US embassy cables: China reiterates ‘red lines’

Posted on 29 November 2010 by admin

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/204917

Thursday, 30 April 2009, 13:07
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 001176
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2034
TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, PARM, PHUM, KUNR, CH, TW, KN, KS,
JA”>JA”>JA, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HE DISCUSSES G-20, DPRK,
IRAN, AF/PAK, UNSC REFORM, TAIWAN, TIBET WITH CHARGE
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i. Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

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1. (C) Taiwan’s participation as an observer at the upcoming May World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings demonstrated what could be achieved based on “one China, very broadly interpreted,” Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) He Yafei said at an April 30 working lunch hosted by the Charge d’Affaires. In his capacity as G-20 Sherpa, VFM He said he would ask for appropriate meetings in Washington to discuss the dates and agenda of the next G-20 summit. VFM He reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington: On North Korea, China encouraged the United States to re-engage the DPRK, but if the Six-Party Talks were suspended for an extended period, we should consider maintaining engagement in other ways. On Iran, Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by Washington and had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume a positive role in the region. On Afghanistan/Pakistan, VFM He asked to see a list of items that would be transported via the proposed Northern Distribution Network, given that “non-lethal” is a broad and vague term.

2. (S) Summary Continued: VFM He raised concerns over China’s “core interests” of Tibet and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which he said could “derail” bilateral cooperation. The Charge raised the Liu Xiaobo and Gao Zhisheng human rights cases, to which VFM He replied with standard language about Chinese law. The Charge asked for assistance in expediting the exit from China of two North Koreans from the U.S. Embassy compound; VFM He promised to assist. The Charge urged China to press North Korea to release the two detained American journalists; VFM H said China would. VFM He expressed concern over building “momentum” on UNSC reform and asked the United States not to be “proactive” on the matter. The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to affect other parts of our support for each other’s practical needs including residential leases and asked for VFM He’s assistance in stopping this trend. The Charge and VFM He agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. End Summary.

TAIWAN OBSERVERSHIP AT WHA

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3. (C) The agreement allowing Taiwan to participate as an observer at the World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings in Geneva in May was “one step forward” toward better cross-Strait relations and demonstrated what could be achieved through consultations based on “one China, very broadly interpreted,” Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) He Yafei said at an April 30 working lunch hosted by the Charge d’Affaires. Cross-Strait relations were “improving,” and as they did, China hoped the United States would feel “less burdened, frustrated and nervous,” VFM He said. The Charge congratulated VFM He on the agreement, noting its timeliness in light of concerns over the H1N1 outbreak, while expressing hope that both sides would continue to take steps to increase mutual trust.

IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL VISITS

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4. (C) The Charge and VFM He agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. Both concurred that Chief of Naval Operations ADM Roughead’s visit to China was a success. The Charge emphasized that, as President Obama told Foreign Minister Yang, the United States wanted to move relations between our two militaries forward. VFM He agreed that State Councilor Liu Yandong’s visit, including her meeting with Secretary Clinton, had been productive. VFM He said Liu came away “very impressed” by her interaction with Secretary Clinton and wanted very much to “follow up” on the issues they discussed such as education, something very basic and important to the people of both countries.

5. (C) Although we recognize the importance of the proposed visit by Politburo Member and CCP Organization Department

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Head Li Yuanchao, it would be easier to arrange a successful visit if Li could postpone his travel to a less busy time, the Charge said. VFM He replied that the visit of Li, a “future leader of China,” was “very important,” so China hoped the United States would provide a full schedule of meetings with senior leaders despite the fact that those leaders recently met with State Councilor Liu. The Charge urged VFM He to arrange a useful schedule for Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, including a trip to Tibet or Tibetan areas, noting that the Speaker was also particularly interested in climate change and environmental issues. China would treat Speaker Pelosi’s visit as a type of “state visit,” VFM He replied. Nevertheless, given her “tight schedule,” the Speaker would likely “not have time” to visit Tibet, VFM He said.

6. (C) Reviewing the upcoming meetings between Presidents Obama and Hu this year, VFM He noted that, over the past 30 years, the U.S.-China relationship had been driven by high-level visits to a greater degree than other bilateral relationships. With these meetings between our two presidents in mind, both sides should be “careful” and act in ways that benefit the long-term interests of the bilateral relationship. Our two presidents would meet several times in the coming months, including at the G-8, G-20 and APEC summits, after which China anticipated President Obama would visit China. We should plan our work for the bilateral relationship in the year ahead with the President’s visit to China in mind.

G-20: DATES AND TOPICS

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7. (C) VFM He stated that, he would ask to meet with NSC’s Michael Froman in Washington and was considering requesting an appropriate meeting with the Treasury Department. The topics would include the dates of the next G-20 meeting, as well as the agenda.

8. (C) In the first two G-20 Financial Summits, U.S. and Chinese positions had been close, closer even than the United States and Europe, VFM He noted. Views on major issues such as the need for fiscal stimulus and reform of international financial institutions were similar. Leading up to the London Summit, VFM He felt that the U.S.-U.K.-China “troika” had been effective: Beijing could persuade the developing countries, Washington could influence Japan and South Korea, and London could bring along the Europeans.

9. (C) The first two G-20 summits, according to VFM He, had succeeded in boosting confidence and agreeing on measures to help international financial institutions cope with the crisis. Now, the G-20 had entered an implementation period. He outlined four objectives that he intended to discuss with Froman:

A) Establish what stimulus and macroeconomic policy coordination the G-20 economies needed to implement to ensure economic recovery;

B) Strengthen the message against protectionism so that leaders did not “break their promises as soon as they returned home”;

C) Set a clear timetable for IMF reform, establishing whether the New Arrangement to Borrow (NAB) decisions had any relation to future quota; and

D) Reforming the international monetary system, vis-a-vis the dollar and an alternative reserve currency such as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

10. (C) Expounding on this last topic, VFM He stated that a stable U.S. dollar was good for China, and Beijing had no interest in “destabilizing the system.” The system, however, was “not perfect and needs reform.” He said China had a huge stake in how the United States managed the dollar. Further, VFM He suggested that the RMB could become a component of the SDR. Mentioning that the RMB could compose two percent of the SDR value, VFM He noted that this was more of a symbolic than practical change.

11. (U) Note: VFM He’s comments on the Strategic and Economic Dialogue will be reported septel.

VFM HE’S WASHINGTON VISIT: DPRK, IRAN, AF/PAK

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12. (C) VFM He reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington, including North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan. On North Korea, VFM He hoped to hold “informal consultations” in Washington on how generally to approach the North Koreans, not just through the Six-Party Talks. Washington and Beijing nevertheless needed to discuss how to maintain momentum in the Six-Party Talks so as to preserve our common interest in stability of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a “spoiled child” in order to get the attention of the “adult.” China therefore encouraged the United States, “after some time,” to start to re-engage the DPRK. In this regard, it was good that the New York channel remained open, VFM He observed. Noting that Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth would visit Beijing in May, VFM He said that, if the Six-Party Talks would be on hold for an extended period, then the Six Parties needed to find ways to continue to engage the DPRK and each other, either bilaterally or even perhaps trilaterally. The Charge noted that we should be careful not to reinforce Pyongyang’s bad behavior.

13. (C) VFM He also hoped to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue in Washington. Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by Washington. China had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume playing a positive role in the region. Though such an Iranian role made moderate Arab countries “jittery,” VFM He said, this should be a matter the United States could “manage.” What was essential was to get Iran involved positively in the region again.

14. (C) VFM He said he also hoped to discuss Afghanistan/Pakistan. The Charge stated that, even though XXXXXXXXXXXX was unable to announce new money for Afghanistan at the April 17 Pakistan Donors’ Conference, China still had an opportunity to contribute to the security and stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. One way to do so would be to agree to a re-supply route via China for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On the re-supply route question, VFM He said China would like to see a list of items that would be transported on the proposed route, noting that “non-lethal” is a broad and vague term.

TIBET AND TAIWAN AS “CORE INTERESTS”

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15. (C) VFM He raised concerns over China’s “core interests” of Tibet and Taiwan, which he said could “derail” bilateral cooperation. On Tibet, China had heard “rumors” that the Dalai Lama would attend a “seminar” in the United States in late September or early October, and that President Obama was “likely” to meet with him then. Noting that there was no need for both sides to reiterate our respective positions on Tibet, VFM He said the critical question was whether both sides would agree to “take care” of each other’s “core interests.” When considering such sensitive issues in the context of the bilateral relationship, they could be viewed either as “obstacles” or as “core interests.” It did not matter whether one side “liked or disliked” such matters; rather, in a “mature, close and important” bilateral relationship such as ours, the question was whether the key interests for each side would be accommodated. The United States had its core interests, VFM He asserted, such as U.S. naval vessels that had operated near the Chinese coast. Both sides agreed to “step down” over that issue, despite the strongly held views of the Chinese public. Regarding the Dalai Lama, China hoped the United States would deny him a visa, and if not, then agree to hold no official meetings with him, including no meeting with President Obama.

16. (C) The Charge expressed concern with China’s defining Tibet as a “core issue” with the apparent expectation that others would “step back.” Instead, our two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an attempt to resolve our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet is a part of China. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious leader and Nobel Laureate, and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity. Future meetings by U.S. officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out. Moreover, there were serious concerns among the U.S. public, the Administration and Congress over the situation in Tibetan areas of China. China should take steps to address Tibetans’ legitimate grievances and engage the Dalai Lama’s representatives in productive dialogue. Denying a visa to the Dalai Lama was not being contemplated.

BEIJING 00001176 004 OF 005

17. (C) Another issue that could “derail” relations was arms sales to Taiwan, VFM He said. China had long opposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially advanced weapons sales. China was concerned by reports of possible “very important” and “potent” arms sales to Taiwan, including 60 Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 C/D fighter aircraft. Such arms sales were a “very serious issue” for China, AFM He said. The Charge replied that there had been no change to our one China policy based on the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In accordance with the TRA, the United States made available to Taiwan defense articles that allowed Taiwan to maintain a credible defense. The Charge urged China to take steps to reduce military deployments aimed at Taiwan.

HUMAN RIGHTS: LIU XIAOBO, GAO ZHISHENG

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18. (C) The Charge raised two human rights cases, inquiring as to the status, location and treatment of dissident writer and Charter 08 signatory Liu Xiaobo and rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng. VFM He replied that, as a sign of the “maturity” of our bilateral relationship, he had “repeatedly” listened to our concerns regarding these two cases. Both cases would be handled “according to law” and in accordance with China’s legal/judicial system. Such cases were “sensitive” and should be handled “carefully,” VFM He said, pledging that he nevertheless would look into the cases “to the extent possible.”

NORTH KOREAN “GUESTS”

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19. (S) The Charge emphasized the importance of expediting exit procedures from China for two North Koreans who had entered the Embassy compound and asked for VFM He’s assistance in doing so. VFM He said he would look into the matter.

U.S. JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN DPRK

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20. (C) The Charge urged China to press the DPRK to release the two American journalists detained in North Korea. VFM He replied that the United States could “rest assured” that China would do so.

UNSC REFORM

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21. (C) China was concerned by “momentum” that was building on UN Security Council reform, which was “not good” for the P-5, VFM He said. China wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform and not be “proactive” on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 “club” should not be “diluted,” VFM He said. If we end up with a “P-10,” both China and the United States would “be in trouble.” Moreover, it would be difficult for the Chinese public to accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Charge replied that the Administration had not completed its policy review on UNSC expansion, so we do not yet have a position on specific proposals. Nonetheless, the United States believed that UN members should be allowed to state their positions freely and openly without undue P-5 influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while no decision had been made about which countries to support for permanent membership on the UNSC, it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council that did not include Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN budget.

COCA II: AVOIDING A “TRADE WAR”

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22. (C) The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to leak into other areas. The Charge asked VFM He to speak with the appropriate PRC officials to stop this trend before significant damage was done. The COCA II team from Washington held good discussions in Beijing last week with MFA DG for Administrative Affairs Li Chao regarding the new CG Guangzhou complex. The U.S. Embassy today had formally invited DG Li to Washington in May for further talks. One serious problem, the Charge noted, was the Chinese having moved to block new housing leases for the U.S. Embassy in

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Beijing in an apparent attempt to gain leverage on office properties. VFM He said this situation sounded like a “trade war.” The Charge asked VFM He to help stop this matter before it led to a downward cycle. VFM He said he believed real progress had been made and differences narrowed during the most recent round of COCA II talks and that China did not want a “trade war” over COCA II issues. He pledged to “look into” the matter. PICCUTA

Kim Jong-il an unhealthy US obsession, WikiLeaks cables show

Posted on 29 November 2010 by admin

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/29/kim-jong-il-us-obsession-wikileaks

With no embassy in Pyongyang, Washington devours hearsay about Kim Jong-il’s health, state of mind and succession plans

Search the cables for news of Kim Jong-il and the talk is often about his health and family. They are perhaps unsurprising obsessions when the 69-year-old’s succession is the factor most likely to determine North Korea’s future relationship with the rest of the world.

Without an embassy in Pyongyang, the Americans hoover up any fragment of intelligence from foreign contacts. The “Dear Leader” variously emerges as “a flabby old chap”, “quite a good drinker” and “increasingly indecisive since his stroke and other health problems”.

A leading Chinese official who met him in December 2009, the most recent face-to-face encounter recorded in the cables, reported that as a result of his worsening health Kim had developed a tendency to “reverse policies”, and that “officials also chart their own course as different factions competing for Kim’s attention, making it difficult for Kim to set a firm, clear direction”.

As an example of his loosening grip the Chinese official pointed to his reversal of a decision to recall students, scholars and scientists working or studying in China as a result of a single student’s defection in Beijing, under pressure from business and trade groups with interests in north-east China.

After an earlier October meeting with a Chinese state councillor, Dai Bingguo, “Kim told Dai that he had hoped to invite the Chinese official to share some liquor and wine, but that because of scheduling problems he would have to defer the offer to Dai’s next visit … Kim Jong-il had a reputation among the Chinese for being ‘quite a good drinker’ and, Dai said, he had asked Kim if he still drank alcohol. Kim said yes.”

Former prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew describes the North Koreans as “psychopathic types, with a ‘flabby old chap’ for a leader who prances around stadiums seeking adulation”. “Kim Jong-il has already had a stroke,” he is recorded as telling the embassy in Singapore. “It is just a matter of time before he has another stroke. The next leader may not have the gumption or the bile of his father or grandfather. He may not be prepared to see people die like flies.”

That next leader is likely to be Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s third son. In a meeting in Seoul in February, assistant secretary of state Kurt Campbell sought the views of a group of North Korea experts. A confidential cable reports a consensus that Kim Jong-un will face a moment of high danger when his father dies. “There were many reasons to doubt that Kim Jong-un would be able to successfully fend off challenges to his control after his father died,” one expert is quoted as saying. “He [the expert] noted that Kim Jong-il had 20 years of experience as an official of the Korean Workers’ party before his father died. Furthermore, Kim Jong-il had the benefit of years of guidance from his father after he had been officially anointed in 1980 to eventually succeed him. By contrast, Kim Jong-un had very limited experience.”

If anyone from the west can connect with Kim Jong-il, it appears to be Bill Clinton, who has a “good personal understanding” with the North Korean leader, a senior Mongolian official was told by North Korea’s vice-foreign minister, Kim Yong-il.

“Forward motion stopped during the Bush administration but was now able to proceed because of President Clinton’s recent involvement in a personal capacity, because President Obama is of the same party, and because former first lady [Hillary] Clinton is now the secretary of state,” the embassy in Ulan Bator reported in August 2009.

US embassy cables: Former Singapore PM on ‘psychopathic’ North Koreans

Posted on 29 November 2010 by admin

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/210110
(Flabby old chap)

Thursday, 04 June 2009, 09:08
S E C R E T SINGAPORE 000529
EO 12958 DECL: 06/04/2029
TAGS OVIP”>OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, MNUC, ECON, SN, CH,
KN
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG’S MAY 30, 2009
CONVERSATION WITH SINGAPORE MINISTER MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Daniel L. Shields. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (SBU) May 30, 2009; 6:30 p.m.; The Presidential Palace; Singapore.

2. (SBU) Participants:

United States

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The Deputy Secretary Glyn T. Davies, EAP Acting Assistant Secretary Daniel L. Shields, CDA (Notetaker)

SINGAPORE

———

Minister Mentor (MM) Lee Kuan Yew Chee Hong Tat, Principal Private Secretary to MM Cheryl Lee, Country Officer, Americas Directorate, MFA

3. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Steinberg used his meeting with Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons and do not want North Korea to collapse. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad than a North Korea that has collapsed. MM Lee asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s answer was that “they can survive on their own.” The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” MM Lee also offered views on the Chinese economy, Taiwan, Chinese leaders, and U.S.-China relations. End Summary.

China and North Korea

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4. (S) Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew on May 30 on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual international security forum held in Singapore. The Deputy Secretary used the meeting with MM Lee to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Chinese do not want North Korea, which China sees as a buffer state, to collapse. The ROK would take over in the North and China would face a U.S. presence at its border. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad for China than a North Korea that has collapsed, he stated.

5. (S) MM Lee said he asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s Delphic answer was that “they can survive on their own.” MM Lee said he interpreted this as meaning that even if China cut off aid, the DPRK leadership would survive. This is a leadership that has already taken actions like killing ROK Cabinet Members in Burma and shooting down a KAL flight. If they lose power, they will end up facing justice at The Hague, like Milosevic. They have been so isolated for so long that they have no friends, not even Russia. They have not trusted China since the Chinese began cultivating ties with the ROK, given China’s interest in attracting foreign investment, he said. The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee expressed worry about the effect on Iran if the DPRK persists. MM Lee said he believes the DPRK can be contained and will not proliferate, but Iran has very high ambitions, ties to Shiite communities outside Iran, and oil wealth.

6. (S) The Deputy Secretary noted that North Korea’s decisions will have an impact in Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” The Chinese must have factored this into their calculations and concluded that the prospect of Japan with nuclear weapons is less bad than losing North Korea as a buffer state. The Chinese take a long-term view and must think that within a few years the DPRK’s current leadership will be gone and there will be new leadership, with new thinking. But there will still be a North Korea, he said.

7. (S) MM Lee said he wishes the USG well in its efforts on North Korea, but he would be surprised if the North Koreans agree to give up nuclear weapons. They might give up a first-strike capacity, but they want nuclear weapons in case the USG decides to seek regime change. They are psychopathic types, with a “flabby old chap” for a leader who prances around stadiums seeking adulation. MM Lee noted that he had learned from living through three and a half years of Japanese occupation in Singapore that people will obey authorities who can deny them food, clothing and medicine.

8. (S) MM Lee said the ROK, after seeing what had happened with German unification, does not want immediate unification with the DPRK. There is “nothing there” in the DPRK, other than a military organization. Kim Jong-Il has already had a stroke. It is just a matter of time before he has another stroke. The next leader may not have the gumption or the bile of his father or grandfather. He may not be prepared to see people die like flies. China is calculating all this. They have their best men on the job. They want to help the United States to advance common objectives. But they do not want the South to take over the North, MM Lee said.

Chinese Economy

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9. (C) Regarding the Chinese economy, MM Lee said the global economic crisis has hit many countries, but the feel on the ground differs considerably from place to place. The Chinese economy is reportedly in the doldrums, but when MM Lee visited Jiangsu Province on May 24, his impression was one of continued prosperity. Shanghai has been harder hit, with container port traffic down 30-35 percent, similar to the situation in Singapore. There is no sign of deep unrest in China. The Chinese are very confident they will be able to sustain eight percent growth. The government is pumping resources into the economy, with a focus on developing Western China. Whether such policies can be sustained for three to four years is unclear, but China can certainly sustain these policies for at least a year, he said.

10. (C) MM Lee stated that in the absence of a social safety net in China, the Chinese savings rate is 55 percent, exceeding even Singapore’s 50 percent level. Consumption accounts for only 35 percent of Chinese GDP, as opposed to 70 percent of U.S. GDP. The Chinese leadership may be loath to shift permanently to a more consumption-oriented economy, but the leadership will do so temporarily, if only to avoid unrest. 20 million people have moved back to the countryside because of economic dislocations. The government is providing microfinance to facilitate the transition. The pragmatists are in charge. There is nothing Communist about it. They just want to preserve one party rule. The Deputy Secretary expressed concern that current Chinese policies designed to counter the economic crisis could undermine reform. MM Lee said this cannot be helped. China wants to prevent riots like the ones that happened in Guangzhou in March when Hong Kong-connected enterprises suddenly shut down, he said.

Taiwan

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11. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked MM Lee for his assessment of Taiwan. MM Lee said former President Chen Shui-bian had left Taiwan in a weak economic position, which had enabled President Ma Ying-Jeou to come to power with his pledge to strengthen the economy through means including expanding the three links with China. In Beijing, former President Jiang Zemin was wedded to his eight-point approach, but President Hu Jintao was more flexible. Jiang wanted to show he was a great man by solving the Taiwan issue in his lifetime, but Hu is more patient and does not have any fixed timeline. In Chinese domestic politics, Hu had wanted Vice Premier Li Keqiang from the Communist Youth League to emerge as his successor, not Vice President Xi Jinping, but Hu did his calculations and accepted Xi when it became clear that Xi had the necessary backing from the rest of the leadership. Similarly, on Taiwan, Hu will be pragmatic. It does not matter to Hu if it takes 10 years or 20 or 30. The key is building links with Taiwan. As in the case of Hong Kong, if necessary the tap could be turned off, he said.

12. (C) In this context, MM Lee said, Hu could live with Ma’s positions on the ’92 consensus and on not addressing the reunification issue during his term in office. What mattered to Hu was that Taiwan not seek independence. If that happened, China has 1,000 missiles and is building its capacity to hold the U.S. fleet at a distance. The implicit question for Taiwan’s leaders is if that is what they want, MM Lee said.

13. (C) MM Lee stated that the alternative is Mainland investment in Taiwan stocks and property. The Mainland has already assured Hong Kong that it will help out economically. The Mainland has not said this to Taiwan, but the Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Director, Wang Yi, did urge Chinese companies to invest in Taiwan. In four years Taiwan’s economy will pick up and Ma will win re-election. The DPP lacks strong potential candidates. Su Zhen-chang is promising, but seems unlikely to be able to win. Meanwhile, even the traditionally DPP-supporting farmers in Taiwan’s South need China’s market for vegetables and other products. Taiwan’s continued participation in the World Health Assembly depends on Beijing. Beijing’s calculation seems to be to prevent Taiwan independence in the near term, then bring Taiwan “back to China,” even if it takes 40 or 50 years. MM Lee said he is looking forward to visiting Fujian Province, where preparations are underway for a new southern economic area linked with Taiwan.

Xi Jinping

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14. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked if in the future a leader like Xi Jinping would continue the policies on Taiwan followed by Hu Jintao. MM Lee responded affirmatively. Xi is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang’s influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes.

Wang Qishan

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15. (C) MM Lee said Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom the MM saw in connection with celebrations in May of the 15th anniversary of Singapore-China Suzhou Industrial Park, is an exceptional talent, very assured and efficient. Wang handled SARS superbly when he was in Hainan. He excelled in coordinating the Beijing Olympics. Li Keqiang may not get the Premiership and the Party is looking for a way to keep Wang on past his 65th birthday until he is 70. MM Lee said he had met first Wang back in the 1990s but had forgotten their meeting. This time when they met, Wang told Lee he had reviewed the records of all Lee’s meeting with Chinese leaders going back to the days of Deng Xiaoping to see how Lee’s thinking had developed. Wang told Lee he respects him as a consistent man.

China’s Rise

————

16. (C) MM Lee said China is following an approach consistent with ideas in the Chinese television series “The Rise of Great Powers.” The mistake of Germany and Japan had been their effort to challenge the existing order. The Chinese are not stupid; they have avoided this mistake. China’s economy has surpassed other countries, with the exceptions of Japan and the United States. Even with those two countries, the gap is closing, with China growing at seven-nine percent annually, versus two-three percent in the United States and Japan. Overall GDP, not GDP per capita, is what matters in terms of power. China has four times the population of the United States. China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China’s close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, he stated.

17. (C) MM Lee said China will not reach the American level in terms of military capabilities any time soon, but is rapidly developing asymmetrical means to deter U.S. military power. China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, raw materials, and food. This is why China is working with South Africa on the China-Africa Development Fund. China also needs open sea lanes. Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma.

Build Ties with Young Chinese

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18. (C) MM Lee said the best course for the United States on China is to build ties with China’s young people. China’s best and brightest want to study in the United States, with the UK as the next option, then Japan. While they are there, it is important that they be treated as equals, with the cultural support they may need as foreigners. Why not have International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs for China? Why not have Chinese cadets at West Point alongside Vietnamese cadets and Indian cadets? America’s advantage is that it can make use of the talent of the entire world, as in Silicon Valley. China still tends to try to keep the foreigners in Beijing and Shanghai. MM Lee noted that his own experience as a student in the UK had left him with an enduring fondness for the UK. When he spent two months at Harvard in 1968, an American professor had invited him home for Thanksgiving. This was not the sort of thing that happened in the UK, and Lee had realized he was dealing with a different civilization. In the future, China’s leaders will have PhDs and MBAs from American universities, he predicted.

19. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message.

Visit Embassy Singapore’s Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm

SHIELDS

China Help with North Korea? Fuggedaboutit!

Posted on 26 November 2010 by admin

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/26/china_help_with_north_korea_fuggedaboutit?page=full

Some years ago, much to my surprise, I persuaded FP’s then editor Moises Naim to drop the expression “Fuggedaboutit!” from these august columns. Chirpy is one thing, vulgar another.

It was kind of Venezuela’s former trade minister to heed the sensitivities of a Brit subscriber. But now I repent me. For nothing less emphatic will do to express my profound dissent from one dominant trope in the endless, circular discourse on North Korea, lately amplified by commentators and policymakers who should know better.
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You know the tune, so sing along. It goes like this: Call Beijing! Only the Chinese have influence in and on Pyongyang. (They deny it, but we know they’re kidding.) Call yourself a responsible global leader, Comrade Hu? Then rally round, and do your bit. Kim Jong Il and his nukes are as much a threat to you as to the rest of us. And now he’s shelling South Korean civilians! So join us in condemning him, and for God’s sake rein the rogue in. Or words to that effect.

Thus Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to CNN this week: “I believe that it’s really important that Beijing lead here…. I’ve believed for some time that probably the country that can influence North Korea the most is clearly China … [North Korea] destabilizes the region, and China has as much to lose as anybody in that region with the continuation of this kind of behavior and what the potential might be.”

State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley echoed this sentiment: “China is pivotal to moving North Korea in a fundamentally different direction …We would hope and expect that China would use that influence, first, to reduce tensions that have arisen from North Korean provocations and then, secondly, [to] continue to encourage North Korea to take affirmative steps to denuclearize.”

Hope all you want, P.J. It ain’t gonna happen, at least not the way you put it. Sure, Beijing makes vague noises. “We are ready to make joint efforts,” the Foreign Ministry said recently.

But China barely talks the talk, and no way does it walk the walk. Has Washington missed the new lovefest between Pyongyang and Beijing? A friendship forged in blood, as close as lips and teeth. The old slogans and warmth are back. And it’s for real. Better believe it.

We saw it first this summer. Not only did China’s skepticism on the sinking of the Cheonan, the South Korean corvette, let North Korea off the hook, but its hostility to U.S.-South Korean naval exercises in the Yellow Sea — Chinese coastal waters, apparently — sent the allies scurrying ignominiously to hold their maneuvers on the other side of the peninsula.

(Not this time. As I write the aircraft carrier USS George Washington and its battle group are steaming toward the Yellow Sea, after North Korea’s latest provocation: Tuesday’s fatal and unprovoked thermobaric shelling of civilians on Yeonpyeong Island, in the same waters. Thus far Beijing has not reacted so fiercely again, recognizing perhaps that the United States and South Korea have got to make some show of force — and a show is better than the real thing.)

China’s support of the North on the Cheonan came despite a contretemps between lips and teeth just weeks before. In early May Kim Jong Il flounced home from Beijing a day before he was due to go; leaving the Phibada Opera troupe — Pyongyang’s finest — to perform the gala opening of their version of the Chinese classic “Dream of Red Mansions” for — well, nobody much. No doubt as usual the Dear Mendicant had demanded summat fe nowt, as we say in Yorkshire. And for once, China’s checkbook stayed closed. Lessons have to be taught.

But beggars can’t be choosers, or not when no one else is willing to cough up any more. By August, Kim had seen the light and headed for China again; this time to the northeast. Hu Jintao came to meet him — and his son Kim Jong Un, soon to be unveiled to his country and the world (although the younger Kim wasn’t publicly announced as being on the trip) as the heir apparent.

A deal was struck. China swallowed this dynastic succession, and probably bankrolled the festivities. Every family in North Korea got liquor, pork, and soap; all are luxuries for many.

Barely a month later, as the reptile press — some North Korean barbs are too good not to use — oohed and aahed at the pudgy young general, most missed the one man on the podium not wearing a Kim Il Sung badge. That was China. Specifically Zhou Yongkang: a top Politburo figure with a public security background, and Beijing’s new point man on Pyongyang.

Back in Beijing a week later, Zhou welcomed an unprecedented North Korean delegation: the party bosses from all 11 provinces and cities, led by rising star Mun Kyong Dok, an economist who runs Pyongyang and at 53 is by far the youngest of the new Politburo (he’s an alternate member). This team went on to tour China’s northeast, which featured prominently in a new economic accord signed in early October. In a comparison no one local will be making, any fresh business ties will be the first big boost since Manchukuo days. For a start Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin provinces will be happy if Pyongyang starts paying for the coal et al that they supply — or at least stops stealing the railway wagons they send it in. There’s quite a ways to go.

October also saw the 60th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ (CPV; old British army joke: I want three volunteers, you, you, and you) entry into the Korean War. That turned the tide, saving Kim Il Sung’s bacon and his infant state from being wiped off the map. It normally rates a few lines in the Pyongyang press, but this year both sides celebrated this fulsomely: “with splendor,” gushed the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the North’s official organ.

Seoul, its nose already well out of joint over the Cheonan, seethed when Xi Jinping — tipped as China’s next leader — called the Korean War “a great and just war for safeguarding peace and resisting aggression.” Whose aggression, exactly? North Korea invaded the South, and then the CPV helped the Korean People’s Army (KPA) capture Seoul a second time in 1950.

In the North, the most striking event was on Oct. 26. After their Chinese guests had gone home, the Kims father and son plus the KPA top brass made an unprecedented pilgrimage to Hoechang, a valley east of Pyongyang where the CPV had its headquarters — and where its dead lie buried, most notably Mao Zedong’s son. The Kims laid a solemn wreath on Mao Anying’s grave. North Korea doesn’t tend to do grateful, so this was quite an extraordinary gesture.

What does it mean? The Kims are snuggling up to Beijing because there’s no one else left to snuggle up to. They’d rather have rival suitors as well, whom they could play off in time-honored fashion — as Kim Il Sung did in the Sino-Soviet dispute, or more recently between China and South Korea during the latter’s “sunshine” decade of an engagement policy (1998-2007).

But now China is the last man standing. For various reasons, everyone else has taken their bat home and quit the field. Beijing probably can’t believe its luck, if such it be. This could all have been far fiercer, as it fatefully was a century ago when the region’s three whales — China, Russia, and Japan — battled over the shrimp of the dying, introverted Chosun dynasty: the original Hermit Kingdom. (The parallels are striking, but the DPRK is more a scorpion.)

The cast of characters doesn’t change much. For Japan, then-premier Junichiro Koizumi’s bold visit to Pyongyang in 2002, eliciting an amazing admission and apology — North Korea doesn’t say sorry, either — by Kim Jong Il in person for past kidnappings of Japanese, was meant to resolve this issue and lay the ground for diplomatic normalization. But it backfired, since Pyongyang patently wasn’t telling the full story. Bilateral ties have been in free fall ever since, to the point where Japan — once a major trading partner — now bans all commerce with North Korea.

And where did Moscow go? The Soviet Union founded the DPRK — Kim Il Sung came home in 1945 in a Red Army uniform — and funded it unstintingly for almost half a century, even under Mikhail Gorbachev, before abruptly pulling the plug in its own final months in 1991. Enter Russia. President Boris Yeltsin leaned toward Seoul but his successor Vladimir Putin tried to mend fences, meeting Kim JongI Il thrice in successive years. But since then nothing, and minimal trade or investment. Pyongyang owes unpaid billions, so maybe Moscow just gave up. Just one of many puzzles about Russian foreign policy nowadays.

Finally, South Korea. Sunshine was one-sided, but at least it gave Seoul a foot in the door. In 2008 a newly elected right-wing president, Lee Myung-bak, threw it all away by refusing to honor new projects — mostly win-win, like joint shipbuilding — signed by his predecessor Roh Moo-hyun at the second Pyongyang summit in 2007. That wasn’t smart. It doesn’t remotely excuse sinking the Cheonan or shelling Yeonpyeong, but it partly explains them.

But back to China. Even if this trio of potential rivals hadn’t each for their own reasons left the scene, arguably Beijing alone has both the means and motivation to really take North Korea in hand, as I reckon it is now starting to do. This goes beyond the familiar mantra, that China fears above all a North Korean collapse, chaos on its borders, massive refugee flows and so on. (South Korea too has reason to be no keener on that scenario, but it’s hard to know what Lee Myung-bak is trying to achieve.)

I used to think the logic of juche, North Korea’s supposed doctrine of self-reliance — which in practice meant defying everyone while taking their money — was such that in the end Kim Jong Il would irrevocably annoy Beijing as much as all the others. China plays a long game. In less than two decades since it opened formal relations with South Korea — which brusquely ditched Taiwan to do so — trade and other ties have soared. China is now South Korea’s top trade partner and main destination for outward foreign direct investment. More flights out of Incheon head for China than anywhere else.

So the smart thing for China, surely, would be to let the irredeemable North rot to the point of collapse; have the South absorb it German-style, which would keep it busy for quite some time; and lure this unified Korea out of Uncle Sam’s embrace into the neutrality that most Koreans in their heart of hearts have always craved. Shouldn’t be too hard, really.

It might have gone that way, if the balance of various forces — in Beijing, Pyongyang, Seoul and elsewhere — had been even a little different. But they weren’t, and now it won’t. Instead, as the Korea expert Victor Cha — of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and lately of the George W. Bush administration — wrote recently, China has made the strategic decision that a unified Korea which is South Korea writ large, and as such a U.S. ally, goes fundamentally against its interests.

Hence Beijing’s support, or as good as, over the Cheonan and the shelling. China is pursuing its own agenda on North Korea, and no one can stop it. It will tolerate some provocations, to show the Kims they can trust it not to let them down. But there is a limit, and a price or two.

First, Beijing will not pour money into a broken system. North Korea must fix itself first. That means finally embracing markets, as Deng Xiaoping first urged a much younger Kim Jong Il 30 years ago. (Imagine if the Dear Leader had heeded him then.)

Second, the roguery has to stop, if not all right away. That means no more nuclear tests, and in the long run denuclearization — perhaps in exchange for a Chinese security guarantee.

What if the Kims won’t play ball? Then China has its own Kim who will. No. 1 son Kim Jong Nam went strikingly off message last month, raining on little brother’s parade by saying he was against a third generation succession. Who did he say this to? Japan’s Asahi newspaper. Where did he say it? In Beijing, where evidently he still lives — and is protected.

True, a regime so introverted, vicious, and world-historically stupid as North Korea’s could yet foul up. The Kims may chafe and rattle their new cage. It could all go wrong, for China and them.

But if they have an ounce of sense, they must know the old game is up. Militant mendicancy won’t cut it any more; no one will buy that old horse again. There is only China. Meanwhile their hungry subjects watch pirated South Korean DVDs, and grow restive.

Bottom line: North Korea’s nomenklatura needs a sugar daddy. If you were they, on whose tender mercies would you throw yourself: Lee Myung-bak, or Xi Jinping? That’s surely a no-brainer. They know how it went in Germany. Becoming China’s satellite is humiliating — but better than ceasing to exist, in whatever sense.

Finally, should the rest of us mind? We can do precious little anyway. Let the Chinese have the burden of dragging the DPRK into the 21st century; that will keep them busy. It’s galling for South Korea, which claims the whole peninsula. But even in Seoul, if honest, they may breathe a sigh of relief for the poisoned chalice to fall to someone else.

And who knows? A decade or two down the line, a by-then-more-normal and half-rich North Korea may slough off the Chinese yoke and seek unification with the South. For the latter, that’s a more feasible project than right now, which is a case of “one country, two planets.”

So frankly, sending the USS George Washington, and all the U.N. resolutions and sanctions, and the Six Party Talks, in fact all the paraphernalia of the past decade and more, are by the by. None of it has worked, and none of it now counts. China has a plan: its own plan. Beijing may go through the motions and play along with our old game a bit, for form’s sake. But the truth is, they have a new game. We shall all have to get used to it, and stop pretending.

For the Kims, the weakest link is family

Posted on 22 October 2010 by admin

By Aidan Foster-Carter
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LJ22Dg01.html

I’m a sociologist, by discipline. Or indiscipline, do I hear you sneer? True, my subject has its share of what one eminent sociologist, Garry Runciman, has called ”attitude and platitude”. Plenty of obfuscating jargon, too. Nor is it half as trendy as when I first got hooked, back in 1968 – when I mixed it up with Marxism. These days, subjects like psychology, history and even economics (despite our present discontents) are more highly regarded than sociology.

But my trade has its uses too, as I shall now try to demonstrate. Take Kim Jong-eun, newly crowned dauphin of North Korea. A communist monarchy: that’s a strange beast indeed, and a contradiction in terms. But sociology, I contend, may shed some light here. What is going on? How on earth did it come to this? And can such a peculiar system survive?

Trotsky saw it coming
Let’s start with Trotsky. Lev Davidovich Bronstein (1879-1940), who took the name Trotsky, was by profession a revolutionary, not a sociologist. Before they joined forces to lead the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, he had criticized Lenin’s methods and in particular his elitism.

Despite starting out as democrats, intellectuals who believe they have history on their side tend to get the idea that they know best. The people’s will becomes whatever they say it is. We are progress, we must prevail. You, conversely, who beg to differ, are an enemy of the people, on the wrong side of history – so shut up, or else. (A word for this is ”vanguardism.”)

The young Trotsky’s critique of such arrogance – before he sold the pass and joined the club, seduced by the smell of power – was sociologically sharp, prescient, and indeed fateful:

”In inner-party politics, these methods lead, as we shall yet see, to this: the party organization substitutes itself for the party, the central committee substitutes itself for the organization, and, finally, a ‘dictator’ substitutes himself for the central committee.”

Which is exactly what came to pass. Having seized power, the Bolsheviks betrayed hopes of democracy by quashing all who disagreed with them: not just counter-revolutionaries, but fellow socialists. Before long, the suppression spread to within their own ranks. The logical conclusion was the monster Stalin – whose agents murdered Trotsky in his Mexican exile.

Had Trotsky lived to see the further perversion of communism that is North Korea, he might have taken this further. Soviet Stalinism spawned mini-Stalins elsewhere. Even as the USSR repudiated Stalin, his Korean epigone Kim Il-sung moved in the other direction: to cement control. Moreover the Great Leader resolved that his system should not perish with him.

And it hasn’t. Kim Il-sung was no sociologist, but he understood what it took to grab power and build a tyranny that lasts. Trotsky’s three stages – three substitutions, in his word – take us from democracy to dictator. But history doesn’t end there. The tyrant must secure his power: both in his lifetime and especially after he has gone. Succession is the Achilles’ heel here.

Looking at how North Korea has managed to endure, three factors appear essential. One is force, pure and simple. With all pretence of democracy gone, Mao’s dictum becomes the bottom line: Power grows out of the barrel of a gun. North Korea’s relentless militarization is thus no surprise, nor is its formalization by Kim Jong-il as Songun (military-first policy): even twisting Marxist theory to make soldiers, not workers, the revolution’s driving force.

Unlikely generals
How far Songun has come was clear from the rare conference on September 28 of the nominally ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). At least the WPK now has a Poliburo and a Central Committee (CC) again; both had atrophied since Kim Il-sung died in 1994. And of course the main point was to hail the new princeling. But first things first. On the eve of the meeting Kim Jong-eun – aged 27, with no known military experience – was made a four-star general.

So was his equally civilian aunt Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong-il’s younger sister, whose field is light industry. Only then did Kim Jong-eun acquire Party rank: as a CC member and (crucially) as joint vice-chairman of the WPK’s Central Military Committee (CMC). (Connoisseurs of comparative communism may care to note that China’s vice-president Xi Jinping, widely seen as President Hu Jintao’s successor, acquired exactly the same position on October 18.)

But back to North Korea. Nephew and aunt look an unconvincing pair of generals – what do real soldiers make of this? – but the symbolism and pecking order are clear. What counts in Pyongyang these days is the Korean People’s Army (KPA). And while Kim Il-sung as an ex-guerilla had the kudos to control the KPA, his pampered son lacked that clout. Indeed, when the Dear Leader dies an actual military takeover looks a distinct possibility. That isn’t the Kims’ plan, however, so two additional strategies have been devised to try to prevent this.

One is family rule. Kim Il-sung took that step as early as 1966. The last time the WPK held a delegates’ meeting like the one we have just seen in Pyongyang – 44 years ago: due process is not North Korea’s forte – it was to be told the startling news that their leader had picked his younger brother Kim Yong-ju – later out-maneuvered by Kim Jong-il, but thought to be still alive at age 90 – as successor. That stuck in some throats, even of those who had seen how ruthlessly Kim purged his foes a decade earlier – they used Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech denouncing Stalin to try to get rid of him, but failed. The lucky ones managed to flee to the USSR and China. Thereafter Kim’s cult of personality grew apace, but extending this to his brother was a step too far for some. Those rash enough to voice objections were duly purged.

Communist monarchy
Communist monarchy: what a grotesque paradox. Yet there is a double logic to this. First, at the end of the day who can you trust? Especially in a culture that prizes filial piety, your own family looks the best bet. Kim Jong-il certainly thinks so, promoting not only his son but his sister – Kim Kyong-hui also becomes a full Politburo member – and of course her husband Jang Song-taek, now an alternate Politburo member as well as a vice-chair of the National Defense Commission (NDC), the highest executive body of state outranking the Cabinet.

Second: In a state barely 60 years old, but preceded by centuries of Confucian monarchy and (more immediately) four decades of emperor-worship under Japanese occupation (1905-45), keeping it in the Kim family presses powerful buttons. Or to put it more sociologically, this mode of essentially patriarchal legitimation of rulers is familiar, indeed deeply ingrained.

On October 8 Yang Hyong-sop, a veteran Politburo member aged 85, told Associated Press Television News (APTN): ”Our people take pride in the fact that they are blessed with great leaders from generation to generation… Our people are honored to serve the great president Kim Il-sung and the great general Kim Jong-il. Now we also have the honor of serving young general Kim Jong-eun.”

He sounded deeply traditional: a loyal courtier to his kings. But North Korea’s communist origins mean it can’t admit it has become a monarchy, so this isn’t quite enough. Both the ruler, and even more his successor, have to justify their rule in some other way. This is the third factor, and it takes two forms – or more precisely, stages.

The first is a cult of personality: originated by Stalin, extended by Mao, and pushed to its extremes by Kim Il-sung. Hey, if a guy claims absolute right to rule, he’d better be special. This is what the German sociologist Max Weber called charisma: a term which has entered the language in a looser sense. Or if he’s not so special, you make up stories to pretend he is. These may be ludicrous, but woe betide anyone rash enough to giggle or cast aspersions.

Yet as Weber saw, as a mode of rule charisma has problems. Unlike traditional authority – a monarchy proper, for instance – charisma is vested in just one exceptional individual. What happens when they die? The challenge, in Weber’s rather ugly term, is to routinize charisma.

Immortal presidents
Well, North Korea has done that. One way is to make the hero immortal. Kim Il-sung is still ”eternal president”, despite being dead for 16 years. The final step, logical enough, is to turn adoration into veneration and in effect create a religion. Again the recent WPK meeting is a case in point. Pouring into Pyongyang from every corner of the land, what was the first thing the delegates did? Before the conference came an act of worship. As a group, they all visited the ”sacred temple of Juche”. That’s how the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) refers to Kumsusan Memorial Palace: where Kim Il-sung lived and worked, and where even now his embalmed corpse keeps a glass eye on things. KCNA noted that the delegates ”paid high tribute” even to Kim’s statue, and ”made deep bows to the president” in person.

Weird, yet it makes a kind of sense. To sum up so far. Trotsky’s grimly accurate forecast of what happens when an elite thinks it knows better than the people it purports to represent – first the party, then a clique, and finally a dictator – is only half the story. For the dictator to hold onto power, even after his death, entails three further steps: militarization, family rule, and a quasi-religious cult. Or at least that’s what North Korea’s peculiar evolution suggests.

Two caveats. This isn’t a complete sociology of power in North Korea, obviously. A fuller account would look more at the role of ideology. This too has mutated far from communism into what Brian Myers bluntly calls ”race-based nationalism”. His book The Cleanest Race examines North Korea’s internal propaganda. The story the regime tells its people about the world and their place in it is even nastier, narrower and more noxious than you’d imagine. Read it, especially if tempted to believe that this regime genuinely wants to make peace.

Can it last?
Second, I dare to hope for a happy ending. Kim Il-sung’s sociological nous has kept the state he created alive longer than many (me included) had expected. But can it go on for ever?

That I doubt. A full answer would loose more hares than there’s room for here. In the 21st century, refusing market reforms is a recipe for self-destruction. Abroad, North Korea’s old game of militant mendicancy, despite some success from the Sino-Soviet dispute right up to the six-party talks, is past its sell-by date; other powers are fed up and won’t play any more.

But just to stick to the processes already mentioned, these too are far from foolproof. The weakest link is familism. Past history, in Korea or anywhere – think of the Borgias in Italy – suggests that monarchies or other forms of family rule can be riddled by strife. Some crown princes just aren’t up to the job. People plot, and before you know it the knives are out.

Specifically, promoting a third son over his elder siblings is asking for trouble. What does number one son think? On October 12 he told us. Interviewed in Beijing by Japan’s Asahi TV, Kim Jong-nam broke ranks, saying: ”Personally, I am against third-generation dynastic succession”. Adding that he didn’t care, and would help little brother ”while I stay abroad”, doesn’t make this any less of a bombshell. Kim Jong-nam has gone off-message, big time.

Nor is he the only one. Even in Pyongyang the mask is slipping. The WPK conference and subsequent military parade seem to have passed off smoothly, but dissent is growing. One recent visiting group (which included a Korean-speaker) heard a full-scale row between their guides – it was evening, and drink had been taken – as to what right Kim Jong-eun had to be foisted on them as leader. That is still dangerous talk; but many more will be thinking it. The young general has much to prove, and may not have long to do so. Interesting times.

Aidan Foster-Carter is honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University, and a freelance consultant, writer and broadcaster on Korean affairs. A regular visitor to the peninsula, he has followed Korea for over 40 years.

The cultural life of North Korea

Posted on 15 October 2010 by admin

North Korea’s 65th anniversary of the Workers’ Party offered a rare insight of every day life in the capital Pyongyang.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/15/north-korea-pyongyang-secret-culture
Tania Branigan

A street scene in Pyongyang. Photograph: Dan Chung/Guardian

Old men playing cards in a park; a woman shopping for vegetables; tired workers jostling for space on a rusting trolley bus. These tiny glimpses of daily life would be unremarkable anywhere else. But this is Pyongyang, capital of one of the world’s most insular countries, and even the mundane is an extraordinary sight – more fascinating to a journalist than the pomp of North Korea’s largest military parade, the real reason we have been allowed in.

We expect to see the portraits of Eternal President Kim Il-sung and his son, the Dear Leader Kim Jong-il, gazing down at us from roadsides. We have been well briefed on socialist haircuts and vinalon, the miracle fabric made from limestone and better known for durability than comfort. We have read the propaganda, combining revolutionary fervour, the vocabulary of 30s potboilers and accounts of Kim’s visits to potato-starch factories.

But who knew that The Da Vinci Code was a hit in this strictly controlled city? That Céline Dion is a karaoke favourite? Or that the mass performances are not only a tribute to the leadership and motherland, but the way that many young people find partners?

Few foreigners see this city at all. Around 2,000 western tourists visited last year, plus perhaps 10 times as many Chinese visitors. The expatriate population, excluding Chinese and Russian diplomats, and including children, stands at 150. Mobile phones are confiscated at entry; visitors are accompanied by official escorts at all times; tourists’ photos are inspected and frequently deleted, even when their subject matter is – to outside eyes – entirely innocuous.

A family passes before the Party Foundation Monunment in Pyongyang. A family passes before the Party Foundation Monument. Photograph: Dan Chung/Guardian

Information is so sparse that interpreting North Korea is not so much like reading tea leaves in a saucer as examining them while they float in a milky brew. People devote their careers to the country yet acknowledge they know little about it – one Seoul-based expert, Park Hyeong-jung, is reportedly writing a paper on “just how terrible our research and predictions are”, though others say information about daily life – such as market prices – is much better than two decades ago.

Our rare media trip has been organised by the government at little notice to show the world that Kim Jong-un, the leader’s youngest son, is now heir apparent. We arrive in Pyongyang less than 24 hours after flinging scribbled applications at the Beijing embassy and officials admit they hadn’t expected so many journalists. With minders in short supply we have more freedom than usual, visiting the railway station, department store, vegetable shops and kiosks and a local restaurant. This is by far the wealthiest section of the wealthiest part of the country.

“Nobody who lives in Pyongyang is an ordinary person. This is the top five to 10% of the population,” points out Barbara Demick, whose book Nothing To Envy offers a vivid account of ordinary life in North Korea.

On top of that, we have arrived amid unusual celebrations. The party has promised special supplies to households in the capital, including a bottle of alcohol, cooking oil and sweets. Most passersby are drab, in grey, khaki or navy outfits; their only colour the red Kim Il-sung badge pinned to each lapel. But women attending the military parade have brought out their bright traditional gowns for the holiday and others show a thirst for colour, with vivid bags or jackets. Hot pink is a surprisingly popular shade in Pyongyang. Most are immaculately made-up and all are neatly coiffed. Hair is a serious matter in North Korea, which licences a limited range of haircuts – in 2005, state television launched a series titled Let’s Trim our Hair in Accordance with the Socialist Lifestyle.

On the streets, a handful of residents lick ice lollies; one tiny girl holds a candy floss stick in each hand. Across from our hotel, people jostle at food stalls for savoury pancakes, fritters and pizza (reportedly a favourite of Kim Jong-il’s). An enormous white frosted cake with pink icing roses is priced at 9,000 won (£6.25), while a dish of shaved ice with syrup costs just 5 won. Young men take aim at shooting stalls, and around town crowds gather to watch open-air concerts, the bands lined up in neat rows like Merseybeat-era Beatles.

But some who know the city suggest that attractions such as the street lighting will vanish once we have gone. Even during our visit, most roads away from our hotel are dark. The sleek restaurants surrounding it are almost empty. The central department store is gloomy, illuminated only by late-afternoon light and a string of fairy lights. As at a rainy English fete, the effect of the bunting above the counters is more plaintive than festive. Stock lies untroubled in glass counters or on the shelves behind them: lengths of plaid fabric, clocks, footballs, pastel towels, TVs and even a cafetiere set. There are perhaps 20 visitors sprinkled across four sizeable floors and the only actual customer appears to be a small child buying a cheap plastic toy.

Old men play Korean Chess near the Party Foundation Monunment in Pyongyang. Old men play Korean Chess in Pyongyang. Photograph: Dan Chung/Guardian

There are certainly signs of change here: Air Koryo has new planes and three gleaming airport buses to ferry passengers from runway to terminal. Last week a vast new theatre opened, as did an apartment complex, although it may be destined for officials. The 105-storey Ryugyong hotel – more than two decades in construction – is finally glass-sheathed and due to open in 2012. That year will mark the 100th birthday of the country’s founder, Kim Il-sung. But it is hard to see how it can achieve its pledge to become “a great, powerful and prosperous nation” by then – even given the Stakhanovite industrial efforts lauded in its newspapers.

Life must be good for some in Pyongyang. A journalist spots a North Korean handing over $2,000 to buy two Longines watches. Orascom, the Egyptian mobile phone company that opened a network here last year, already has 200,000 subscribers, although the handsets cost anywhere between £65 and £190 and their use is strictly limited: Koreans can only call other Koreans, while foreigners can only call each other or abroad.

But away from the handful of show projects there is little sign of improvement in ordinary lives. Overloaded trolley buses wheeze along, more rust than steel. One reporter sees a woman and child apparently digging for roots in a park. The country has been heavily reliant on food handouts since the 90s, when hundreds of thousands died. Those who have visited the countryside recently say residents are visibly gaunt, even in farming areas.

Pyongyang is lucky: no one is plump, but nor is there noticeable emaciation. Dr Andrei Lankov, associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, says the official income in Pyongyang is around 3,000 won a month, but many have ways of making money on the side and – unlike other North Koreans – its residents receive subsistence food rations. Most top those up at markets that are legal though never formally acknowledged (officials insist that “everything is public”). At the turn of the year, the government embarked on currency reforms to eradicate an increasingly independent group of “kiosk capitalists”. But wiping out hard-won savings caused highly unusual public discontent and even, reportedly, unrest.

“It was a near complete disaster; the first time in my memory that high-level North Korean officials openly complained to their counterparts about government policy,” says Lankov.

The government swiftly reversed the changes and reportedly executed a senior official for the blunder. Now, says one frequent visitor, the economy is exactly as it was – except that prices have risen sharply and people are unhappier. The government would like foreign investors to help revive the economy, but the country’s unpredictability and the international sanctions imposed over its missile and nuclear tests make that unlikely, despite its rock-bottom wages.

Armaments are its big earner and those aside, its existing production base seems unlikely to save it. The current issue of Foreign Trade, designed to woo international business, advertises a curious selection of goods – homemade wigs, rabbit fur, steel cutlery and Kaesong Koryo Ginseng Extract, recommended “for treating radiation diseases, cancer and Aids”. Amid these problems, culture becomes more important than ever as a tool to bind support for the regime. Often, it makes little attempt to disguise its pedagogic intent – songs include Vinalon is a Textile Made from Stone and My Youngest Daughter, Pok Sun, Became an AA-Machine Gunner.

But music is a genuine passion as well as a political tool for North Koreans, and other tunes combine political themes with romance. Our foreign ministry escorts grow misty- eyed when The Night of Pyongyang City starts playing at the mass dance. Young lovers walk hand-in-hand at night murmuring the romantic melody, they say. Many of those couples have met through the months of drilling for such performances.

“Lots of people also find love in the Grand People’s Study Hall. I found my love there,” says one minder. “People usually keep loving relationships for a long time and try to help each other in study or work . . . You can’t achieve CNC technology [technological production] if people don’t have that aspiration,” he adds.

Tired commuters cross Pyongyang on an old bus. Photograph: Dan Chung/Guardian

More surprisingly, The Da Vinci Code was a big hit here, though it seems unlikely that Dan Brown’s publishers are aware of the fact – or are benefiting much. So, too, was Harry Potter. Young women love Jane Eyre and Anne of Green Gables – a translation of the third volume in the series is due out shortly. Though banned, foreign films are also increasingly – albeit surreptitiously – popular. The government hoped people would watch films such as the sprawling patriotic series Nation and Destiny when it authorised DVD players. But smuggled movies from China have provided residents with a glimpse of life outside. One NGO worker recalls a teenager requesting shyly whether she could ask her a question: Who did she think was better – Brad Pitt or Keanu Reeves? Though they might sound trivial, such anecdotes show that the information seal is not airtight.

Koreans in border areas are also using smuggled handsets and sim cards to make calls via Chinese networks. Many have slipped across the border, too, or have relatives living covertly in China. The country is becoming increasingly porous.

“People are beginning to suspect that the world lives better than they do,” says Lankov. But he adds that very few realise how much better, and that North Korean propaganda has adapted. “It doesn’t insist any more that it is a prosperous and rich nation and everything else is hell. They say, ‘Well, there are other places, but we have our leader and our pure national blood . . .’,” he notes.

It is impossible to know whether North Koreans find such statements convincing. Tears stain the faces of some performers at the mass dance when they glimpse Kim Jong-il watching them – but the cheering is piped through speakers and apparently pre-recorded.

“North Koreans do criticise the leaders and politics, just not in public – especially to foreign visitors. That is the quickest way to be arrested, tortured and sent to prison. It’s a society where pretty much all freedoms are restricted,” says Kay Seok, the Seoul-based researcher for Human Rights Watch.

State news agency KCNA describes such reports as lies, insisting: “The independent and creative life the Korean people enjoy is a dignified, worthwhile and happy life unimaginable in the capitalist society.”

In the absence of open conversation, analysts seize on the tiniest signs to read the mood of the country. If rising hemlines indicate optimism in western economies, so too can trousers show defiance in North Korea, one observer suggests. Women are banned from wearing them in Pyongyang in the summer, apparently because Kim Jong-il considers them alien to Korean culture. Neighbourhood committees monitor compliance and send offenders home to change. Yet as the temperatures rose this year, several women defiantly clung to their slacks. Is that, asks the Korea watcher in all seriousness, a sign of increasing disaffection and feistiness following the disastrous currency reforms?

Only North Koreans know for sure. And they are not telling.

Swedish Ambassador on the sinking of the Cheonan

Posted on 15 July 2010 by admin

(Coyner’s Comment: Rarely do we get an ambassador to make a statement for the KER. In this case, I had to do some minor negotiation with the Swedish Ambassador, H.E. Lars Vargo, to allow his statement to be circulated.
Accordingly, specifically and absolutely, the below statement is not to be quoted or distributed further without prior consent of the Swedish Ambassador. If you wish to quote or distribute, you must contact the Ambassador at lars.vargo@foreign.ministry.se . He is a very generous individual and you may expect his general cooperation. But you must ask beforehand, please!)

———————————————————-

I have been very close to those involved in the investigation (the Swedish team) and the way the investigation has been performed. And there is NO doubt whatsoever that it was a torpedo that sank the Cheonan and that the torpedo was of North Korean origin. The Swedish team has been very careful in its investigation and the members have had no reason to rush to any conclusion, but after researching the evidence, also evidence that has not been discussed in the media, they are fully convinced that it was an outside explosion caused by a torpedo of North Korean origin. The Swedish team consisted of the four best experts we have in the field.

It is also very clear that North Korea has started an Internet campaign to plant doubts wherever they can about the investigation. Some of the mails also we have received and they originated in North Korea, although Chinese servers was used. It is natural, perhaps even good, that journalists and scholars doubt reports where governments are involved, but in this case the evidence is overwhelming.

There has also been rumours circulating that the Swedish team was having doubts about the conclusions. This is not true. As all professional investigators they looked at the evidence with extremely critical eyes before drawing any conclusions. With their expertise they could also point at some evidence that others had not fully noted.

The Swedish experts have many years of experience investigating similar incidents in the Baltic Sea.

So, no doubt in my mind.

Best regards,

Lars Vargo
Swedish Ambassador to Korea

London: not as liveable as I’d like

Posted on 1 May 2010 by admin

By Tyler Brûlé
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/b423b1b4-532e-11df-813e-00144feab49a.html
Published: May 1 2010 01:29 | Last updated: May 1 2010 01:29

By London standards, I’m a high-rise resident. I live in a duplex on the top floor of a period building in the heart of central London and from my terrace I have views of the BT Tower, the twinkling westbound approach to Heathrow and the rooftops of Marylebone.

As spring kicks into gear I throw the doors open most mornings to create a bit of indoor-outdoor living (weather permitting) and I like to take the sun before the clouds start to settle some time just after 9.30. I could almost go so far as to call it penthouse-living except, this being London, my penthouse is a somewhat vertically challenged three to four storeys above the streets of W1.

In spite of the Lilliputian proportions, it’s a tall building by Marylebone standards and stands out among its neighbours. It shares airspace with the dishes and antennae bristling on top of the Chinese embassy and has views into a handsome apartment across the street belonging to a couple I never see on the street below but frequently glimpse acting out scenes of cosy domestic bliss. On days when the skies are big and bright, the southerly views make it feel connected to the warm plains of the Iberian peninsula; when the heavens are grey and low it all becomes damp and Dickensian.

Last Saturday I arrived back in London after a 10-day Asian tour and, bright skies and warm breezes aside, I couldn’t help but feel I’d been dropped into a shabby chapter from Oliver Twist. Heathrow was its usual dysfunctional self with the added feature of a fire alarm that shut down the arrivals area and broken public announcement system that left passengers arriving from Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore wondering if they’d all been detained by HM Customs or were about to be burnt to a crisp. At the taxi rank outside Terminal 3 cabbies were hot and bothered and not budging from their comfy seats whether to help elderly Canadian couples load their luggage, or bewildered mothers heave children and prams into passenger compartments.

As we bounced and bumped our way into central London, my post-flight mood was best captured by various political party campaign posters for the general election beside airline billboards promoting the electric delights of Asia. Was I being to asked to vote for parties ill-equipped to take their game on to a global stage or vote with my feet and return to countries that are already speeding past the UK? Voters in the UK have a buffet of choices (a purée of policies, soundbite-size candidates and pickled promises) before them but none is particularly appetising. Much was made of the three parties’ manifestos but there’s little to convince voters that they’re supporting a group of individuals who will lead them boldly into the future with a worldview to match.

Spend two days in Seoul and London starts to look and feel like a sleepy, stagnant backwater. At Incheon airport you can spy UK designers flying in to work on high-profile projects for South Korea’s biggest technology players. At the headquarters of a major financial services company the chief executive is meeting a Pritzker prize-winning architect to embark on the creation of a concert hall for his credit-card holders. Beneath the streets, rails are being laid for an expanding metro system and stations are being overhauled into gleaming hubs to serve the citizens of one of the hardest working capital cities in the world. At the Park Hyatt Seoul staff deliver a level of service that’s mirrored across a variety of sectors in South Korea’s economy. As the nation becomes less competitive as a manufacturer its financial, retail, transport and technology companies are all sharpening their skills to take their respective games global. Even Mayor Oh’s promise to make his city greener or more design-minded seems to be coming good.

When I first travelled to South Korea seven years ago I found it grey, a little grumpy and largely unattractive. In less than a decade it’s fashioned itself into a major passenger and logistics hub, is home to some of the best hotels in the world and crackles around the clock. Korea Inc’s executives want to work and learn from the best and leaders at both the local and national level have embraced the liveability mantra to retain and attract talent.

As I crossed Oxford Street on Saturday afternoon there was little of this sort of crackle – just a lot of crack. Up and down the street tummies were hanging out over jeans, food was being stuffed into faces, and bums were falling out of trousers. Was this a nation at rest and play on a gorgeous spring day? Perhaps. Was this also a fleeting snapshot of a nation that’s lost its dignity and sense of pride? For sure.

As a chronic low-scorer on global liveability surveys it’s surprising that none of the UK’s political party strategists have embraced a message that’s become central to leaders elsewhere. A manifesto for “A More Liveable UK” would surely be a vote and inward-investment winner.

Tyler Brûlé is editor-in-chief of Monocle

tylerbrule@ft.com

More columns at www.ft.com/brule

Changrae Lee on The Surrendered

Posted on 10 April 2010 by admin

The inspiration for The Surrendered has its roots in a project I worked on more than twenty years ago, while I was still in college. I was taking a seminar on modern Korean history, and I decided that I would conduct an interview with my father to fulfil the writing assignment, conceiving a reporter-at-large-type piece that would offer personal testimony and narrative set against a historical backdrop. I wasn’t sure if he would agree. My father was twelve years old on the eve of the Korean War, and although over the years I had asked him a number of times about his experiences, his responses were typically vague and hurried; he never seemed to want to talk about that time, only briefly mentioning that his sister had died during the war from an untreated bout of pneumonia. But since I was taking a course with a special focus on Korea, he agreed to speak in more detail about that period.

My father’s family was originally from Pyongyang, now the capital of North Korea, and they had joined the throngs of refugees who were heading south in an attempt to get behind the line of American forces. He first recounted a story about his favourite older cousin, who was pregnant and just about to give birth as the rest of the extended family was frantically packing up and leaving. My father was dispatched to tell his cousin that everyone was departing–explosions could be heard in the distance–yet even though she and her husband desperately wanted to go, she had already started her labours. She couldn’t be moved. Everybody soon left, and that was last time the cousin and her husband were seen alive; to this day no one knows what happened to them, whether they perished or survived the war and ended up living in North Korea.

Telling that story of his cousin seemed to break the grip of something on my father. He recounted again that his sister had died of pneumonia during the refugee march, then added, casually, that in fact his younger brother had died during their travels, too. This disclosure surprised me. I knew that he had lost a brother, this from asking him, as children often will, about how many siblings he had, matching the number against my uncles and aunts, but I remembered his saying that his brother had died in a “subway accident.” I didn’t think there was a subway in either Pyongyang or Seoul during his childhood, so I asked him when his brother had died, and how.

My father told me that in fact his brother had been killed not by a subway car but by a boxcar of a train full of refugees. They were among the hundreds who filled the cars. The car holding the rest of their family was packed tight, so he and his brother had to sleep on top of the boxcar. In the middle of the night the train halted violently, and his brother, who was eight years old, fell off, the train then lurching forward for a short distance. My father jumped down and went back and found his brother, whose leg had been amputated by the wheels of the train. My father carried him back to the car, to the rest of their family, as the blood–and his life–ran out of him.

I’ve been haunted by that story since I heard it, not only by the horror of the accident but also by the picture of my father as a boy, a boy who had to experience his brother’s death so directly and egregiously. I was struck, too, by how unperturbed my father had always seemed to me, this cheerful, optimistic man who certainly didn’t appear to be haunted by anything. But of course this was not quite true. The events of the war had stayed with him, and always would.

In recent years I began to consider writing a novel about that time, and what happened to my father and his brother kept coming back to me. I finally decided to try to write that scene, wondering whether a larger story might be instituted. Naturally the details changed quite drastically as I began to write, the story expanding in every direction, developing its own world and aims, and soon enough it was not my father’s story at all. But the kernel of what had happened grew to become the first chapter of The Surrendered, which for me is not so much a war novel as it is a story concerned with the effects of mass conflict on the human psyche and spirit, the private odysseys that those who have experienced conflict must endure.

Review

** ‘Masterful … THE SURRENDERED bursts with drama and human anguish … Powerful, deeply felt, compulsively readable and imbued with moral gravity, the novel does not peter out into easy redemption. It’s a harrowing tale: bleak, haunting and often heart-breaking – and not to be missed’ PUBLISHERS WEEKLY ** ‘Chang-rae Lee has created such a tour de force that its images and narrative linger for a long time after reading’ BOOKSELLER’S CHOICE ** ‘A major achievement, and likely to be remembered as one of this year’s best books’ KIRKUS STARRED REVIEW ** ‘Tthe most ambitious and compelling novel of Chang -rae Lee’s already impressive career. Readers will be swept up in the power of The Surrendered and its characters’ aching and indelible stories’ Michiko Kakutani, NEW YORK TIMES

Asia’s first Master of Wine

Posted on 5 March 2010 by admin

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/968cb2dc-27e0-11df-9598-00144feabdc0.html
FT, Published: March 5 2010 22:45 | Last updated: March 5 2010 22:45

What wine would do justice to the explosive taste of fried chilli prawns? How about beef satay, or chicken in a spicy coconut sauce? Now imagine you are in Singapore or Malaysia and that all three dishes, plus half a dozen more besides, are set before you. How could you possibly match wine to such a panoply of competing and powerful flavours?

Korean-born Jeannie Cho Lee, the only Asian among the world’s 279 Masters of Wine, spent two years trying to puzzle out precisely that. She travelled to 10 Asian food cities – Hong Kong, Shanghai, Beijing, Taipei, Tokyo, Seoul, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Mumbai – sampling dishes and figuring out which wines, if any, would make a worthy addition to an already sumptuous table. The resulting book, Asian Palate, published in November, is an attempt to understand food in its own context and to suggest appropriate wine without imposing alien tastes on some of the world’s complex cuisines.

“I wanted to see how wine fits in to our Asian food culture,” she says when I meet her in a private dining room in the China Club, a Hong Kong club that eschews the stuffiness of more traditional establishments. “I think food is place-driven,” she says, drawing a parallel with what wine experts refer to as the terroir to denote the characteristics that a grape draws from its geography. “It is the entire environment from which that particular ingredient comes from, the climate, the weather, the soil, even the people. It is the same with food,” she says. “I wanted to look at how to introduce wine to a table without disrespecting the harmony and the integrity of the dishes.”

Lee, who grew up eating Korean food cooked by her mother in the US and who now lives in Hong Kong, says the starting point must be a true love of Asian food. “I have an Asian palate,” she says. “My familiar tastes are of dried squid, salted anchovies, pungent soybean paste. You need to love the chewiness of intestines, the gelatinous and chewy texture of chicken feet and to appreciate jellyfish. You need to love that very soft mushy texture of sea cucumber and sea urchin. You can’t tell someone to like that.”

Lee’s love of wine began in Oxford, where she spent a year as part of her degree. She remembers being served “two or three clarets and perhaps a white wine to start”. Her interest piqued, she began to explore the wines of France and Italy and, when she returned to New York, she attended the famous Windows on the World Wine School, then on the top two floors of the World Trade Center. After moving to Hong Kong with her husband – whom she met at wine school – she continued to study, now with the UK-based Wine & Spirits Education Trust. At that time, wine taxes were high in Hong Kong – they were cut to zero in February 2008, transforming the city into Asia’s wine capital – and there wasn’t much of a wine culture. Lee pushed on, taking detailed tasting notes of every wine she came across in her job as a food and wine writer. By 2005, she felt ready to sit the daunting Master of Wine examination, a four-day test that includes four theoretical papers as well as a rigorous assault course of blind tasting, held annually in Sydney, London and Napa Valley. “I thought, ‘It’s a wine exam. How difficult can it be?’ ” she recalls. Like most first-timers, she failed. Second time around, in 2008, she cracked it.

Armed with that distinction, she set off on her 10-city quest to pair wine with Asian food. But she was determined not to force one culture on to another. Some food, she concluded, was simply better enjoyed without wine. “If you want chilli crabs in Singapore, whether the chilli or the black pepper crabs, perhaps it is better to have something thirst-quenching, like a beer, or cold water or some lemonade.” She understands why some Japanese chefs stick to rice-based sake, refusing to serve wine with their food, even though wine became popular in Japan a generation before it took hold in Hong Kong and mainland China. “Wine comes with unique flavours. It can intrude or take away from the balance of the food,” she says.

Her approach is to recommend wines in keeping with the flavours already present. “I would never suggest a sweet wine in northern China even though it would go well with the food in theory, because it is not culturally part of the local palate,” she says. But in Thailand, where a typical meal might include coconut, fresh fruit or sweet tea, she is comfortable recommending a medium-sweet wine. For Thai cuisine, her tips include an off-dry Riesling, an aromatic Alsace Gewürztraminer and an Austrian Grüner Veltliner.

In the same way, with spicy Sichuan food, often bobbing in red hot chilli-pepper oil, her training tells her that the tannins in red wine fight, and exaggerate, the spicy flavours. “You’re thinking to temper that with a white. But a lot of Asians want that taste to linger. So people who want that pungent taste to go on and on naturally reach for the red.” Whether white or red, her tip for Sichuan fare is for something with a lot of personality and not too expensive, since the grape will always lose the battle against the chilli.

Her sensibility to local tastes aside, she says some Asian food goes extraordinarily well with wine. She raves about the combination of sushi and vintage champagne, particularly if the fish is white and served with salt as opposed to soy sauce. Her preference is for something such as a 1996 Blanc de Blancs from Salon. For fattier tuna, she suggests a delicate, textured Pinot Noir. Tempura goes well with light-bodied reds with modest tannins or medium to full-bodied whites with crisp acidity.

Her native Korean food, packed with a range of flavours, demands versatile wines with refreshing acidity such as Sauvignon Blanc or a fruity Pinot Noir. Her tips for Indian food include a Sauvignon Blanc/ Semillon blend, old world full-bodied whites from Alsace or Rhône and, more surprisingly, a Rioja.

But the biggest challenge in pairing wine with Asian cuisine, she says, is the fact that Asians share their food, rather than ordering one dish at a time. “We are very communal and we like to dig in. We like to have different texture, bite and flavour combination with each mouthful. You dabble in and out of different flavours.”

That makes it impossible to match one wine with one flavour. One suggestion is to open a few different wines to cater for the variety of food on offer. Alternatively, the wine can be selected with one or two highlighted dishes in mind.

Her final piece of advice is not to have exaggerated expectations. “A wine is not going to make a meal so much better,” she says, “Asian flavours and the intensity of those flavours are already so high.” In the long run, she says, Asians will themselves gradually work out how best to incorporate the flavours of wine into their age-old cuisines. Their discoveries may shock and delight.

Random Korean Articles

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Author Archives: admin

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Swedish Ambassador on the sinking of the Cheonan

London: not as liveable as I’d like

Changrae Lee on The Surrendered

Asia’s first Master of Wine