are there, it is important that they be treated as equals, with the cultural support they may need as foreigners. Why not have International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs for China? Why not have Chinese cadets at West Point alongside Vietnamese cadets and Indian cadets? America’s advantage is that it can make use of the talent of the entire world, as in Silicon Valley. China still tends to try to keep the foreigners in Beijing and Shanghai. MM Lee noted that his own experience as a student in the UK had left him with an enduring fondness for the UK. When he spent two months at Harvard in 1968, an American professor had invited him home for Thanksgiving. This was not the sort of thing that happened in the UK, and Lee had realized he was dealing with a different civilization. In the future, China’s leaders will have PhDs and MBAs from American universities, he predicted.

19. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message.

Visit Embassy Singapore’s Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm

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