S Korean farmers look further afield for brides

By Anna Fifield in Yangbuk, South Korea
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cead98f0-7e85-11db-84bb-0000779e2340.html
Published: November 28 2006 02:00 | Last updated: November 28 2006 02:00

Down on his luck and approaching 40, Jang Sae-jong three years ago followed in the footsteps of an increasing number of South Korean men – he boarded a flight to Ho Chi Minh and within a week had a Vietnamese bride.

In a country fast leaving behind its agricultural roots, rural Korean men like Mr Jang are finding it increasingly difficult to persuade upwardly mobile Korean women to choose rural life.

“I was living in a remote village with my mother then I decided to come to open a restaurant here in Yangbuk, but it failed and I lost a lot of money,” Mr Jang says, sitting on the floor of his modest two-room house in the south-east of the country. “At the same time, I was getting old and there weren’t many women around, so I joined a guy from this village who was going to Vietnam.”

With a dozen other men, he went to a hotel in Ho Chi Minh where he was presented with a line-up of 60 potential brides, which he whittled down to three. He asked them about their backgrounds and families, then chose Tran Thi Diem, now 27.

“I didn’t want anyone who was better educated than me because I thought that if she was too smart, she might figure out how to run away,” he says. “And I liked her – she seemed nice.”

The following day he met her family and the day after, they were married in a Vietnamese-style ceremony with the other bride-hunters. The trip to Vietnam, fees to the marriage agency and the wedding cost Mr Jang about $15,000, a third of which he had to borrow. Ms Tran, who had travelled seven hours to Ho Chi Minh, remembers the event in similarly un-nostalgic detail.

“My husband liked the look of me and I liked the look of him, but actually the brides don’t get much choice,” she says.

“I wasn’t thinking about love. My family is very poor and my parents are sick and I heard that Korea was a very wealthy country so I wanted to help them and earn money for them,” she says, their two-year-old twin daughters jumping on her.

In a conservative country fiercely proud of its ethnic homogeneity, marriages like that between Mr Jang and Ms Tran represent a seismic social shift. Indeed, the Korean countryside is fast becoming more globalised than the cities.

Last year 14 per cent of all Korean marriages were to foreigners, up 20 per cent on the previous year, but in rural areas, four in every 10 men married non-Korean Asian women last year.

Many are Chinese or Philippine but men are increasingly opting for Vietnamese women because of their ethnic similarity. Posters on the lampposts in Yangbuk declare: “Get a new life – marry a Vietnamese lady! You can pay later!”

With the birth rate plummeting and farming life on the brink of extinction, local governments are supporting efforts to help men find wives and have children to pass the farm to.

Kyongju City Government, which encompasses Yangbuk, will soon start giving grants of Won5m ($5,000) to help local men find wives. “There are no young people left in the countryside so we have to help the men revitalise rural areas,” says Kim Sang-guk of the Kyongju welfare centre.

The local authority is also trying to help the 450 foreign women, including 282 from Vietnam, in the area, offering Korean language and cooking classes.

But almost all of the women struggle with their new lives. “This is not the Korea I imagined. I had heard that Korea was a wealthy nation and I wasn’t expecting to be out here in the countryside,” says Ms Tran. “But even though I didn’t love my husband when we got married, since I had my babies I’ve grown to love him.”

But the biggest problem has been the language barrier – she says she still often has to rely on sign language to communicate.

While Ms Tran seems to accept her new life, Mr Jang, who flits between temporary agricultural or building jobs, is not so happy. “It’s quite a burden to send money to Vietnam because I don’t earn much,” he says.

But it is the relationship between his wife and his mother that causes him the most headaches. “My mother speaks very fast and gets angry when my wife can’t understand her. My mother once yelled at my wife to go home to Vietnam and my wife cried a lot.”

“Now I’m opposed to international marriage,” he says in front of his wife, who is distracting herself with an imaginary spot on the floor. “If I get married again I won’t go to Vietnam, I’ll look for a bride in Korea.”

New life for an old way of building

By Anna Fifield
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80473f90-5496-11db-901f-0000779e2340.html
Published: October 6 2006 12:17 | Last updated: October 6 2006 12:17

Walking the streets of Bukchon, it’s hard to believe you’re in the middle of one of the world’s most populous cities. Located only a short walk from Jongno, Seoul’s central drag, where neon competes with carbon monoxide in the pollution stakes, the neighbourhood embodies the Korea of five centuries ago. Rows of hanok, Korea’s traditional houses, with their wooden lattice windows and patterned brick walls, line quiet narrow streets where cats prowl and birds flit across the sloping tiled roofs. One could easily imagine aristocrats being ferried past on carriages held on men’s shoulders.

Such areas are rare in Seoul because construction of new hanok stopped in the 1960s when industrialisation began. Those that already existed were flattened during the Korean war or bulldozed to make way for faceless, functional apartment tower blocks.

Now, however, Korea is a developed country and its citizens are increasingly valuing form as much as function. Many are restoring old hanok or building new ones. And Bukchon, a neighbourhood that is nestled between two of Seoul’s biggest Chosun-era royal palaces, which is said to have the best feng shui in the capital, is a hub for such activity.

“There is definitely a hanok restoration boom going on,” says Lee Moon-ho, an architect who specialises in renovating the old houses. “As soon as [one] is put on sale in this area, it is snatched up. As a hanok architect, I feel very proud of this. As every day goes by, new renovated hanok pop up in this area.”

Although Bukchon lost about 600 hanok when local building restrictions were lifted in the early 1990s, there is now a concerted effort to preserve the remaining 920 and ensure that new construction is in keeping with the traditional aesthetic. Five years ago the Seoul metropolitan government started offering up to Won30m (about $30,000) to any hanok owner wanting to restore his or her home and so far about 250 have been remodelled. Officials have also promoted broader initiatives, burying cables underground and relaying plumbing works, as well as tightening restoration and new construction rules, spending about Won41bn in total.

“Korea developed at breakneck speed after the Korean war,” says Kim Woo-sung, of Seoul’s urban design team. “Because of that rapid expansion, the government could not set a long-term city plan like European cities have. But now we are setting out a long-term plan.”

The government’s efforts have been successful in drawing new residents to the area. Lee Myung-bak, the former mayor of Seoul who advanced the “greening” of the capital through projects such as the rebuilt Cheong-gye-cheon stream through the city centre, is just one of the people who recently moved into Bukchon, as did this correspondent.

Park Jong-duck from Daesung Real Estate, an agency that specialises in hanok, reports a steady rise in inquiries since the restoration craze started. And “prices are rising steadily,” he adds. “There are some people who want to buy just an ordinary house near hanok village. The area is developing day by day so they expect the overall house prices in the neighbourhood to go up.”

Hanok prices vary wildly depending on proximity to Bukchon’s main road and the state of repair. A house on a small narrow street can cost only Won9m per pyong (3.3 sq metres) while a renovated property in a convenient area can cost as much as Won50m per pyong. This compares with an average price of Won14m for an ordinary apartment in Seoul. Building a hanok from scratch usually costs Won13m per pyong on top of the Won10m-15m one might pay for the land.

According to Korean tradition, all buildings are regarded as parts of a wider environment, so houses are typically positioned based on the principle of baesan-imsu – having a mountain at the back and a river in the front. Hanok usually face south to expose the living areas to the sun and are built as a series of inter-connecting rooms opening up to a central courtyard – to allow the energy to flow through the house. They are single-storey with stone foundations, wooden frames and soil in the walls and on the roof for insulation.

Heating and cooling is achieved through ondol, a system of ducts carrying hot air from the kitchen stove (or more likely a boiler nowadays) to the stone floors of the house in winter, which conversely helps aerate the rooms during the oppressive summers while the stones keep the floor cool. (This is one of the reasons why Koreans habitually sit on the floor.) Hanok also have glorious curved roofs made of tiles with edges that are engraved with patterns, usually of flowers, animals or insects, particularly spiders. They are useful as well as beautiful, further protecting the house from the sun’s heat.

“In this area, the hanok are very old so it is difficult to renovate them partially, so most of the time I rebuild them from scratch,” says Lee, the architect. “The rule that I try to follow is to build in a traditional way. You have to follow certain rules – the house should face south and everything in the bedroom should be low to make sure the energy does not drain from your body. According to Korean beliefs, when your bedroom is low, you sleep very soundly. I use Korean woods and try to make modern facilities, such as heating and air-conditioning systems, inconspicuous.”

Although hanok are widely admired for their quaintness, most Koreans still think consider them to be inconvenient for modern living, especially when compared with standard high-tech apartments. In most restored houses, the walls and roofs are still made of earth and air-conditioning units are embedded into the ceilings so not so as to not be too obtrusive.

But residents of Bukchon – such as restaurateur Choi Mi-kyoung who lives in a newly built hanok on a quiet alley with her Swedish husband and their two teenage sons – are proving that it’s possible to marry traditional character with contemporary comfort. The design of the house, which she worked on with an architect, is traditional; the living room opens out onto the courtyard, complete with wooden shutters that can be hung from the eaves while the doors are open. But the stainless steel kitchen is ultra-modern and downstairs, where the boys’ bedrooms and workroom are located, is all Swedish minimalism. Construction took 11 months.

“My husband has lived here for 20 years and likes Korean-style houses very much,” Choi explains. “Our friends think it would be uncomfortable to live in a hanok but they are envious.”

She acknowledges that life in Bukchon can be slightly inconvenient – there is no parking and few shops – but says the family enjoys their modern-traditional home. “It feels so peaceful and like we are close to nature because we have a garden and there are always birds flying around but actually we are in the middle of Seoul,” she says.

Next door is a hanok that serves as a guest house for visiting suppliers to Casamia, a ritzy Korean furniture company. As in Choi’s house, old blends with new. Interconnecting living rooms circle a garden but also lead to a huge modern kitchen. The minimalist bathroom with its square, inset tub is more boutique hotel than bygone house.

As with any project involving historic buildings, the rejuvenation of Bukchon’s hanok is not without its controversies. Families who have lived in the area for decades complain about noisy development and unwanted trendiness, while traditionalists complain that many new houses are built with modern materials and are not complying with tradition. But Kim argues that the transformation will allow Koreans to pass on an appreciation for indigenous architecture to future generations.

“Because people’s lifestyles have changed, it is inevitable that hanok will change,” he says. “Cultural heritage is not something that should only be protected. Preservation should be protection plus evolution. We live in modern times so we have to accept changes and that’s why we need boilers or air conditioners in hanok.”

Lee, the architect, agrees. “I think reinvigorating this area is much more important than reviving Cheong-gye-cheon [the Won330bn ($330m) stream reconstruction] because there is no culture in Cheong-gye-cheon but there is here,” he says. “You should feel a human, natural and ecological touch. I believe this area will become the Montmartre of Seoul.”

Room for One More

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/de165a7c-0cb9-11db-84fd-0000779e2340.html
By Anna Fifield
Published: July 7 2006 13:12 | Last updated: July 7 2006 13:12

When Shin Dong-jin first started turning up in South Korean country villages in 1968 at the age of 22, he wasn’t always made to feel terribly welcome. He was not an unruly young man. At one time, he had ambitions to be an accountant. But instead he became an educator with the Korean Planned Parenthood Federation, and the reason he went to the villages was to tell farmers’ wives not to have any more babies.

“It was weird from their point of view,” says Shin, sitting in his Seoul office, where the walls are covered in family planning posters. “This green, single guy who still smells of his mother’s teats would come up to them and talk about family planning. It was like trying to write in front of Confucius.

“Talking about sex at that time was extremely taboo. To even look at a woman’s calf was extremely arousing – when [singer] Yoon Bok-hee wore a miniskirt the whole of Seoul flipped.”

It wasn’t just the women who had their doubts; their husbands were also suspicious. Shin often found himself sitting around a lantern drawing pictures for a group of women to explain how contraception worked. Occasionally the men of the village, curious about the tall young stranger, would peep through the paper doors and see him holding up graphic pictures to their wives. “All hell would break loose,” says Shin, who is now 60. “The village leader would try to convince them that it was all right, but sometimes I had to flee from the village in the middle of the night.”

Shin persevered with his job, in part because he was “completely mesmerised” by the over-population problem then facing Korea’s 30 million mostly rural people. The birth rate – the average number of children per woman – was 4.53 and it was Shin’s job to explain the economic damage this was likely to have on Korea, then one of the world’s poorest nations.

“Daughter or son, stop at two and bring them up well,” said the posters he used to hand out. And that is exactly what people did. So much so that today Shin is still working at the planned parenthood federation, but instead of trying to persuade people to stop reproducing, he is desperately trying to get them to start.

In the 38 years he has been at the federation, Korea’s birth rate has plummeted to just 1.08 – the lowest in the developed world. The economic think-tank, the Korea Development Institute, estimates that the country’s economy will start slowing by 2010 unless the birth rate begins to rise. The situation has become so grave that the median age of the Korean population is forecast to rise from 31.8 years in 2000 to 50.9 by 2040, which means that more than half the population will be over 50 within a generation, and there won’t be enough younger people to support them.

So these days Shin is in charge of encouraging Koreans to have more babies. His latest leaflets say: “Get pregnant within a year of marriage and have two children by 35.” This complete U-turn underlines the astonishing pace at which Korea has developed. When Shin started working, it was an agrarian nation where 75 per cent of the population lived on farms and children were considered a source of both labour and wealth. At that time, the average annual income was $250 and official figures forecast that each percentage point increase in the population would slow economic growth by 3 percentage points. Park Chung-hee, the authoritarian president who masterminded Korea’s economic development during the 1960s and 1970s, set about trying to lower the birth rate.

But his policies, which made it economically disadvantageous to have more than three children, coincided catastrophically with Korea’s rapid industrialisation. When companies such as Samsung, Hyundai and Daewoo started hiring for factories, Koreans increasingly abandoned their farms and moved to the cities, where they didn’t need children to help in the fields and didn’t have as much space to house a big family. The average income grew to $16,300 and Korea is now the world’s 10th biggest economy, renowned for making cutting-edge mobile phones and specialised shipbuilding.

All this was unimaginable to the young Shin when he first joined the planned parenthood federation in the late 1960s. “It was April 1968,” he says. “I thought, wow, this is really a big international problem, and in Korea the problem was even bigger. So it was a really important issue and if I was going to do something good for our society, then family planning was really something worth dedicating my life to.”

After a brisk two-week training course he was dispatched to the villages. The villagers may have been shocked to hear Shin’s frank reproduction advice, but he was comfortable with the subject. “At high school I studied stockbreeding,” he says. “It wasn’t people, but sexual reproduction issues were familiar so the job was quite apt for me.”

He began by forming “mothers classes” of 20 or so wives in each village. “We just talked about life, like the flood last year, how difficult it is to make a living… how we are short of rice, how good it would be if we had a good harvest,” says Shin. Many families said they were having a hard time, that they were “living because we can’t die”.

“Then I’d say that a good harvest was not the only way out – we could instead reduce consumption. In Korea there is an old saying: ‘Instead of trying to cultivate the paddy field right in front of our gate, it would be better to reduce the number of mouths.’”

The women would often tell him that having children was “up to the skies”, whereupon Shin would open his bag full of condoms, contraceptive pills and vasectomy information. Explaining the nitty gritty to even the willing listeners was not always easy. The villagers often had strong Shamanistic traditions and superstitious beliefs.

“When we talked about condoms, we would show how to use them on a stick,” says Shin, grabbing the golf club from the corner of his office to demonstrate. “But one day I went to a village and there were these condoms hanging on the fence posts. So I asked why they were there. The woman replied that after they had finished doing ‘what married people do’, they had put the condoms on the sticks as contraception.

“At that time, people were very spiritual so they thought it was some kind of Buddhist good fortune tag or something. I couldn’t even laugh,” he says, laughing uproariously now.

At other times, husbands would complain to Shin that their wives had still become pregnant even though the men had been conscientiously taking the pill every day.

Shin was certainly a true believer. In 1979, when he was 33, his wife gave birth to their daughter, Jung-a. “I was crazy about family planning – you could say that my face was a family planning advertisement – so about three months later I told my wife that one daughter was quite enough and I was having a vasectomy,” he says. “The next day I went to work and suddenly my mother popped in for a visit in the office. She grabbed hold of my tie and shouted ‘you’re going to have a vasectomy? Let us both die then!’”

The next day he was summoned to see his father-in-law. “It’s just not right!” the older man shouted, as Shin knelt before him on the floor for more than an hour.

“Eventually, because my knees hurt so badly, I had to give in and agree to have more children,” he says. Two years later they had a son.

In the rest of Korea, Shin and his family- planning colleagues were having great success. By the 1980s, the birth rate had dropped to 2.83 and the government announced it wanted it to fall to 2.1 by 1990.

To help speed the process, those who agreed to have a contraceptive operation received a Won100,000 ($165 at the time) payment and priority to buy apartments. Parents who had more than three children lost government refunds for money spent on their children’s education. Men could even trade some of their army reserve training days for time off to have a free vasectomy. By 1988, to Shin’s disbelief, the ministry of statistics declared that the target had been achieved. But he was too successful. What appeared to be a gentle reduction in the number of births turned out to be steep, exacerbated by migration into the crowded cities, women’s greater participation in the workforce and rapidly increasing living costs.

In keeping with those changes, Koreans started placing more emphasis on education, much of which was done at expensive private cram schools. A decade ago, the average Korean family spent Won183,000 – about 8 per cent of average household income – on private education for each child per month. Now it spends Won310,000 – 14 per cent – a month.

By 1990, the birth rate had fallen to 1.59, creating the fastest ageing society in the world, and Shin’s job description was rewritten. “Before, I was working to restrain population growth. Now it is completely the opposite,” he says. “I focus on pro-marriage education programmes for teenagers, also pro-birth programmes, and then supporting married couples that are infertile.”

But again, Shin’s own family is evidence of the struggle he faces. His daughter Jung-a, now 28, is in no hurry to contribute to population growth, much to her father’s disappointment. “My job title is the director of the low population department, so I establish pro-marriage programmes and I tell young married couples to have children quickly. But I can’t even convince my own daughter to get married,” he says, taking out his key ring which has a photo of his daughter on it that he shows to potential sons-in-law.

“She herself has doubts about whether marriage is really necessary… so I feel like dying,” he says, adding with relief that his son “is up for marrying” once his income is more stable.

To counter women’s increasing participation in the workforce and concerns about the cost of schooling, the government introduced a range of measures such as 90 days’ guaranteed paid maternity leave.

Meanwhile, the federation recently started a more emotional campaign to encourage Koreans to have more babies.

“It doesn’t work if you just say ‘Let’s have babies!’” says Shin. “We’re showing lots of images of people happy because they have a baby and the preciousness of children and family, to touch their emotions.”

The government is now making aggressive efforts to encourage more births. It announced last month it would spend more than Won30,000bn over the next five years to try to raise the birth rate. About 80 per cent of families with children under the age of five are due to receive childcare allowances. The number of nursery schools will be doubled and state schools will receive funding to run their own after-school classes.

The private sector is joining the effort. The Korea Stock Exchange, for example, gives employees a Won5m bonus when they have a third child.

Shin is optimistic that he and his colleagues will be able to convince Koreans to have more babies, just as they persuaded them to have fewer in the 1980s. They are looking to France, which he says has been the most successful at boosting its birthrate.

“They created an environment conducive to having children through education and welfare policies,” says Shin. “Also, their policy was implemented over a long time so there was no immediate financial burden,” he says.

One cause for optimism is that the expected number of births in Korea is relatively high. A survey by the Korean Women’s Research Institute last year found that the average number of children that Koreans want is 2.2.

“So, people are getting married late and even when they do, they’re not having enough babies but that doesn’t mean I’m pessimistic about the future. I still have hope,” he says. “Why? Because of Korean culture – this is a culture where one’s family and family name is important. The second reason is that when we say ‘let’s do something’, we’ll do it. Look at our family planning policy in the past, the speed at which it was achieved was unprecedented.”

Then he puts his key ring back in his pocket and mutters, “If only I could convince my daughter to get married.”

Can you share soup on a first date?

By Anna Fifield
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/17ccd8cc-f81a-11da-9481-0000779e2340.html
Published: June 10 2006 03:00 | Last updated: June 10 2006 03:00

Seoul is a city of paradoxes. Aconcrete-block industrial powerhouse encircled by rocky mountains, home to leather-skinned old men dragging newspaper-laden carts between impossibly beautiful girlstoting Gucci bags and metrosexual boys watching TV on their mobile phones.

It often seems that you can witness the past, present and future of this rapidly changing country on just one Seoul street.

But I don’t always love Seoul. When I’ve got sore ribs from being elbowed by the fierce ajuma (housewives) who fight their way through the hordes in Lotte department store, or when it takes 45 minutes to drive 2km, it can be hard to dredge up affection for this city.

And I’m not going to pretend Seoul is a cosmopolitan place – good food and wine are not impossible to come by but the exorbitant prices tend to overwhelm any culinary pleasure. Nor would I suggest it is aesthetically pleasing – the functional apartment blocks and the jogging track beside the Han river have all the atmosphere of an industrial estate. My unscientific calculations suggest there is one tree for every 500,000 residents.

Nevertheless, over the 18 months that Seoul has been my adopted home, I feel pleasantly comforted, my heart breathing a happy sigh, when the plane’s wheels hit the runway at Incheon airport after travelling abroad. I can’t wait to return. And when I’m in London or Wellington or Hong Kong I break out in a smile when I see Korean barbecue restaurants or hear the soothing yos at the end of Korean sentences.

Seoul for me is a vibrant city, a place where it is impossible not to feel alive – and on Saturdays in particular. Apart from going to a palm-fringed beach, it seems there is nothing I can’t do within 30 minutes of leaving my apartment.

I can climb Bukhansan, the rocky mountain in the northern part of the city that is seemingly conquered by all 20m residents of greater Seoul each weekend. Or I can wander around one of the beautiful Chosun dynasty era palaces – such as Deoksugung and Kyungbokgung – in the heart of the city. Or go to Insadong, the artsy area populated with galleries and quaint tea houses. Or survey the works by artists including Mark Rothko, Andy Warhol and Lee Sang-beom at the Samsung-owned Leeum museum.

For some glitz, there is swish Apgujong, where edgy twenty-somethings park their BMWs, then drink martinis in bars that would not be out of place in Manhattan. For cool, there is Hongdae, the university area renowned for its hip music clubs. And for a shopping adventure, there is no beating markets such as Namdaemun, where you can buy everything from writhing eels and whole ginseng roots to reflexology slippers and fake Louis Vuitton bags, all offered with ear-splitting commentary.

But for me, there are two things that make Seoul even more of a fun place to live: the Korean love of eating together and the Korean love of heat.

Food is such an integral part of social interaction that the Korean way of inquiring after someone’s well-being is not to ask “how are you?” but instead to say “have you eaten?”. You can barely walk 50m in Seoul without passing yet another restaurant – often specialising in stews, bulgogi barbecue, ribs, fish or crabs – that at noon and 7pm each day is invariably full.

Walk into any average Korean restaurant and sit on the floor (heated in winter) and the table will automatically fill with panchan, the complimentary side dishes that can include spicy kimchi cabbage, pickled radish, dried fish, sweet potatoes, acorn jelly and vegetable roots that almost make a meal in themselves.

Eating is a communal activity – everyone dips into the bowls with their chopsticks, an activity thattriggered anxieties about hygiene when I first arrived but that I have now embraced. Good friends even slurp soup from the same bowl, a rather intimate form of eating. I sometimes ponder whether it would be OK to share soup on a first date?

After eating panchan, soup and the restaurant’s speciality – often meat cooked in barbecues set into the table – and just at the stage when unwitting foreigners are feeling stuffed, the waiter will ask “And what would you like for your meal?” No Korean eating session is complete without a rice or noodle dish.

There are two stereotypical comparisons made about Koreans. The first – that they are the Italians of Asia – is supported by this love of food and spending time together at the table. The second – the Irish of Asia – is demonstrated through conviviality that is an integral part of socialising.

To shouts of “bottoms up”, you are urged to empty your glass of soju, the Korean rice liquor, then hold it out to be refilled. The drinking inevitably progresses to the consumption of poktanju or bomb drink – a small glass of soju or whisky plopped into a larger glass of beer. By 10 each night, the restaurants and bars of Seoul are filled with the tinkling sound of a small glass rattling within a larger one, the sign that someone has just downed another poktanju.

To me, this kind of typical restaurant experience sums up everything – at the risk of stereotyping – that I love about Koreans: the friendliness, the rowdiness, the tendency to extremes. No Korean goes to a bar for just one drink – it’s all or nothing.

A Korean friend recently explained this tendency to me by reference to the weather – the country’s almostarctic winter, then an unbearably humid summer led Koreans to extremes of emotion, he said.

But to balance out all this drinking and eating, Koreans head to the mountains or to the jimjilbang – a kind of living-room-cum-sauna. In these ubiquitous public resting places, people in unflattering T-shirts and shorts (usually pink for girls, blue for boys) lie around in various hot rooms – charcoal, yellow mud, oxygen – reading, napping or chatting. There are also normal rooms where you can watch DVDs, surf the internet, have massages or eat.

The idea is that you sweat out the stress – and the soju and the kimchi you’ve probably eaten three servings of that day – or let the ions recalibrate your body. Then there is the sauna area where, after washing yourself thoroughly, you sit in the pools or steam room letting the excesses evaporate from your body.

My favourite part of visiting the sauna is the demiri or body scrub, which is not for the faint-hearted (or the modest).

To one side of the sauna, there is usually an area where you can lie naked on a plastic table while a woman (in the women’s sauna, that is) essentially sandpapers your entire body, an experience in which the discomfort is easily trumped by the invigoration.

The first time I had one of these body scrubs I opened my eyes during the sloughing to see what appeared to be long rolls of grey plasticine on the table next to me. It took me a couple of minutes to realise that it was, in fact, rolls of my skin.

These scrubs vary from sauna to sauna but during the process it is not uncommon to have green tea paste or mulched-up cucumber applied to your face, your hair washed, or a person walking along your back.

After being steamed and scrubbed to within an inch of my life, I am almost literally a whole new woman as I walk out, relaxed, on to a cacophonous Seoul street, ready for another round of soju and kimchi.

Ancestor worship

By Y. Euny Hong
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/0f721f38-ebb4-11da-b3e2-0000779e2340.html
Published: May 26 2006 15:28 | Last updated: May 26 2006 15:28
hong1
My parents have a very large, very ugly framed photo hanging in their living room. It was snapped by King Gustav VI Adolf of Sweden on one of his famed archaeological visits to Asia in the 1950s and depicts a prehistoric cave drawing of a dragon near the border of China and North Korea. The king presented the photo to my grandfather as a diplomatic gesture. It has been touted as material evidence of the splendour that was my family. I have always found this story odd, but my family has been in decline for more than five centuries, so it is important to cling to these things. This isn’t exactly what one would call raging against the dying of the light.

I can trace my ancestry 28 generations on my father’s side and 26 on my mother’s; in both cases the progenitors were Korean feudal monarchs. Here’s what the family is up to now. An uncle, who was in medical school 40 years ago, is a waiter in a restaurant, as is his son. A cousin began his career as a brilliant architect, but was unwilling to compromise with contractors and clients. While still in his 30s, he gave up on working altogether; he is now an amateur water-diviner. A beauteous aunt, banished by the family for some vague malfeasance that can only be described as excessive commonness, became a hand model in New York before falling in with some dubious rich fellow. She died in a fire in her hotel room. As I grew into adulthood, I came to suspect that she had lit it on purpose. It seems a fitting end for a goddess in her twilight: setting Valhalla aflame and going down with it.

In the US, where I have spent much of my life, most people imagine that the Old World aristocrats living among them lead fabulous lives; that they are like the most popular clique in high school. It was not like that at all for my family or for any of their fellow expat Korean bluebloods who lived here. Most of the ones I know are not gregarious at all; they are antisocial, often agoraphobic.

In his book The Periodic Table, Primo Levi compares his relatives to inert gases, remarking that such gases are also known as “noble” gases – so dubbed because they were thought not to react to things around them; to resist change. Perhaps the metaphor requires updating: noble gases do not live in mortal fear of contamination, whereas noble people do.

Most parents place restrictions on the kinds of friends their children are allowed to have, but few took it to the extremes that my parents and their friends did. From the day I was born until the day I left home for Yale, I never had a friend over at my house for dinner, unless of course their parents were friends of my parents, and they had been dragged along. Birthday parties were one of only a handful of exceptions. My parents’ unimaginative explanation was that they didn’t have liability insurance.

To avoid having to return invitations, they forbade me, on pain of thrashing, to eat or drink anything other than water at a friend’s house. Anyone who started to become close to me was put off sooner or later by my coldness and inability to give or receive hospitality. But no matter, because by early adolescence I had been fully indoctrinated in the belief that anyone outside my family was second-rate. My relatives were my only friends.

I didn’t spend too much time worrying about my future because I was too stupid to understand that while my family might have been symbolically important, it was no longer influential.

Contrary to the common stereotype that all Asian families want their children to become medical doctors, my father instilled in me and my sisters the belief that medicine was a manual trade and therefore far beneath us. He once sniped at his brother-in-law, a physician, “an MD isn’t a real doctor”. By this he meant that only academics should bear the title, as is the case in some parts of Europe. Recently, one of my sisters, somewhat estranged, called my father crying; a debt collector had threatened her with legal action. He bailed her out, as he always did, then wrote to all three of his daughters expressing deep regret for any inculcation on his part that discouraged us to learn a trade.

Upon graduation from Yale with a degree in philosophy, I found myself deeply in debt and, for a good while, unemployable. Reluctant to learn a trade, I often fantasised about being a 19th-century French courtesan, thinking that it was the only profession for which my upbringing, languages and knowledge of opera would not go to waste. Happily, I never pursued that scenario.

It is especially depressing to be an immigrant blueblood in the US if one also happens to be from an ethnic minority. The latter status always trumps the former; a price most of my family were unwilling to pay. My parents first settled here in the late 1960s to pursue their doctorates. They had three daughters, of whom I, at 33, am the eldest. When my parents saw that they had grossly overestimated their ability to live without a sense of entitlement, we moved to Korea. I was 12; my sisters were 10 and eight, respectively. It was a decision that brought extreme misery to us all. My sisters and I all fled to the west at our first opportunity, when it came time to go to university, and to the great disappointment of my father, we never resettled in Korea.

Many of my parents’ high-born Korean colleagues who had emigrated to the US as students repatriated to Korea shortly after we did, out of similar disgust.

Having at one time lived in Germany for several years as a freelance journalist, I find the continentals much more accommodating than Americans of minority bluebloods. Though Europeans are often defensive on this matter, they still take for granted the difficulty of changing one’s status, for good or for ill. They accept, with surprisingly little paranoia, that my background, education and so forth entitle me to certain privileges and opportunities, irrespective of race. Especially indulgent are the French, who coo over the fairy-tale exoticism of a petulant young Korean woman speaking their language. Not that Europeans are less racist than are Americans, mind you; but they have very small east Asian populations; I am never mistaken for a cab-driver, a job-stealer or a terrorist.

My friend Harold (not his real name), a fellow Korean-American, is distantly related to the last Korean royal line. His family is very well known in Korea, and is far more illustrious than mine. His entire family prepped at Andover (the school that moulded the Bushes) and attended Ivy League universities; they are financially comfortable but discreet about it, genteel and well-mannered. Harold now lives in Manhattan. A few years ago he entered a friend’s office building and was stopped by the concierge, who assumed that he was a Chinese-food delivery boy and told him to re-enter the building through the back door.

Families like mine and Harold’s are approaching obsolescence in our home country as well. My family’s heyday, in fact, had ceased by the time the last Plantagenet breathed his last.

It’s not modernity’s fault that my family has a poor work ethic. And despite all my father’s claims, there was never a time in the history of the world when our way of doing things would have fallen into the category of how ladies and gentlemen should behave. My family is belligerent with subordinates; we make waitresses cry.

After my family lost their feudal monarchies hundreds of years ago in some sort of skirmish with rival lords, they became court advisers to subsequent kings. Confucianism, which was in full swing by the 16th century, was the second big blow to my family line. Confucianism heavily emphasised scholarship, and consequently government posts were determined by exams. Fortunately for my ancestors, it was not a true meritocracy: one had to be of noble birth to sit for the exams. So my family was still protected, somewhat. Within a very rarefied environment, they were able to survive.

When the Japanese colonised Korea in 1919, it was not by invasion. At the time Korea was being courted by several world powers simultaneously, it had to choose one coloniser, or have the choice made for them. People like my ancestors advised the Korean royal family to hand the country peaceably over to Japan. Many Korean nobles believed they stood a better chance of retaining their power under the Japanese than the west. The Japanese government rewarded my relatives by giving them positions as viceroys, legal advisers and so forth, but with greatly limited autonomy.

When, at the end of the second world war, Japan relinquished Korea, the latter formed an independent republic. The new regime branded many of my ancestors as traitors; some were hanged, lynched or kidnapped. Very fortunately for me, my paternal grandfather was just unimportant enough to survive. Under the Japanese he had been a viceroy for a remote province in what is now North Korea; offing him just wasn’t worth the bother.

My grandfather had a stroke of luck. The purging left few people qualified to run a government, so imperial loyalists like him had to be given posts in the new government (a fate that also befell post-Third Reich Germany). He became a presidential cabinet minister.

Still, democracy proved the bluebloods’ greatest nightmare. My mother’s family lands were seized by the government and redistributed to the poor. Faced with the prospect of competing with the public at large, my family found itself unequipped for the battle of life.

My father failed two classes at the elite Seoul National University. The way he tells the story, he did it deliberately. “It was called a double-holster,” he would say. It was a way of distinguishing himself from the common upstarts who had been admitted to university based entirely on their exam scores. Those poor slobs would have to endure the humiliation of interviews with strangers in order to get jobs; my father and his family had never had a job interview in their lives.
hong2
There was just one problem: he wanted to go on to graduate school in the US. He was rather shocked to learn that the Americans did not recognise the symmetry and sublime gentility of two “F”s. American brahmins did have a tradition known as the “Gentleman’s C”, but it didn’t apply to foreigners, and at any rate an F is not a C. With some dues-paying, he got his doctorate and became a reasonably successful economist, first in the US, then in Korea. Still, he has always considered himself a failure. He is inconsolably upset that he can’t have the words “cabinet minister” chiselled into his tombstone after he’s dead.

Which brings us to the present day: we are finished.

Korea is now in its Fifth Republic, though it has only been a democracy for two decades.

An uncle in Seoul continues to wear a tiepin with the logo of his elite secondary school, though the school has long ceased to exist; it is his defiant “piss off” to the changing world around him. But he, like the rest of us, is a museum piece.

The Korean presidential election of 2002 was the most recent, and possibly final, cut of all. Lee Hwe-Chang, the fellow who lost, had gone to the same schools as my father. In fact, my father served as an ancillary adviser to Lee during his campaign. The Korean people, however, found Lee too patrician. When he lost, it was the shot heard round the world. Around my family’s world, at any rate.

President Roh Mu-Hyun, who won and who still occupies that post, is a man of the people. He very nearly wants to tar and feather families like mine. He has suggested dismantling Seoul National University, the school that educated most of my family for generations, on the grounds that it fosters an oligarchy. If he gets his way, the school will be split up and lose its grande-ecole status, as it were. My father saw the new regime as a sign of our family’s permanent disenfranchisement. He fell into a deep depression from which neither he nor the rest of my family will recover. To fill the void, he took up and dropped various hobbies. At one point, he suggested to my mother that the two of them fill their lives by taking in foster babies. (My mother’s horrified response: “We’re too old.”) He finally got out of his funk by burying himself in the writing of an economics textbook.

Still, we will never be the same. Evidence of my family’s acceptance of defeat is that no one seems to care any longer whether any of the family newborns are boys. My eldest male cousin, who would have been the head of the family for my generation, died of cancer 10 years ago. His father had placed many of the family holdings in this son’s name, because this practice seemed to have the magical effect of making the properties rise in value; using any of his other children’s names seemed to make prices stagnate. Because of a legal technicality, and the Korean tradition of honouring common law over personal wills, my cousin’s widow received a great deal of my family’s property, including the family cemetery. This would not be such a serious problem except for the fact that she has cut herself off from the Hongs. She eventually ceded the cemetery, after my father gave her a very hard time. So occasionally, the family bullying tradition does have its merits.

Still, having the cemetery is less important to my father’s generation than ensuring that someone will maintain it and organise the rituals of ancestor worship. There’s no one left. The next male in line is the aforementioned water diviner, who seems to have become Christian, which precludes it. The male after that is from yet another estranged branch of the family; the father-son waiter duo. The rest of my cousins are in the US. As for my generation, everyone keeps popping out girls – which, some say, is what happens to the weak. Our family line, in many ways, is finished.

In theory, the way our family has handled such tragedies is by convincing itself that bad luck was somehow a good thing. Whenever I have a setback of any kind, my parents repeat a fable they have been repeating since I was a child. The story tells of a farmer with a wife and son. One day a beautiful stallion wandered into their grounds; they kept it, and the villagers cried, “How lucky you are!” Then one day, the farmer’s son fell from the horse and was crippled, and the villagers cried, “How unlucky you are!” But soon a rival feudal lord came around to the village to recruit all able-bodied men into his army. Because the farmer’s son was crippled, he was left alone. “How lucky you are!” the villagers cried. The story has no end, in theory. Its veracity was borne out by several family anecdotes.

One of these is the aforementioned story of how my grandfather’s low bureaucratic rank under the Japanese prevented his execution in the subsequent Korean republic. Another is the fact that my father missed out on speculative investments in Korea for which his friends got in on the ground floor. This distressed him greatly; he blamed my mother for delaying our repatriation to Korea; if not for her, we would be making a killing, he said. It turned out, however, that the investments were fraudulent, and some of his friends are now in prison.

The lesson that my sisters and I were taught to draw from this are: (1) only idiots get excited about things, for good or for ill, and (2) good luck is actually bad luck, and vice versa.

So what happens when good luck is really bad luck, and fair is foul, and foul is fair? All words are emptied of meaning. A family can only pretend for so long that it has a healthy appetite for the absurd; soon indifference begets the desire to cease to be, and then the noble really do become inert.

Y. Euny Hong’s first novel, “Kept: A Comedy of Sex and Manners”, based partly on her family, will be published in the US by Simon & Schuster later this year.

Mr Vengeance

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/magazine/09park.html
Ian Buruma, 9 April 2006

09chanwook.190Park Chanwook does not look like a violent man. When he isn’t wearing glasses, his soft, round face resembles that of a gentle Tang dynasty Buddha. He speaks quietly and smiles a lot, more like a hip college professor than the director of an ultraviolent revenge trilogy. Pinned on the walls of his office in Seoul, among the movie posters and postcards, are photographs of his wife and 12-year-old daughter. His wife, whom he met at a university film club in the 1980’s, reads all his scripts and is his most trusted adviser. Their daughter has seen most of his films. A nice, quiet, reflective family man, then, this 42-year-old director who also happens to be a master of imagery at times so brutal that it is almost unbearable to watch.

Sitting in his office not long ago, we talked about violence, or more specifically about Park’s terror of violence. “In my films, I focus on pain and fear,” he said. “The fear just before an act of violence and the pain after. This applies to the perpetrators as well as the victims.” To illustrate his point, Park described a scene from his last film, “Lady Vengeance,” in which the father of a kidnapped and murdered child finally has the kidnapper at his mercy, tied to a chair in an abandoned schoolhouse. The father is there with his family and relatives of the child murderer’s other young victims. They all patiently wait their turns to wreak a terrible revenge on the defenseless killer.

“The father,” Park continued, “has picked up his ax. His daughter tries to restrain him. The audience expects her to say something like, ‘No, don’t do it!’ Instead, she asks him to leave the victim alive, so the rest of the family can also have a go at him. The audience laughs. The next shot shows the father with his ax dripping blood, terrified of what he has just done. The audience can’t be cynical anymore and regrets having laughed at the preparation for such a brutal act.”

Park didn’t smile while he told me this. Violence, for him, is a serious business. He may have a disturbing way of manipulating the viewers’ emotions, but as he explained to me, the focus of his work is not “the beauty or humor of violence.” As far as his films are concerned, he thinks of himself “as an ethical man.” To Park, the psychology of the perpetrator is as important as that of the victim. His main characters are often a bit of both.

Their suffering might easily be written off as a black farce were the gory details not piled up with such relentless, and in the end often numbing, force. The second film of his trilogy, “Oldboy” (2003), follows a man who is suddenly released after 15 years of solitary confinement. We see him stuffing a live octopus down his throat, battling a gang of armed thugs in a narrow corridor, cutting off his own tongue with a pair of scissors and slithering across a bloody floor in a final deadly encounter with the man who had him locked up. Ah, yes, and along the way, he commits incest with his daughter.

Park’s daughter was allowed to see “Lady Vengeance” but not “Oldboy,” because of the incest. A faint, slightly embarrassed smile illuminated Park’s face. “If it had been a mother and son,” he said, “I might have felt better about it, but since it is about a father and daughter, I would have felt awkward.”

09chanwook.2.190Park’s films are usually classed as “Asian Extreme,” something of a catchall term for a new crop of hyperviolent films made in South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong and Thailand that have garnered a cult following not just in Asia but also in Europe and the United States. The films take many of the elements of exploitation flicks and twist them — the violence is stylized and inventive, the plots often tinged with political attitudes. Both Takashi Miike’s postapocalyptic yakuza epic, “Dead or Alive,” and Fruit Chan’s macabre parable of the beauty industry, “Dumplings,” use extreme situations to underscore social ills. The two filmmakers were included along with Park in an anthology of the genre, “Three. . .Extremes,” released in the United States last year. Park has become the most modish figure in the world of Asian Extreme. Art houses and college festivals have been quick to screen installments of his revenge trilogy, his films win prizes at festivals and he was rated on the taste-making Web site aintitcool.com as the No. 1 filmmaker of 2002 and 2003. But he has also received more mainstream acceptance. In 2004, he won the Grand Prix at Cannes for “Oldboy.” Universal bought the rights to remake it and tapped Justin Lin, a 33-year-old Taiwan-born American director, with one hit behind him, to direct it.

Park is also enormously popular in Korea. In 2003, more than three million Koreans went to see “Oldboy.” Three years earlier, his feature film, “Joint Security Area” — a tale of two South Korean border guards who sneak across the cease-fire line to fraternize with their counterparts in North Korea — was one of the highest-grossing films in South Korean history. (“Joint Security Area” is also scheduled to be remade for an American audience, by David Franzoni, a writer and producer of “Gladiator,” with the story reimagined on the United States-Mexico border.)

In large part, Park’s success is a product of a newly energized Korean cinema, part of the so-called Korean Wave, which first swept Asia and then Europe and the United States. The end of Korea’s military dictatorship in the late 1980’s meant the end of rigid censorship, and the country’s film industry, once tightly controlled, began to attract a much wider audience. (Korea’s minister of culture was until recently Lee Chang-dong, whose own film “Oasis” won an award at Venice in 2002.) Many of the new Korean films are explicitly violent — Kang Je-gyu’s terrorist-thriller hit “Shiri”; Kim Ki-duk’s hard-boiled noirs; “A Tale of Two Sisters,” Kim Jee-woon’s horror smash — but not all. Some deal with sex, at times of a rather unusual kind, like the protracted love scene between septuagenarians in “Too Young to Die,” which initially prompted the Korea Media Rating Board to declare the film unfit for public viewing. Some are subtle human dramas set in the past. There are comic films, too, and then there are the television tear-jerkers, like “Winter Sonata,” which reduced millions of Japanese, as well as Koreans, to weekly floods of tears.

South Korea offers the kind of state support that many filmmakers would envy. Since 1966, Korean theaters have been required to show Korean films a certain number of days a year. The figure has been set at 146 days since 1984. (The number was halved during negotiations last month for a U.S.-Korea free-trade agreement, which prompted widespread protests from the local film industry.) The largest distributor of Korean films, CJ Entertainment, is also the owner of one-third of the country’s multiplexes, and its parent company helps to finance the productions of studios like Park’s, Moho Film. But the ease of financing and distribution do not account entirely for the success of local films, which often outperform Hollywood blockbusters, a sign, perhaps, of Korea’s new mood of cocky nationalism. “We are feeling confident,” Park said, “perhaps a bit too confident.”

There appear to be almost no limits on what can be shown in Korean films. I asked Park whether there were any taboos left in cinema at all. He thought for a while and shook his head. The only thing, he said, was a category called “outside ratings.” If the sex and violence are too extreme, then a movie can be shown only in restricted cinemas. I asked him whether any films were ever criticized for their political content anymore.

Well, Park said, “when ‘Joint Security Area’ was released, the public was quite shocked, because the North Koreans were portrayed as human beings and not monsters, but this actually helped the film commercially.” But of course “you can’t praise North Korean politics. That would be very scandalous.” Was that the only thing? Yes, Park replied, that was it. Otherwise, there was no longer any censorship. I was surprised, perhaps still haunted by memories of recent authoritarianism, and pressed him again. He reconsidered, shutting his eyes in thought. Well, he said, “there is one thing that can never be said in Korea. You could never say that the Japanese occupation of Korea had been beneficial. That would create even more hostility than a movie praising North Korea. It would be like telling Jews that the Holocaust didn’t exist.”

From a man who revels in moral ambiguities, this was a surprising statement. The Japanese occupation lasted from 1910 until the end of World War II, and it was often brutal, but it was no Holocaust. Much of the Korean elite collaborated, as they later would with postwar dictatorships, because the occupation brought benefits too: railroads, schools, industry, efficient administration. Park admitted that the paradoxes of collaboration could be interesting and said that there were books and novels that dealt with such cases but that they couldn’t yet be touched in the movies. It is a curious notion: you can show the most terrible violence in Korean films, even children being tortured, but the cherished myths of nationalist history have to be left untouched.

Children, especially little girls, play a big role in Park’s imagination. They often die by drowning, torture or other violent means. In the short film “Cut,” Park’s contribution to “Three . . . Extremes,” he tells the story of a successful, well-liked movie director who comes home one night to find his wife tied to her grand piano by an intruder, an extra on one of the director’s films. The extra threatens to chop off the wife’s fingers one by one (she’s a pianist) if the director doesn’t agree to kill a kidnapped child, huddling in terror on the couch.

It may be that there is no contradiction between Park the quiet, loving family man and Park the master of cruelty. His films can be read as the nightmares of a doting father. This comes out most clearly in “Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance” (2002), the first film in his revenge trilogy and perhaps his darkest. A deaf-mute kidnaps the small child of his former boss, a ruthless businessman who once fired him. But that is not the reason for the kidnapping. The deaf-mute man needs to raise money for his dying sister, who needs a kidney transplant. His girlfriend, a member of a vaguely left-wing terrorist group, argues that the kidnapping will actually be a blessing to the father and child, for after the ransom is paid, they will be so happy to be together again. But when the sister finds out what he has done, she kills herself. And before the child can be returned, she accidentally drowns in a river, and the enraged father slices the kidnapper’s Achilles’ tendons and lets him bleed to death. Some of that scene is filmed underwater, making the killing more sinister, the water turning a dark crimson.

“Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance” was, for Park, a rare commercial failure. I asked him why. “In the first half of the film,” he explained, “the audience invests a lot of emotion on the deaf-and-dumb kidnapper. Then, in the second half, things are reversed. The audience now has to identify with the father. I find the structure of this movie interesting, because it forces the audience to identify with the perpetrator as well as the victim. And the audience doesn’t necessarily like doing this.”

When I first met Park in New York, after the U.S. premiere of “Lady Vengeance” at the New York Film Festival last fall (it will be released in U.S. theaters later this month), he said that only a psychiatrist could explain his preoccupation with horror and violence. In fact, however, his background offers some clues. Park’s first ambition was to be not a filmmaker but an art critic. As a student of philosophy at Sogang University in Seoul, he was mainly interested in aesthetics. Since this was barely taught at his university, he devoted himself to photography and watching films. In an interview, Park once described what happened next: “Then one day, I saw Hitchcock’s ‘Vertigo.’ During the movie, I found myself screaming in my head, ‘If I don’t at least try to become a movie director, I will seriously regret it when I’m lying in my deathbed!’ After that, akin to James Stewart when he was blindly chasing after some mysterious woman, I searched aimlessly for some kind of irrational beauty.” Park’s films, even, or perhaps especially, in the most violent scenes, have a haunting beauty whose aesthetic owes something to Hitchcock, to be sure. One scene in “Oldboy,” of the hero chasing his younger self up a stairway, rather like Jimmy Stewart in “Vertigo,” is a direct homage to the master of suspense. But Park has a visual language all his own too: sequences that even in their violence are often dreamlike (a half-man, half-dog pulled through the snow by the female lead in “Lady Vengeance” or the protagonist of “Oldboy” mutely embracing his daughter in a snowy wood); richly textured interiors and images built around a single color, to eerie, symbolic effect.

I asked Park what kinds of films he grew up watching. He said that as a child he’d had little opportunity to go to the cinema. Born in 1963, Park was raised in the last grim decades of the military dictatorship, when Seoul was still under curfew. Japanese films were not allowed to be shown in Korea, because the wounds of colonial rule were still raw. Park’s movie education came from Hollywood classics on television. “If I had grown up seeing films by Kurosawa, Mizoguchi or Ozu,” he said, “I might be a different kind of person.” Instead, he watched “Shane,” “High Noon,” “The Man From Laramie” and his favorite film, “Apache,” with Burt Lancaster as the last Apache warrior. At first, he said, “seeing Lancaster play an Indian was ridiculous, but then the idea of one man taking on the white race made me cry.” The image of Lancaster, “half-naked like Tarzan, rolling about in the desert, being cut and bruised by rocks and stones, is still vivid in my mind. I can still feel it.”

Images of physical suffering are clearly important to Park. They move him. And the images that stick in his memory appear to be mostly from Western movies. Such cross-cultural pollination is not a new phenomenon. Akira Kurosawa’s samurai movies were an inspiration to many Western directors. John Sturges’s “Magnificent Seven,” starring Steve McQueen, was a remake of Kurosawa’s “Seven Samurai,” and “A Fistful of Dollars,” directed by Sergio Leone, the great Italian maestro of the spaghetti western, was a version of Yojimbo. Less well known is Kurosawa’s own debt to Hollywood: his samurai films were inspired by John Ford’s westerns. Park is openly in awe of certain Western filmmakers. When he was awarded the Grand Prix for “Oldboy” (the jury was headed by Quentin Tarantino) at Cannes, he told the audience: “I met Roman Polanski at a party, and we had our photograph taken together. That was already such an honor that I really didn’t expect to win a prize.”

And yet, despite sharing some of Polanski’s morbid obsessions, or Tarantino’s Hollywood flash, Park’s films seem to belong to a different tradition, one more rooted in East Asia — manga (Japanese comics), anime (the Japanese form of animation that, in its adult guise, can take on a cyberpunk feel) and kung fu films, but also the computer games spread around the world from Tokyo and Seoul, are part of this tradition. Park says that young Koreans “no longer have a problem with Japanese popular culture.” “Oldboy” was in fact based on a Japanese manga, by Tsuchiya Garon and Minegishi Nobuaki. In manga, as in the traditional Japanese woodblock print that could be considered its forerunner, everything, including the sex and violence, is wildly exaggerated. And scenes are cut, not seamlessly as in a Hollywood movie, but more, as Park once put it, “like a knife cutting through tofu.” “Oldboy,” Park’s most mangalike film, is a kind of visual circus full of violent excess, at once beautiful and painful to watch.

This taste for the grotesque and the absurd can also be found in the stylized Chinese, Korean and Japanese theater, which depend on deliberately exaggerated effects and theatrical gestures. Kabuki, Chinese opera and the Korean masqued dance theater called Talchum are never meant to be realistic. Where the Japanese excelled in stylized violence — murder, ritual suicides, battle scenes — Koreans have a long tradition of humorous social satire. Like anime, Korean and Japanese computer games are part of this stylized theatrical tradition and appear to have influenced Park’s work as much as his early viewings of Hitchcock. Bending reality through digital effects, which allows the camera to jump around and move through space at dizzying speeds or to cut out an entire side of a building to follow the hero in a fight sequence in one continuous take, a technique common to side-scrolling video games, are just some of the things that make Park’s films resemble computer games.

“Funny you should say that,” Park responded when I brought up the subject of computer games. “I can see why my films remind people of computer games, but I’ve never played one. Actually, I was approached by a Japanese designer of a PlayStation game called Metal Gear Solid. When I met him, I found that there was nothing really to talk about. But I was told that I was idolized in the world of computer games.”

09chanwook.3.190There is another explanation for Park’s violent preoccupations, one based less on aesthetics than on political circumstances. He was at college in the mid-80’s, the height of the student demonstrations against the military regime. Confrontations with the riot police often had an oddly ritualistic character: the screaming students charging like a rebel army, the clouds of tear gas and the inevitable retreat. The worst brutalities didn’t actually happen in the streets, in front of the world’s television cameras, but in army barracks and police jails, where students were sometimes beaten to death.

Park, always the bookish movie buff, stayed away from the demonstrations. He was too afraid. This left him with feelings of guilt and fear that he was never able to shake off. “Young people set fire to themselves,” he recalled. “Others were taken away to be tortured. Some fell off buildings. The fear of violence made a big impression on me.” Since the 80’s, he said, “young people have fallen into two distinct groups. Those who participated actively are proud of their sacrifices. They changed society, but they also feel deprived, because they were unable to enjoy their youth. Then there are the others, who feel guilty for not having taken part. We enjoy our freedoms without having done anything to earn them. One of the worst legacies of military dictatorship is that it polarized a whole generation.”

Guilt, as well as fear, is one of the themes that run through all of Park’s movies. The bloodiest acts are carried out by people whose rage is fueled by guilt — for kidnapping a child, an act committed by the protagonists in both “Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance” and “Lady Vengeance,” or cheating on a wife, like the movie director in “Cut.” Often, the brutality of his characters is fueled by class resentment — the fury of poor, marginalized people against the newly rich. Student politics of the 80’s are also reflected in such themes as the black market for human organs, brutal prison conditions, the sexual exploitation of women and the summary dismissal of factory workers. Perhaps Park, with all his talent for manipulation, is really a moralist, working out his feelings of rage, fear and guilt in scenes of cinematic horror. By doing so, he has hit a nerve in a country whose history of colonial rule, civil war and military dictatorship has burdened many people with these emotions.

I met Park again on a wintry afternoon in a fashionable European-style restaurant in Kangnam-gu, a newly developed area of Seoul that matches the mood of his films: it is a slickly modern district of Internet cafes, wine bars, design companies and high-end boutiques. Park was dressed casually in black, as usual, but was in a more jovial mood than I’d seen him in before. We were now on his home turf. Sitting next to him was the lead actor of “Oldboy,” an affable baby-faced man named Choi Min-sik. A big star in South Korea, Choi first made his reputation as a theater actor and became famous for a variety of movie roles: a 19th-century painter, a North Korean agent, a trumpet-playing music teacher and a gangster. He has made two films with Park, playing the vengeful victim in “Oldboy” and the child-killer in “Lady Vengeance.” For someone who could be a pampered movie star, he has submitted to some remarkably grueling scenes, not just gobbling up live octopuses, but standing in icy rivers, crawling in pools of blood and being pummeled and beaten and slashed by more than a dozen men in single long takes. This last, a scene in “Oldboy,” was the hardest, Choi said. Park giggled: “Every time I called ‘cut,’ Choi would look up at me with his sad puppy eyes, and I had to tell him to carry on.” I asked Choi whether he thought there was a sadist lurking in the heart of every film director. “In his case,” Choi said, “absolutely.” Park giggled again. “Only with male actors.”

The two men seemed to have an extraordinary rapport. Choi collaborated closely with Park on the script for “Oldboy.” “We talked throughout the process of making the script,” Choi said. “This was not a case of a famous actor wanting to get his way. When you work together on a script, you have to have enormous respect and trust for each other.” Park later explained to me that he typically works on scripts by getting a lot of input from others. He has two computers on his desk, one for himself and one for his collaborators, who take part in the writing. These can be actors or other members of his staff. Ideas are thrown back and forth, lines added or deleted, narratives revised, until finally the result passes the eyes of Park’s wife. The process can be remarkably fast. “Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance,” Park told me, was written in 20 hours of nonstop work.

I wondered what, precisely, Choi’s input on “Oldboy” had been. I knew that Choi had played Hamlet on the stage. In Asia, “Hamlet” is usually interpreted as a revenge play. I asked him whether this was because Korean theater was often about revenge. He replied that the “Hamlet” production he starred in interpreted the play that way, but both he and Park quickly assured me that this had nothing to do with Korean tradition. Japanese theater is often about revenge, but Korean culture, in Park’s words, is “more about forgiving — forgiving too easily, in fact.”

Despite this rather sweeping statement, Park, quite rightly, is wary of being pinned down to generalities about culture or tradition. I had mentioned the word han to him in New York, the word that Koreans often use to define their national character. Han, like most clichés claiming to explain national character, is not easy to translate. It means something like “long-smoldering resentment about past wrongs.” I thought it might shed some light on Park’s obsession with revenge. But Park was quick to dismiss it: “We don’t like to use that kind of language anymore,” he said. It reminded him of traditional society, when women were said to carry lifelong grudges because they couldn’t have children.

Still, there are elements in Park’s films that seem particular to Korean and Japanese culture. One is the almost casual appearance of ghosts. In Park’s trilogy, murdered children haunt the guilty consciences of the living. The drowned daughter in “Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance,” for example, appears in her father’s apartment days after drowning, with water dripping from her body. (Water, perhaps not incidentally, often has sinister connotations in East Asia; bad spirits frequently emerge from swamps and lakes.) I asked Choi whether Korean ghosts were usually benign or vengeful. He said that traditionally they were both. He mentioned a mythical Korean character in the shape of a 100-year-old fox who often disguises herself as a woman. The fox is envious of humans and capable of doing them harm. But she also wants to make peace with them. “Western ghosts,” Choi said, “are evil, but Korean ghosts are about making peace. That is part of our Korean psyche.”

“Yes,” Park said with a straight face, “and I’m thoroughly sick of that. That’s why I make movies about revenge, as a reaction.” Choi smiled and nudged Park in the ribs, as if his director were a naughty child. But the fox story was interesting. I thought of the characters in Park’s movies, the good father who murders the kidnapper of his daughter, the angelic woman who exacts her hideous revenge against a child-killer in “Lady Vengeance,” the “old boy” who is tormented by his own efforts to take revenge against a tormentor. Like the fox-woman, they are all soaked in moral ambiguity.

One thing conspicuously lacking in Park’s fearful world of murder and revenge is sexual passion. There are sex scenes in his movies, to be sure: incest in “Oldboy”; men masturbating to the sound of a moaning woman in the apartment next door in “Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance”; lesbian prison scenes in “Lady Vengeance.” But none of these scenes are joyful or even erotic. Passion, in Park’s films, is between fathers and daughters, or between siblings. With one possible exception: “Joint Security Area.”

There is undoubtedly passion in it — between the men. As the two South Korean border guards become increasingly comfortable slipping across the cease-fire line to visit their North Korean counterparts, they drink and sing, exchange presents and horse around like little kids. When they are discovered by a North Korean officer, two North Koreans are killed in the shootout that ensues. One of the South Koreans manages to get back to the South Korean side safely. The other is wounded. Rather than implicate his buddies, on both sides of the border, one of the men ends up committing suicide.

“Joint Security Area” is a melodrama that perfectly expresses the modishly left-wing nationalism that grips many young South Koreans today: North Koreans are depicted as mostly nice, gentle people; much of the brutality is in the South; and the partition of Korea is the work of foreigners. What is remarkable about this film is not the passionate male bonding but the sentimentality. Even Park loses his hard-boiled airs when it comes to national sentiment.

Violence, of course, can be a form of passion, and sometimes perhaps the only form of human communication. Park’s films describe a world without much physical contact, a society in which the traditional comforts, and constrictions, of family relations, or any collective social life, have disappeared; in which individuals are locked in their private spaces, communicating through the Internet or other mechanical devices. South Korea is one of the most wired societies in the world. Earlier, in Park’s office, I asked him if violence, even imaginary violence, was perhaps an exaggerated response to this virtual new world, an extreme form of human contact.

Park didn’t answer my question immediately, but took his time, screwing up his eyes, working up a coherent answer, and then went off on a political riff on the nature of modern society. “Because of capitalism,” he said, “relationships between people and their communities — family, or clan, or region — have largely broken down, especially in Asia.” He had told me earlier that compared with filmmakers in the West, Koreans were “more sensitive about the tensions between individuals and society.” The characters in his films, he said, were “bound to feel lonely and isolated from the world.” That is why he often shows them communicating by e-mail or mobile phones, instead of actually seeing one another. “This puts a distance between people, leading to misunderstandings, which is interesting.”

The same could be said of any modern society, but then Park told me a story that showed how much tradition can matter, even in cyberspace: “A young woman, working in our office, fell in love with a man through the Internet. The young man was so taken with her that he not only scrutinized her blog but followed all the links in her blog as well. He traced her family relationships, but also her entire private history, including her boyfriends going back to high-school days. Not only their names, but even their digital pictures came up through the links. In the end, he knew everything about her, without having to hire a detective.”

Park continued: “You might find this invasion of privacy a bit scary, but young Koreans like it. It is, in a way, a revival of village life, a revival of community, where everyone knows everything about everyone else.” But it is a peculiar community, where human intimacy takes place without physical contact. I returned to my question about violence. “Yes,” Park said, “violence is a form of communication, whether good or bad — that isn’t the issue. It is symbolic of a kind of human communication.”

Park’s films, then, reflect the virtual nature of our contemporary world, as well as the Korean past, soaked in blood and guilt and oppression. Park has responded to harsh political issues in the way East Asian writers, painters and playwrights have so often done before, by expressing their violent emotions in fantasy, by stylizing cruelty and exorcising fears by acting them out in a world of irrational beauty. Perhaps it is this, more than anything, that has made Korean, Chinese and Japanese directors into such masters of the absurd. Park’s next film will feature a combat cyborg who falls in love with a thief of human souls — in a mental hospital. Things cannot get much stranger than that.

S Korea’s soap operas win fans across Asia

By Anna Fifield
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1/e66c48cc-4d29-11d9-b3be-00000e2511c8.html
Published: December 13 2004 17:13 | Last updated: December 13 2004 17:13

With his floppy hair, sweet smile and displays of raw emotion, it seems Bae Yong-joon is every Korean woman’s ideal man. Increasingly, he is every Japanese, Taiwanese, Chinese and Vietnamese woman’s dream too.

The star of South Korea’s wildly popular soap opera Kyoul Yonga (Winter Sonata), Bae might be written off as a wimp in a western drama. But he has won millions of hearts in his home country and across Asia.

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“He is so gentle and sweet. I like seeing such a pure man and such pure love,” says Park Sun-hee, a 46-year-old Seoul housewife. Part of the wider Hallyu (Korean wave) spreading through Asia, tear-jerking soaps such as Winter Sonata are giving Korea new-found kudos across the region and boosting tourism revenues, as well as providing something of an escape from reality.

To western eyes, these programmes seem slow and old-fashioned. But their traditional romantic themes have been a hit, particularly among ajummas, or housewives. “I like the classic love story,” says Park Yun-hee, a 50-year-old estate agent. “It reminds me of my youth and shows me what I couldn’t experience at the time.”

These soaps, which also include Autumn in My Heart and Love Story in Harvard, have a common theme: beating the odds to find true love and happiness. But unlike their western counterparts, there is no sex or even lust in these dramas. Winter Sonata is the story of Jun-sang (Bae) and Yu-jin (Choi Ji-woo), who fell in love at high school and arrange to meet on New Year’s eve, before Bae’s character departs for university in the US. But Jun-sang is hit by a car on the way to meet Yu-jin and she hears he has been killed. Years later though, they meet again it turns out he only had amnesia. So they embark on a second winter romance. Then he has a second car accident and becomes blind.

The population of Seoul is now bombarded by bespectacled Bae’s wholesome smile on advertisements for Lotte department store, LG Telecom and apartment buildings. If he launched a wave in Korea, Bae is a tsunami in Japan, where he is affectionately known as “Yon-sama”. About 5,000 women, most middle-aged, flocked to Tokyo’s Narita airport last month to greet Bae. Ten sustained minor injuries in the rush to see him. The almost courtly love of Korean dramas translates well across Asia, especially among the ajummas.

“Many people want to turn the clock back 20 or 30 years because Korean and Japanese society has changed so much in that time,” says Ma Dong-hoon, professor of cultural studies at Korea University.

The right mix of fantasy and reality also helps. “People here don’t like heroes like Arnold Schwarzenegger. They like the idea of someone they can find in everyday life,” Prof Ma says. The popularity of these soppy soaps contrasts with the heartache involved in many Korean and other Asian relationships, says Michael Breen, author of The Koreans.

“Even though most coupling is now through love marriages, parents still have so much influence that if they are not happy with their child’s choice of partner they put so much pressure on them that they often break up,” Mr Breen says.

Hallyu is not just spreading culture out from Korea, it is also drawing people in. The number of tourists coming to Korea to attend concerts or visit locations where films and television dramas are filmed is expected to double this year to 400,000. There is already overwhelming demand to visit the ski resorts and hotels featured in Winter Sonata. But now even a cancer hospital is getting in on the act, planning to offer tours of room 348, where Bae’s character stayed while undergoing treatment for a brain tumour.

With Korean airlines reporting strong demand because of “Yon-sama syndrome”, the Korea National Tourism Organisation thinks the total economic impact effect of Winter Sonata could hit Won1,000bn ($937m, €709m, £490m) this year.

As an economic phenomenon, Hallyu has been a boon to South Korea’s stagnating economy, but it is the social aspect that is now causing a commotion.

Especially noteworthy is the popularity of Korean drama in Japan, given the bad blood between the two countries since the end of Japanese colonial rule with the second world war.

“Fans of Winter Sonata are women in their 40s and 50s, the age group that has the most discriminating attitude towards Korea,” says Lee Hyang-chul, professor of Japanese studies at KwangWoon University in Seoul. “They saw negative aspects like the war and periods of dictatorship, so they were very ignorant about Korea. But now their attitudes are changing and they are looking at Korea differently.”

GIs’ vigil honors teens killed by truck

Photo captions from Stars and StripesBy T.D. Flack, South Korea bureau chief
Pacific edition
Stars & Stripes
Thursday, June 20, 2002

CAMP HOWZE — A single row of seven empty chairs faced a nearly 400-soldier formation. Instead of grieving family members, a single lit candle stood in front of each chair.

It wasn’t supposed to be that way.

The families of two 13-year-old girls who were killed by a U.S. Army tracked vehicle on June 13 declined an invitation to Tuesday night’s candlelight vigil at Camp Howze.

The girls were killed when the 60-ton vehicle from the 2nd Infantry Division’s Bravo Company, 44th Engineer Battalion at Howze ran them over near the Twin Bridges training area last week. The soldiers planned the vigil to remember the girls.

As an Army band played soft music and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters drifted lazily overhead, soldiers slowly marched into the base club’s parking lot.

Soldiers lined up in rows in the grass as their platoon leaders barked cadence. Many glanced toward the podiums and two large Korean funeral wreaths of white flowers. “We pray for your soul,” was written on each wreath in Korean characters and an expression of sympathy was written in Chinese characters.

Staring silently back at the soldiers were the girls, their images caught on film and blown up into large photos.

Somewhere in the ranks stood the two crewmembers who were in the tracked vehicle when it struck the girls. South Korean officials identified the driver as Sgt. Mark Walker but didn’t provide the other soldier’s name. Base officials have turned down requests for interviews with the soldiers because of an ongoing investigation.

Many of the soldiers — as many as could fit in the chapel — had been to a battalion memorial at 6 p.m., said Maj. Dale Kornuta, 44th Engineer Battalion executive officer. He said about 250 soldiers filled the pews for a somber 45-minute ceremony before the vigil.

VIPs sat behind the families’ empty chairs — including Maj. Gen. Russel Honoré, 2nd Infantry Division commanding general; Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller of U.S. Forces Korea; Brig. Gen. Philip Coker, 2ID assistant division commander for movement; and Republic of Korea military and government officials.

While the base holds services for its own troops, this is the first case most people knew of in which South Koreans were honored.

The memorial was planned, said 2ID’s chaplain, so the community could draw closer in the aftermath of the accident.

“We grieve together as a community,” said Lt. Col. Jack Van Dyken. “In the aftermath of 9/11, we saw how important it is to come together. We knew that this was a time for us to draw together here.”

He said the U.S. soldiers wanted to help the families grieve and bring their own closure.

Honore, one hand cupping the flame on his candle, slowly led the dignitaries into the formation, where they lit the soldiers’ candles. Soldiers in the companies were softly bathed in the candlelight, with their faces lit below their black berets.

As the soldiers held their candles, they sang the first stanza of “Amazing Grace.” The Korean national anthem preceded “The Star-Spangled Banner” before the final prayer.

After the ceremony, the VIPs placed their candles at the base of the wreaths and photos. The soldiers spontaneously followed suit, with the whole formation slowly filing up to place candles on the ground. Many soldiers bowed their heads; some paused for a long look at the photos.

“The reason we’re here is to provide peace,” Honoré said. “Incidents like this hurt our hearts.”

Bottoms Up / Smoke Signals

Korea’s avid drinkers and smokers offer a market opportunity – but not without risks

Heading a foreign business association can be a routine, even dreary task. Not for Jeffrey Jones. The president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AmCham) recently starred in a TV ad warning against the demon drink: specifically poktanju (boilermaker), a potent cocktail of whisky and beer, made more so by the custom of knocking it back in one and instant refills. Poktanju’s victims include a senior prosecutor who in 1999 after several too many – for lunch – boasted of entrapping a union in a strike and implicated the justice minister. Both were sacked. This year, a female ruling party MP blamed the brew for her uttering unladylike obscenities.

Koreans tend to bridle at lectures from foreigners, as when told not to eat dogs – which few in fact do – by the likes of Brigitte Bardot and FIFA’s Sepp Blatter. But Jones is different. Long resident in Seoul, he has changed AmCham’s approach – without compromising on the issues – from confrontation to partnership. Married to a Korean and fluent in the language (a rarity that goes down well), ready to praise as well as blame, he is seen as “one of us”. The 45-second ad, carefully conceived, portrays poktanju as letting the side down, even disgracing the ancestors.

That may be better PR than history. Most early foreign contacts with the hermit kingdom noted that even then Koreans liked a drink – and a smoke. Today, foreign businesses must still brace themselves for the rigours (and prodigious cost) of their Korean peers’ idea of a good night out. One who passed the poktanju test – Wilfred Horie, till recently CEO of Korea First Bank (KFB) – credited his US Special Forces survival training: “As long as you don’t have more than five, you should be OK”. (A theory on Horie’s sudden departure is that Newbridge Capital, who own KFB, feared that the Japanese-American, initially controversial, had become too Korean.)

Champion boozers
But one person’s headache is another’s market. Statistics confirm that South Koreans are world-class drinkers. In 1999 they put away 64 litres per head; the true average is higher, allowing for women – who drink less, but are catching up – and children. But they are particular about what they imbibe. According to the Korea Alcohol and Liquor Industry Association (KALIA), this comprised 72 bottles (500ml) of beer, 64 bottles (360ml) of soju (the local white spirit), 0.37 bottles (750ml) of whisky, and 5.2 bottles (750ml) of makkoli (traditional rice wine). KALIA does not even keep figures for grape wines, which account for under 1% of all alcohols sold.

Last year’s figures show slightly less consumption and a shifting balance. In 2000 46m Koreans downed 2.9bn litres, for an average of 63 litres. This time the breakdown was 81 bottles of beer (more), 52 of soju (less), 4.9 of makkoli (slightly less), and 0.67 of whisky (almost double). The figure for whisky – other estimates are higher – is set to rise further. South Korea is the world’s fifth largest market for Scotch. Imports in the first half of 2001 were 40% up on last year, and total whisky sales (both local and imported) may double this year to reach Won1.2trn ($923m).

Whisky galore
In Korea, any cocktail mixing excess with a foreign dimension produces predictable hysteria. With fur coats and golf clubs, liquor is a staple of the commerce ministry MOCIE’s moralistic press releases deploring “luxury” imports. Admittedly it is striking on both counts to learn that last April South Korea imported more alcohol ($25m) than cars ($20m). In similar vein, linking rising whisky sales to poktanju, the Korea Times wonders “if our culture is being duped by the global liquor industry”. In truth, it is hard to imagine the makers of Ballantine’s 17 Year Old – the brand of choice: Korea is its top market worldwide – being any happier at seeing it blended with beer, than French vintners are at the Chinese habit of adding sugar to vintage red wine.

But a market is a market; and as ever, the distinction between local and foreign is blurry. Jinro Ballantines, who make the best-seller, is as its name suggests a joint venture. In that sense most whisky consumed by Koreans is made in Korea, and adapted to Korean tastes. Whisky as such has long been the most popular western spirit in Korea. Poktanju seems to date from the 1980s, while premium brands ironically took off in the 1997 financial crisis. The top end is booming, and the sky is the limit. In April Macallan introduced a 52-year old brand, priced at a modest W5m ($3,760) a bottle. Seven bottles were sold even before the launch: the annual target is 50.

Save our spirits
Such conspicuous consumption (or investment) apart, soaring sales are a mix of rising incomes, changing taste patterns – and globalization. Until two years ago imported spirits faced a 100% tariff, while soju was taxed at only 35%. The EU complained, and the WTO ruled this illegal. From January 2000 taxes were equalized at 72%, raising the price of soju 27% to W890 a bottle while whisky fell 13% to W29,000 on average. That still vast differential gave nationalist protests a populist edge: soju being seen as everyman’s drink, while whisky is for the wealthy.

In the event, fears for the demise of soju proved overdone. Though sales fell in 2000, this was more a shift to beer, on which tax rates were cut from 130% to 100%. Now soju is bouncing back. Sales rose 22% in the first half, after the main maker – Jinro, once again: it has over 50% of the market, with a clutch of mainly regional firms sharing the rest – introduced an upmarket mild brand with lower alcohol content. (A similar strategy has paid off for cigarettes: see box.)

A tale of two chaebol

But while soju remains in Korean hands, the rest of the sector has indeed undergone a foreign invasion – due mainly to the vicissitudes of the two second-tier chaebol who used to dominate the market. Jinro (pronounced “Chillo”) declared bankruptcy in 1997 with debts of W1.4trn, and remains technically under “workout” status. Allied Domecq saw its chance, and in 1999 paid $120m for 70% of Jinro’s whisky business, then as now the market leader. Jinro also sold its beer interests for W480bn, as well as other assets including Seoul’s inter-city bus terminal.

For Doosan, the 11th largest chaebol, divestiture has been even more thorough – and somewhat more voluntary. Doosan is in some ways a very traditional Korean firm: being both the oldest (founded in 1896) and the first to hand control on to a fourth generation of its family owners, when Park Jeong-won at 39 succeeded his father as group president in October. Yet it has also been one of the boldest restructurers, selling even crown jewels – and before necessity dictated.

Only here for the beer
Thus in 1998 Doosan sold the whole of its share in its joint venture whisky business, which had 41% of the local market, to its partner Seagram. Even more radically, for a group which until 1998 went by the name of its best known brand, OB (Oriental Breweries), Doosan is getting out of beer. In 1998 it sold half of OB, which has 47% of the local market, to Belgium’s Interbrew. A year later, though, it acquired Jinro’s former joint venture with Coors; after an auction which prompted the US firm to allege malpractice and pull out of Korea. But then in June this year Doosan sold 45% of OB to Hops Cooperatieve, a Dutch investment firm, for W560bn; keeping just 5% and its status as Interbrew’s Korean partner. All this reflects a desire to cut debt, shed what are now non-core businesses, and focus on – power generation. Last year Doosan bought Hanjung, a state-owned power plant manufacturer, and it is now eyeing various bits of Kepco. But chaebol habits die hard: Doosan insists it plans to stay in soju, where it ranks at no. 3.

By contrast, Hite, the other big player in South Korea’s W2trn beer market – growing at 10% a year – focuses solely (“sorely”, according to its website) on this sector. With expected sales of W700bn this year and a debt-equity ratio well under the official 200% target, Hite stresses both its business and nationalist credentials. Yet in 1999 Carlsberg paid $100m to take a 16% stake, while Hite’s shares are a blue chip favourite of foreign equity investors.

Wine and dine
Overall, despite high consumption and a strong foreign presence, the Korean drinks market still has further potential. In spirits the challenge is to extend tastes beyond whisky, and get people to drink at home: only 20% of whisky is bought by households. In beer too, it would be good to widen the available range: the best sellers are all bland US-style lagers, which it is feared will disappoint (but hardly inebriate) the hordes of football fans arriving next summer. Remaining barriers to trade include a bizarre ban on microbreweries, which the EU chamber of commerce hopes to see lifted in time for the World Cup. And in wine, a whole market waits to be created.

Meanwhile, BA’s correspondent – who has researched this article exhaustively over many years – will happily stick to cheap and cheerful soju, and sends seasonal greetings to all our readers.

Smoke signals
As with booze, so for fags. Tireless rankers as they are, one statistic Koreans could do without is being the world’s top smokers. In 1997, according to WHO, 68% of South Korean men lit up. Despite desultory health campaigns, the figure has hardly sunk since – and women are smoking more. Last year the health ministry reported another dubious global record: 42% of male high school students smoke, way ahead of the US (28%) and Japan (26%). At about W7trn annually, South Korea’s market is the world’s ninth largest – and one of the few in OECD still growing.

Even more so than alcohol, not only was tobacco for decades a protected sector in South Korea, but the state ran it. The quaintly if accurately named Office of Monopoly begat Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation (KTG). Now in process of privatization, KTG still dominates the field – but it is no longer a chasse gardee. The market has been open for a decade, yet at first foreign brands were deemed unpatriotic. But in recent years penetration has risen sharply: from 4.9% in 1998 to 6.5% in 1999, 9.4% in 2000, 14.6% in the first half of 2001, and 15.2% as of October. KTG attributes this to young smokers’ view that local equals cheap and nasty; it has launched an upmarket milder brand called Cima, to compete with the likes of Dunhill and Mild Seven.

Get in there
A new trend is a shift from imports to direct investment, On November 26th, British American Tobacco (BAT) broke ground on Korea’s first foreign-owned cigarette factory. With an initial investment of W100bn, rising to W1.4trn (over $1bn) during the next decade, it plans at first to produce 400m packs or 8bn cigarettes a year by 2004, as against the 6bn it currently sells. Its competitors are not far behind. Philip Morris, with 6.6% of the market to BAT’s 4.4%, will choose a site soon. Japan Tobacco International, makers of Mild Seven, is expected to follow.

There are two reasons for this rush (besides the lure of all those puffing schoolboys). Foreign cigarette plants, banned until as recently as last July, have suddenly become compulsory for all serious market players. As a quid pro quo for unbanning FDI, a 10% tariff on foreign cigarettes was imposed from July, which will rise in stages to 40% by 2004. The original plan to slap on the full 40% right away was deferred, in the hope of avoiding trade friction – but the USTR, which in the Clinton era fought shy of defending US tobacco firms, is complaining anyway.

KTG: seeking a suitor?
Meanwhile KTG’s privatization is moving forward faster than most in Seoul. Over the past two years it has spun off its ginseng business (but kept the name), and released successive tranches of equity to both local and overseas buyers. In October Seoul sold off a further 20% of its 53% stake for $550m: $310m in global depository receipts (GDRs), and $240m in exchangeable bonds (EBs). Current plans are for the three state-owned banks which own the remaining 33% – the main shareholder is Industrial Bank of Korea, with 19% – to divest locally by next April; but that deadline could be postponed if there is a risk of swamping the stock market.

Up to now, the privatization process had been designed to keep control firmly in Korean hands. But on November 29th, while denying press reports that it had already found a foreign partner, KTG admitted it has had talks with several candidates – and that this is its long-term aim. Long may mean soon, if it keeps on losing market share. There are pull as well as push factors. KTG has global ambitions – one export market is, or was, Afghanistan – but can hardly go it alone.

In good health?
There should be no shortage of suitors. KTG’s third quarter profits were up 58% on last year, due to better margins on pricier brands which by September comprised 49% of its sales. While turnover rose from W1.2trn to W1.3trn, net income was up from W64.7bn to W102.1bn. For the first 9 months, profits rose from W177bn to W264bn on sales up from W3.3trn to W3.5trn.

The figures are healthy enough; but what of the customers? Korean obsessions with health on other fronts – prolonged inspections of fresh food imports, sometimes passing their sell-by date, are a perennial bone of contention – that an anti-smoking backlash may be just a matter of time. When it comes, no doubt foreigners will be blamed as usual – if undeservedly. In September, an opposition MP admitted that both tar and nicotine levels were higher in Korean cigarettes.

Beat Poetry

Jang Sun Woo Tops From the Bottom
Chuck Stephens
Tuesday, November 21st 2000
http://www.villagevoice.com/2000-11-21/film/beat-poetry/1

“Think of my dick as shit,” a middle-aged dude in the South Korean sex farce Lies tells his teenage lover, as he prepares to plumb what the film’s intertitles refer to as her “Third Hole.” “That will make it easier.”

1930666.47Jang Sun Woo’s Lies is a raunchy/funny, fascinating/tedious, and ultradry comedy about a sculptor, a schoolgirl, and the dozens of sticks, switches, and staves the couple use to impress their passion upon one another. “Y” (played by 22-year-old fashion model and real-life nonvirgin Kim Tae Yeon) initiates an affair with “J” (played by 39-year-old first-time actor and real-life sculptor Lee Sang Hyun) to spare herself the fateful deflowering that her sisters endured at the hands of rapists. Y finds that she enjoys J’s rough and rabbity approach to sex, and when J suggests that their lovemaking include a little bastinado, Y agreeably takes control of “the stick that makes everyone happy,” and beats her own path into the future.

Is Lies the “tender love story” Jang was talking about? If so, then perhaps “tenderized” would be the more exact term, since Lies is an excruciating valentine to his long-term creative partners and inadvertent collaborators, the Korean censors. “The original idea for Seoul Jesus,” said Jang of his first film, begun in 1985 but not released until 1988, “was to climax with the protagonist’s crucifixion, but the censors told us we needed to change it to a happier ending.” He’s been—as dominatrices like to say—topping from the bottom ever since. In 1998, when the censors demanded Jang cut Timeless, Bottomless Bad Movie (about glue-huffing street kids in Seoul) by more than 30 minutes, he calmly complied, and even went so far as to shorten the film’s title. “Dear Censorship Board Members,” heckles the remonikered Bad Movie’s press kit, “Thanks for chipping in on the editing.”

Based on the controversial (and ultimately banned and burned) novel Tell Me a Lie, by Jang Jung Il—the first writer in Korean history to be jailed as a pornographer—Lies became Korea’s fifth highest-grossing film of the year as of July, its proceeds roughly equal to those of a pseudo-scandalous import called American Beauty. Negative reactions have come mainly from outraged citizens’ groups and members of the international press—and without their righteous indignation, it’s unlikely U.S. audiences would have had the chance to see Lies at all.

Lies may not be the best introduction to Jang’s cinema of provocation, or to recent Korean film (Im Kwon Taek’s wrenching romance Chunhyang and Lee Myung Se’s cartoon policier Nowhere to Hide both open here in the next few weeks). For Jang, it’s but a single tile in a sprawling mosaic where painstaking re-creations of Korea’s recent political past are as likely to run up against a crayon-animated blow job (in To You, From Me) as a cheapskate re-creation of an image from The Exorcist (in A Petal). Like all of Jang’s films, Liesis about more than fucking with the censors; it’s about exorcising the demons of Korea’s, and Korean cinema’s, past.

And who better to perform such an exorcism than Y, or any of the “little girls” who populate this director’s “bad” movies? Call it a theme; Jang won’t disagree. He’s got, as usual, his next two films already in preproduction. One’s a $40 million animation based on an epic shamanic poem, several centuries of Korean folk painting, and the life of an abandoned princess named (like the film) Bari, who redeems her loathsome father and becomes, as Jang puts it, “the Goddess of Korean shamans.” The other, a “cyber-action thriller” set partially inside a video game, is under way with a crack martial arts and special-effects team from Hong Kong. It’s called The Resurrection of the Little Match Girl. Burn, baby, burn.

Read J. Hoberman’s review of Lies here.

For the sake of lens-wiping, Lies is not an art film, an s&m retread of Lolita, a reaffirmation of patriarchal tyranny, or particularly “symbolic.” Lies is a film about fucking qua fucking, as even the redoubtable Variety recognized when, with accidental accuracy, they dismissed it for having “nothing much to say.” Now, the characters in Lies may not be having the kind of sex you like, but why should they? Jang’s refusal to pander to anyone’s libido other than his characters’ should be a cause for congratulation. Just ask President Kim Dae Jung, whose “sunshine” government abolished the former Hermit Kingdom’s Ethics Review Board in 1996, just weeks before Jang found himself at the Rotterdam Film Festival, feted by a retrospective of his idiosyncratic oeuvre and surfing the porno channels in his hotel room. “I always use sex in my films as a way of referring to political material I can’t discuss directly,” the director said after a screening of his historiographical horror flick, A Petal. “But now that the government has officially abolished censorship, I don’t think it’s going to make filmmaking any easier. In fact, a lot of Korean filmmakers are going to have a hard time figuring what to do. I think I’ll be ready to go back to something basic: a tender love story about a man and a woman, maybe.” Would the Dutch porn have any impact on his next project? “Of course,” he laughed, stabbing his finger at an imaginary remote control. “I just can’t change that channel.”